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SUMMARY
The Search fo r Equity is a theoretical and empirical study of equity.
The empirical research focusses on local education authorities and their search for 
equity according to need in resource allocation to schools. It analyses how equity is 
interpreted in practice by policy-makers constructing funding formulae, and identifies 
the main factors which influence this process and its results.
I draw upon two main sources of empirical data. First, the findings of three national 
censuses of LEAs in England, conducted in 1989, 1991 and 1992. The censuses show 
up great variety in LEA formulae, and also a high degree of flux over the study period. 
The factors influential in shaping LEA policy were meanwhile examined via four case 
studies of individual authorities - the second main source of empirical data.
Overall, I argue that there are three main features of the policy problem faced by LEAs 
which help to explain the prevalence of diversity and change: the existence of multiple 
and often competing policy objectives; the uncertainties and opportunities associated 
with the concept of need; and also problems and opportunities associated with the 
concept of equity itself.
The theoretical element of the research develops the notion of equities - different 
versions of the concept - following the lead of Rae in his seminal study of equality / 
equalities.
In explaining how equities are created, I highlight the three ingredients which are 
essential in operationalising equity in the context of resource allocation. I call them the 
focal unit, focal variable, and input-outcome relationship. This unit / variable / 
relationship approach provides, I argue, a means of mapping different versions of 
equity which is rooted in conceptual analysis rather than equity's colloquial usage. 
Indeed, I argue that colloquial usage of equity provides little if any help to those 
wishing to, or needing to, understand the concept, and go on to assert that goals of 
'equity' or 'equity according to need' are less meaningful than many seem to assume; 
such goals seem to direct policy in way which is more symbolic than real. I urge that 
advocates of equity pay greater attention to what it is that they are really advocating.
1CHAPTER 1
THE SEARCH FOR EQUITY: INTRODUCTION TO THE THESIS 
INTRODUCTION
Even if money can’t buy you love, it is still a pretty useful commodity. The 
benefits it can bring are sometimes obvious - being able to pay can make the 
difference between your child being educated in a class of fourteen or 40, between 
having an operation next week or next year. For the majority of people, however, 
paying for welfare is either unaffordable or unthinkable. Or is it? The services 
which constitute much of the welfare state do not operate on goodwill. They too 
require money, which is raised mainly through taxation, both nationally and locally. 
Hence, what exists is a general and systematic separation between the paying for 
and the receiving of some of our key social services, such as education and health.
This separation carries with it many implications, not least the onus placed on those 
controlling the public purse to spend the public’s money wisely and on appropriate 
provision. But this is an over-simplification. Typically, the translation of money 
into provision occurs only in the last stage of complex processes. These have 
become more diverse in recent years as a result of moves towards a more mixed 
economy of welfare. However, they basically take the form of a financial cascade
in which money is allocated and re-allocated between different levels of the 
administrative hierarchy, or different parties in welfare production.
Despite much rhetoric about choice and the empowerment of service users, and 
certain policies designed to turn rhetoric into reality, most of us have no direct say 
at any stage of this financial cascade; we have to rely on others to make allocation 
decisions for us. For this reason alone, the actions of allocators deserve close 
scrutiny.
In the social services, it is common to find allocators’ actions directed towards the 
achievement of equity. Equity is an intriguing concept. It is undeniably a principal 
resident of the social policy pantheon. Moreover, it seems to be a popular goal; a 
flag which few would refuse to march behind. But what is equity, and to what 
does the catchphrase ‘equity according to need’ refer? Many answers seem 
possible. This is because the two propositions at the heart of equity - ‘treat equals 
equally and unequals unequally’, and ‘to each X  according to its T  (explained in 
Chapter 4) - make general, not specific, demands. Thus, the application of equity 
to real situations is very much left open to interpretation by those entrusted with 
policy-making.
This realisation implies the need to look at the characteristics and impact of actual 
allocation policies, if understanding about equity is sought. And if that approach is 
pursued, questions flow. What does equity look like when ‘brought to life’? Does 
it take one or a variety of forms? What are the main factors which play a part in
shaping manifestations of equity? And does equity peacefully co-exist or conflict 
with other policy goals? These are the general questions addressed in this thesis 
which is based - in part - on a research project of mine, ‘Social disadvantage and 
LEA resource allocation to schools’, funded by the ESRC (grant number ROOO 
232 504).
THE RESEARCH LABORATORY: FORMULA FUNDING
Having established key questions, a context is required in which to seek answers. 
My study examines the resource allocation policy known as formula funding which 
operates in the education system. Formula funding forms part of the Local 
Management of Schools policy, introduced via the 1988 Education Reform Act. 
Formula funding, which came into effect in 19901, provides an excellent laboratory 
for this study, as the following, diverse points illustrate.
Equity
The achievement of equity according to need is clearly a goal in formula funding. 
Indeed, as will be shown in Chapter 2, LEAs are legally obliged to achieve an 
equitable allocation of funds to schools. Beyond this, however, equity is left 
imprecisely defined. Thus it is left to policy-makers to operationalise the concept 
and find means of expressing it in policy.
As will be explained in the next chapter, inner London authorities began to introduce 
formula funding in 1992.
4Potential for variety
As its name implies, formula funding involves the use of an allocation formula. 
However, a national funding formula does not operate. Instead, each and every 
LEA (there were 109 in England by the end of the study period) is required to 
create and operate its own formula designed to suit local needs and priorities. In 
this way, there is great potential for local diversity in the composition of LEA 
funding formulae. For this reason formula funding provides a far better laboratory 
than allocation policies where only one formula is found, such as the calculation of 
central government grants for local authorities or NHS regions.
Characteristics of LEA formulae
There are a number of further factors which make formula funding conducive to 
my research. First, the formula funding process is tied to the financial year. If 
made, changes to formulae come into effect just once a year, in April. Thus there 
are regular decision-making points at which LEA formulae can be compared. 
These comparisons may be either across authorities at one point in time, or 
historical, looking at one authority’s formula at different points in time. Second, 
the process of formula funding is intended to facilitate accountability and certainty. 
The government demands that:
the basic rules of the formula should be simple clear and predictable 
in their impact, so that governors, head teachers, parents and the 
community can understand how it operates and why it yields the 
results it does, and can include it as a key factor in their planning for 
future years.
(DES, 1988, para. 104).
5What is expected to be true for governors, teachers and parents, should also hold 
for researchers.
Third, and expanding on the latter point, the policy framework of LMS is such that 
the main constituent components of LEA formulae should be clearly identifiable (as 
will be seen in Chapter 2). All formulae must include a component providing a per 
capita allocation based on pupil numbers. Then, formulae may have up to three 
other main components: to cover premises costs, to provide protection for small 
schools2, and to cover the extra costs to schools arising from additional educational 
needs (AEN). This separation of components allows this study to analyse the 
specific component of the formula intended to secure equity according to need - 
the AEN component. The precise purpose and content of this component may 
vary from authority to authority, but in all cases it is used to take account of inter­
school variations in needs.
Properties of money
The fact that formula funding is a financial allocation policy also enhances its 
potential as a context in which to study the search for equity. One key property of 
money - divisibility - has a number of implications. Since money is a divisible 
resource down to the last penny, more than one competitor can receive a share. 
Moreover, the inherent value of money is not eradicated by division - shares remain 
valuable, and Solomonic judgements are not required. Furthermore, whether a
2 As will become clear in the next chapter, the bulk of money distributed via formula 
funding must be allocated according to pupil numbers in different schools. This being 
the case, small schools - with few pupils - require extra resources if they are to be able to 
fulfil their duties.
6resource is divisible or indivisible affects the choice of principles by which that 
resource can be allocated:
When goods are indivisible, allocation decisions take the form of 
saying Yes or No to the candidates, rather than awarding them 
some variable amount of the good. ... principles of the form "To 
each according to his X" have no application for indivisible goods.
(Elster, 1992: 22)
Thus it is only because money is a divisible resource that equity - a type of ‘to each 
according to their X* principle - can be pursued in financial allocations. The fact 
that a resource is divisible does not necessarily mean that division is unproblematic, 
however. Divisible resources can be heterogeneous by nature - land, for example. 
Money, on the other hand, is both divisible and homogenous in the sense that ‘all 
units are indistinguishable ... [and] any two equal-sized amounts are ... 
indistinguishable’ (Elster, loc. cit.).
Scarcity and rationing
There is one more important property of money to mention - scarcity. In this 
respect money is no different to the majority of other goods and resources in social 
policy; needs and demands tend to outstrip supply. But the scarcity of money is 
particularly significant for two reasons: the availability of many other goods and 
resources depends to a great extent on the availability of funds with which to 
purchase and provide them; and the supply of money cannot be increased to a point 
where all needs and demands are satiated. Analysts have thus identified rationing 
as one of the central activities in social policy. Indeed, Glennerster (1983: 2) 
describes the ‘whole complex process which determines who gets what from the
7social services ... as a multiplicity of rationing devices’. Here, the analysis is 
restricted to formula funding, one example of financial rationing3, i.e. ‘procedures 
by which sums of money are allocated between competing claims’ (Judge, 1978:
5).
Equitable rationing
Moreover, formula funding - on paper at least - displays three key features which 
Glennerster (1983) deems conducive to the achievement of ‘socially just’ or 
equitable rationing.
The first feature is rationality. Glennerster (ibid., p. 3) distinguishes between 
allocations which are ‘automatically incremental ... [involving] the mere rolling 
forward or backwards of existing patterns of resource allocation’, and those 
involving ‘some conscious choice o f alternatives or priorities’. The latter 
approach Glennerster deems necessary for the achievement of equity / a socially 
just allocation; it is also required of LEAs by the terms of formula funding. This 
incremental versus conscious choice distinction is useful but must be made with 
care. For example, the latter approach does not necessarily lead to a new and 
different distribution pattern. A conscious consideration of who should get what 
could result in a decision not to change a pre-existing allocation, or to make just 
minor alterations. Furthermore, even ‘conscious choice’ allocation policies may 
have a bias towards incrementalism built into them. Policies which place an
3 Judge (1978: 6) distinguishes between financial rationing and service rationing, the
latter referring to ‘those procedures, implicit or explicit, by which clients obtain access to 
... services’.
8emphasis on per capita funding - as in the case of formula funding - in effect limit 
the degree to which outcomes can vary from one allocation to the next.
Visibility is the second feature. Rationing decisions can be open to public scrutiny 
or kept secret. However, Glennerster (ibid, p.4) argues that:
i f ... socially just priorities are to be achieved, rationing has to be 
visible ... so that allocators and professionals can be held 
accountable for the actual priorities revealed in their actions.
As previously mentioned, LEA formulae are expected to be simple - to aid their 
understanding - and visible - open to public scrutiny.
The third feature is probability. Glennerster (loc. cit.) contends that if equity is to 
result from an allocation which takes place regularly (even if infrequently), then 
consistency and predictability must be built into the allocation. He states that:
An individual or group that is deemed to be a priority one week 
must be able to expect similar priority next week ... That is 
necessary to any concept of a just allocation.
The point applies equally well to an annual allocation procedure such as formula 
funding; as cited above, the government’s intention is that formulae will be 
predictable in their impact.
9BOUNDARIES OF THE RESEARCH
Having introduced the topic of my thesis, and before providing an outline of the 
sections and chapters that follow, I wish to distinguish this study from others in the 
field of equity research and make explicit what is not attempted.
First, I eschew the issue of whether equity should be a goal of social policy 
resource allocations. Here, my starting point is the observation that equity is 
imposed as a goal of formula funding (and explicitly or implicitly accepted as a goal 
in many other allocation policies).
Second, in the empirical part of this research, the analysis is restricted to equity 
according to needs, the version of the equity concept found in formula funding. 
However, unlike Le Grand (1991), my intention is not to advocate that version of 
equity or any other.
Third, this is most definitely not an exploration of the notion, popularised by 
Davies (1968) and used by many since, that ideal patterns of resource distribution 
can be constructed for comparison with actual allocations. Indeed, I will argue 
that (and explain why) the value of such analyses is extremely limited, and confess 
my agnosticism concerning the existence of an equitable ideal.
Finally, my thesis offers neither an anthropology nor a pathology of policy-making. 
The focus is not the minutiae of decision-making processes; a study similar to that
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of Byrne (1974) or Silver and Silver (1991) is not pursued. Rather, the focus is on 
the main factors underlying decisions, and also the implications of those decisions, 
i.e. the main factors that affect how equity translates into practice. Throughout, 
my aim is to try and understand, not ridicule, even though the decisions which 
policy-makers make are often surprising and occasionally bewildering. Such 
decisions are viewed as symptomatic, both of the complexity of the task of 
operationalising equity and of the constraints within which policy-makers must 
operate.
OUTLINE OF THE THESIS
This is a theoretical and empirical study of equity. It is composed of thirteen 
further chapters which are grouped into four main sections.
Section A
This section provides the policy and conceptual background to this study. Chapter 
2 provides a detailed description of the LMS policy, in particular the financial 
allocation mechanism of formula funding. This clarifies that in formula funding 
schools, policy-makers are ordered to achieve equity according to needs. It also 
suggests that we need to know about and understand the concepts of equity and 
need. Chapter 3 critically reviews the general literature on need and also analyses 
research on additional educational needs factors.
Chapter 4 goes on to analyse the concept of equity. In this chapter I draw upon 
the literature on equity, argue that there are some major problems with the way 
equity is often used by academic writers, and also provide my own ideas as to how 
gaps in the literature might be filled. In particular, I argue that we need to think in 
terms of different versions of the equity concept - 1 call them equities - and develop 
a means of mapping differences between equities.
Chapters 3 and 4 emphasise not only that equity and need are concepts which 
require operationalisation by policy-makers, but that they are tricky notions to 
work with. Therefore in the final chapter of this section, Chapter 5 ,1 undertake a 
selective review of the literature on policy-making and implementation.
Section B
This section is devoted to research questions and methods. It contains one 
chapter, Chapter 6, which begins by taking stock of the background information 
and teasing out issues for investigation. The methods employed in my research are 
then explained and justified. I undertook three national postal censuses of LEAs - 
in 1989, 1991 and 1992 - and made four case studies of individual authorities.
Section C
The third section of the thesis presents my empirical findings. Chapter 7 analyses 
how education authorities have implemented the order to achieve equity, drawing 
on data from the second of my three censuses of LEAs. It thus offers a snapshot 
picture of similarities and differences in AEN funding across England. In Chapter
12
8, on the other hand, I consider whether this picture changes or stays the same 
over time. To do this, I compare and contrast data from all three of the censuses I 
conducted.
The verdict of chapters 7 and 8 is that the pursuit of equity across England is a 
process characterised by diversity and change. But the census data does not reveal 
why this is so. This is the task of chapters 9 to 12, which each present one of the 
case studies of education authorities.
Section D
The final section is comprised of two chapters. In Chapter 13 1 discuss the search 
for equity in the light of the census and case study findings, return to re-assess my 
initial contentions regarding the concept of equity itself (made in Chapter 4), and 
offer my own judgement on the concept.
Finally, Chapter 14 provides a summary and conclusion to my thesis, as well as 
identifying areas for future research.
CONCLUSION
The focus, overall structure and chapter contents of this thesis have been set out. 
As stated, the purpose of the next chapter is to provide a detailed description of the 
policy terrain in which the research takes place - Local Management of Schools 
and formula funding.
SECTION A
CONCEPTUAL AND POLICY BACKGROUND
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CHAPTER 2
SETTING THE GOAL OF EQUITY: LMS AND FORMULA FUNDING 
INTRODUCTION
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, local education authorities, which had grown up 
empire-like over a century of state intervention, were confronted by legislation 
prescribing a radical restriction of their influence: the Education Reform Act 
(ERA). The Act, passed in 1988, brought forward policies to reduce local 
government’s grip over the service, increase central control and encourage market 
forces. One policy which had a great impact on LEAs, Local Management of 
Schools (LMS), transformed resource allocation practices in education. The policy 
of formula funding was imposed, whereby [a] a mathematical formula must be used 
to calculate schools’ budgets, [b] the bulk of binding must be allocated according 
to pupil numbers, and [c] additional factors can be taken into account in order to 
deliver equity.
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, LMS and formula funding provides the 
policy terrain for this thesis. Later chapters will critically analyse the conceptual 
issues at stake, and also present and discuss my findings regarding the search for 
equity by LEA policy-makers. In this chapter, however, the aim is more 
straightforward and the content is primarily descriptive. The purpose here is to
15
introduce the policy of LMS and provide a detailed description of the rules and 
guidelines on formula funding, as found in law and departmental Circulars.
Local Management of Schools is a three part policy. First, it affects the way 
schools are run: LEAs cease to manage schools and the governing bodies of the 
individual institutions take over. Second, LMS is a vehicle by which money is 
diverted out of LEA central spending and into school budgets. For the first time, 
limits are placed on the proportion of the education budget which LEAs can retain 
themselves, centrally. The third, and for this study the most important, part of 
LMS demands that LEAs adopt formula funding as a means of allocating resources 
to schools. These three aspects of LMS are explained, in turn, in the three main 
sections of the chapter. First, however, the key texts governing the implementation 
of LMS are introduced.
THE LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE FRAMEWORK OF LMS
Under section 33 of the 1988 Education Reform Act, LEAs have a legal duty to 
prepare and implement schemes for the Local Management of Schools. The Act, 
whilst sketching the broad outlines of LMS policy (sections 35-51), contains few 
precise details for LEAs to follow. Instead, section 34 gives the Secretary of State 
delegated powers to direct and regulate the implementation of LMS. It authorises 
the Secretary of State to ‘publish any guidance... in such a manner as he thinks fit’, 
commands that in preparing schemes LEAs must take such guidance into account,
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and stipulates that an authority’s scheme cannot operate without Secretary of 
State’s approval. Ultimately, section 34 of the Act gives the Secretary of State the 
right to impose a scheme upon errant authorities.
The Secretary of State’s formal guidance on LMS has come in a variety of forms - 
DES Circulars, orders and regulations. The Circulars - two are of concern here - 
are by far the most important sources. Circular 7/88, Education Reform Act: 
Local Management o f Schools (DES, 1988), was issued in September 1988 and 
forms the basic LMS text. Its 226 sections offered authorities advice on the initial 
preparation of LMS schemes and specified the criteria which the Secretary of State 
would apply in the process of approving, requiring modifications to, or rejecting 
authorities’ proposals. The Circular was intended to provide a general framework 
for LEAs to work to and within, not a straitjacket. Each LEA was expected to 
'devise its own scheme in response to its local needs and circumstances’ and the 
Secretary of State assured that in ‘considering schemes submitted to him for 
approval’ he would give due regard to ‘the individual circumstances relevant to 
each scheme and to the merits of the scheme as a whole’ {ibid. para. 11).
Commenting on the provisions of the Education Reform Bill in June 1988, the 
Audit Commission (1988: 1) noted that the timetable for introducing LMS was 
‘extremely tight’. LEAs outside inner London were given until 30th September 
1989 to prepare draft versions of their LMS schemes and submit them to the DES 
ready for ministerial vetting {ibid. para. 3). The Secretary of State envisaged that 
most approved schemes - with or without modifications having been required and
17
made - would then come into force in April 1990 (ibid para. 4). Others could be 
granted conditional approval to operate for a limited time without fully complying 
with the Secretary of State’s wishes (ibid para. 216). The 12 new inner London 
LEAs created on the abolition of the ILEA in 1990 were given until September 
1991 to submit their draft proposals. If approved, these schemes would come into 
force in April 1992 (ibid para. 5).
Once approved, LMS schemes operate indefinitely. The only requirement was that 
LEAs conduct a full review of their scheme within three years of it coming into 
effect (ibid para. 97). However authorities are not irrevocably tied to their 
original scheme * minor and significant alterations are possible. In the case of 
minor alterations (as defined in: ibid para. 218), authorities are merely required to 
inform the Secretary of State of changes made. Significant variations, however, 
require ministerial approval. A departmental order issued in February 1990 
clarified what would and would not be classed as a significant variation (DES, 
1990a).
One of the few specific duties imposed on LEAs directly by the Education Reform 
Act, rather than by the Secretary of State via delegated powers, concerns the 
publication of financial data. Section 42 of the Act stipulates that at the beginning 
of each financial year authorities must issue a detailed statement of their resource 
allocation plans, and that at the end of the financial year they must issue a 
statement of their actual expenditure. The precise content of these Section 42
18
budget statements was prescribed by the Secretary of State in a regulation made in 
February 1990 (DES, 1990b).
The second DES Circular on LMS, Circular 7/91, Local Management o f Schools: 
Further Guidance (DES, 1991), was issued in April 1991 - i.e. 20 months after 
Circular 7/88 and just over one year after most LEAs had introduced LMS. 
Reflecting the Secretary of State’s desire to ‘extend the benefits of LMS’ (ibid. 
para. 3) it called for the implementation of LMS to be re-directed in mid-course in 
pursuit of new objectives. The detail of these new requirements is given in the 
sections below.
DELEGATION OF DECISION-MAKING
Above, it was noted that LMS is a three part policy. The first part, merits only 
brief consideration here, relates to the delegation of managerial responsibilities to 
school governing bodies.
Delegated management
Originally, Circular 7/88 specified that all secondary schools and all primaries with 
over 200 pupils should become self-managing by April 1993 (DES, 1988, paras. 
33-36). For Inner London authorities, the deadline was April 1994. LEAs were 
left to choose whether to extend delegated powers to any, all, or none of their 
smaller primary schools. Nursery schools and Special schools were excluded from
19
the formal provisions of LMS. Later, however, Circular 7/91 simplified 
arrangements by stipulating that by 1994 all schools, regardless of size or location, 
must be locally managed (DES, 1991, para. 13).
Delegated management has given extensive powers to school governing bodies. 
Local managers have 'freedom to deploy resources within the school*s budget 
according to their own educational needs and priorities* (DES, 1988, para. 21). 
No sums within a school’s delegated budget can be earmarked by the LEA for 
specific purposes. Therefore governing bodies, and not LEAs, determine the 
complement of teaching and non-teaching staff, how much is spent on books and 
materials, and how resources are deployed to meet curricular priorities.
The government foresaw a range of interrelated benefits to result from delegation 
of management: greater efficiency and effectiveness; encouragement of competition 
and market forces; and reductions to, and changes in, the role of local authorities. 
However, these factors bear no direct relevance to this research study. What is of 
relevance though is the way in which, historically, the trend towards delegation of 
managerial responsibilities has been seen as necessitating the development of new, 
formula-based forms of resource allocation to schools.
Delegated management and links with formula funding: a brief, historical 
review
Perhaps the earliest policy ancestor of LMS is a scheme referred to by Downes 
(1988:3): in the 1950s Hertfordshire operated a system whereby Head teachers
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managed a budget for expenditure on books, stationery, postage, repairs to 
furniture and equipment, and various other items. However, it was in the 1970s 
and 80s that more notable landmarks emerged.
In 1973 the ILEA launched its Alternative Use of Resources (AUR) policy which 
gave schools freedom to determine how a relatively large part of their budget 
should be spent (basically the element other than that assigned for staffing). This 
was thought to allow spending to ‘follow more closely upon changes in needs and 
priorities’ than if decisions were taken centrally (Briault, 1977: 258). The AUR 
policy also attempted to make the process of resource allocation to schools more 
rational and equitable by using the Educational Priority Index1 to financially 
compensate those schools with greatest needs.
Cambridgeshire is also frequently cited as an innovative authority in this field. In 
1977, a policy of Increased Financial Responsibility for schools was introduced. 
This evolved over a decade to a point where all secondary schools and a small 
number of primaries were under what was then called Local Financial 
Management. Schools are reported to have generally welcomed these 
developments (see, for example, Downes, 1986), however one area of dispute 
remained: schools continued to receive budgets based on historical figures and not, 
as they perceived it, their relative, financial needs. Finally, a formula for calculating 
secondary school budgets was devised which came into operation in April 1987. It 
allocated money primarily according to ‘age-weighted pupil numbers* i.e. the
The ILEA’s Educational Priority Index is discussed further in Chapters 3 and 12.
21
numbers of pupils at each school adjusted to take account of variations in the costs 
of provision for different age groups.
By the late 1980s forms of local management were found in over 20 LEAs 
(Downes, 1988:4). Also, there was a growing, if still minimal, recognition that 
decentralisation, among other factors, would necessitate fundamental changes to 
the ways LEAs funded schools. These twin developments were embraced by the 
government and plans for nation-wide local management of schools written into 
the ‘Great Education Reform Bill* presented to Parliament after the Conservative 
victory in 1987.
CONTROLLING LEA CENTRAL SPENDING
Prior to LMS, it was the prerogative of the LEA to decide how much of its budget 
would be spent centrally - on administration, services, training, etc. Since 1990 
and the advent of LMS, however, they have been forced to limit central spending 
and encouraged to pursue ‘maximum delegation* of resources to schools. Control 
of LEA central spending is the second part of the LMS policy.
A simplified model of the original resource allocation process under LMS is shown 
in Figure 1 below. The General Schools Budget (GSB) was defined as the total, 
for one financial year, provided by the LEA to spend on services in and for all 






INDIVIDUAL SCHOOLS’ BUDGET SHARES
FIGURE 1:LMS RESOURCE ALLOCATION UNDER CIRCULAR 7/88
Source: LEE (1990b)
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principle of maximum delegation, LEAs were informed that as a general rule 
‘provision should be delegated except where there is a clearly identified need for 
the LEA to retain control’ (ibid. para. 63), and that central control should only be 
retained if such practice could be ‘clearly demonstrated’ to be ‘more efficient or 
effective’ than delegation (ibid para. 10). No indication was given, however, 
concerning how authorities could or should evaluate the efficiency or effectiveness 
of delegation compared to central control.
Any form of spending or provision kept under central control was classified as 
either a mandatory exception, an unlimited discretionary exception, or a limited 
discretionary exception. Mandatory exceptions, namely capital expenditure and 
specific grants2, were not to be delegated. Unlimited discretionary exceptions were 
items which the government felt could be delegated by LEAs, yet were not taken 
into account in the limits placed on central spending (ibid para. 96). LEA 
administration, advisory and inspection services, school meals, and measures 
designed to smooth the transition into LMS (as described in: ibid paras. 94-5) fell 
into this category. The government saw less of a case for LEAs retaining central 
control over the diverse items (see: ibid paras. 68-89) classed as limited 
discretionary exceptions. From 1990, no more than 10% GSB was allowed to be 
spent on limited discretionary exceptions, and LEAs were told to plan so that no 
more than 7% GSB would be spent by 1993 (ibid paras. 96-7).
These grants include those from either the UK government - such as Education Support 
Grants, LEA Training Grants, and Section 11. grants - or the European Community.
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The Aggregate Schools Budget (ASB) was defined as the amount left after 
deducting the costs of all exceptions - mandatory and discretionary - from the 
General Schools Budget. It was also defined as the total allocated directly to 
schools by the LEA’s formula {ibid para. 98).
School Budget Share was the term used in the 1988 Act (section 33) to refer to 
each school’s portion of the Aggregate Schools Budget, as delivered by the 
formula. This amount might be managed by the school directly - where governing 
bodies had received delegated powers, or by the LEA in the case of schools either 
awaiting, or excluded from, local management.
This system came into operation in 1990. However the detail did not last long 
unchanged: Circular 7/91 brought revisions to the resource allocation process and 
harsher controls on LEA central spending. The Secretary of State wanted to see 
LEAs ‘shifting resources from administrative overheads and other central services 
to school budgets managed by governors and heads’ {ibid para. 5). To achieve 
this, a new stage - marked by the Potential Schools Budget (PSB) - was inserted 
into the original LMS resource allocation process, as shown in Figure 2 below. 
The Potential Schools Budget is the total which government judge could, in theory, 
be delegated to schools each year. It is the sum left over from the General Schools 
Budget once LEAs have deducted money for only five items, namely capital 
expenditure, specific government grants, home to school transport, school meals 
and certain transitional measures {ibid para. 6).
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*■ Excluded items
LEA central services. 
(Maximum limit of 
15 per cent of PSB 





INDIVIDUAL SCHOOLS’ BUDGET SHARES
FIGURE 2:LMS RESOURCE ALLOCATION UNDER CIRCULAR 7/91
Source: LEE (1992a)
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Circular 7/91 ruled that from 1993, the procedure for limiting LEA central 
spending would focus on delegation within the PSB. This change reflected the 
Secretary of State’s realisation that the GSB had previously provided an arbitrary 
reference point for comparisons between LEAs since it included several 'large and 
uneven items* (precisely those mentioned above which are excluded from the 
PSB). By April 1993 (1995 in inner London), LEAs had to delegate at least 85% 
of their Potential Schools Budget to schools (ibid. paras. 7, 29).
The implications of these Circular 7/91 changes are worthy of brief mention. At 
the outset of LMS in 1990, the bulk of LEA central spending was not subject to 
limits. Conforming to the 10% GSB restriction on limited discretionary exceptions 
represented a major problem only for the most ‘top-heavy* of LEAs. The need to 
meet the planned 7% GSB limit by 1993, however, left the majority of LEAs with 
work to do. DES data in 1990 showed only 6 authorities, out of 82 listed, already 
at that level of delegation (DES, 1990c). I estimated what might be called the 
‘delegation deficit* which existed at that time, i.e. the additional amount of money 
which would have had to have been delegated by LEAs if they were all to meet the 
7% target on time. It was in the order of £200 million (Lee, 1990a). Circular 7/91 
effectively quadrupled the delegation deficit. LEAs were collectively faced with 
the prospect of reducing their central expenditure by around £850 million during 
the period May 1991 to April 1993 (Lee, 1992b).
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By initiating such a mass transfer of resources from LEAs to schools, the 
government showed that it held great faith in the idea of delegated management. 
By implication, the government also showed that it had immense confidence in the 
process of formula funding - the means by which delegation of funding takes place. 
Simply stated, and all other things being equal, every extra pound delegated by 
LEAs is an extra pound allocated via the formula.
FORMULA FUNDING
Formula funding is the third and, for this study, most important part of the LMS 
policy. It forms the cornerstone of the intra-LEA resource allocation process and 
the policy ‘terrain* in which my research into the search for equity takes place.
To a great extent, formula funding came about because of the government’s wish 
to see schools managing their own affairs. For the latter to be achieved, a system 
was required whereby schools received individual budgets to manage. However 
the introduction of formula funding was also advocated in response to two other 
factors. The first was that a number of LEAs - as mentioned above - had already 
experimented, with generally positive results, with allocation formulae. The 
second factor was the government’s general dissatisfaction with most authorities* 
previous allocation procedures. As I have commented:
It was perceived by government that past allocation procedures 
were overly complex and generally incomprehensible to anyone but 
a small group of education authority officials. Worst of all,
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previous methods were thought to be ineffective in relating 
resources to needs.
(Lee, 1990b: 15)
Hence formula funding was introduced with a number of aims in mind. What 
shape does the policy take?
Crucially, LMS did not impose a national allocation formula. Instead, each 
individual LEA is required to develop its own way of calculating and allocating 
school budgets (DES, 1988, para. 104). In so doing, LEAs are expected to take 
into account local needs and priorities. But total freedom was not granted: LEAs 
were required to conform to the Secretary of State’s guidance. This guidance 
came in three forms: general rules, specific requirements, and an indication of some 
of the approaches which LEAs might consider.
General rules
Paragraph 104 of Circular 7/88, from which the quotations below are taken, 
establishes the three general rules which LEAs must abide by in constructing their 
formulae: objective needs and equity; age-weighted pupil numbers (AWPN); and 
simplicity (DES, 1988). These guide-lines remained unaltered during the study 
period of this research.
The fundamental rule regarding objective needs and equity in formula funding is 
concisely stated. The circular commands that each LEA’s formula:
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should be based on an assessment of schools* objective needs, 
rather than on historic patterns of expenditure, in order to ensure 
that resources are allocated equitably.
(emphasis added).
Second, LEAs must treat the number of pupils on the roll as the 4central 
determinant’ of each school’s funding requirements. However since the costs of 
providing education vary over a child’s school life, pupil numbers should be 
weighted - i.e. given different financial values - according to pupils’ age 
differences.
Third, whilst the Education Reform Act, section 38, stated that LEAs could 
employ ‘methods, principles and rules of any description, however expressed* as a 
basis for resource allocation to schools, Circular 7/88 added the caveat that LEA 
formulae must be ‘simple, clear and predictable in their impact, so that governors, 
heads, teachers, parents and the community can understand how it operates and 
why it yields the results it does*. Furthermore, authorities were warned not to 
include too many different factors in their formulae: paragraph 104 stated that ‘a 
multiplicity of factors will make the formula less intelligible without necessarily 
making it more equitable*.
Specific requirements
These requirements changed somewhat during the study period, as a result of 
Circular 7/91. Both old and new requirements are explained below.
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Circular 7/88 stipulated that at least 75% of the money shared out by the formula 
(i.e. the Aggregate Schools Budget) must be allocated on the basis of age-weighted 
pupil numbers3 (DES, 1988, para. 105). In allocating the remainder of the ASB 
(maximum of 25% ASB), the Secretary of State advocated that authorities should 
take at least two factors into account: variations in the costs of providing for 
children with special educational needs (SEN) in different schools; and the extra 
resources required by small schools in order to enable them to maintain a full 
curriculum.
The further guidance Circular, 7/91, made significant, if not major, alterations to 
the guide-lines on formula funding. It stated that from April 1993 (1995 in inner 
London) at least 80% of the ASB would have to be devoted to ‘pupil-led funding* 
(DES, 1991, para. 10). The term ‘pupil-led* was an innovation: it referred not only 
to funding tied to age-weighted pupil numbers, but also to pupil numbers weighted 
in lieu of factors such as a child’s special educational needs or attendance in a 
designated nursery class {ibid. paras. 39-40). Subject to Secretary of State’s 
approval, up to 5% of the ASB could be devoted to special educational needs and 
included in the 80% ASB required to be allocated for ‘pupil-led’ reasons (ibid 
paras. 103-106).
Indicative guidance
The above-stated rules and requirements laid the foundations of the formula 
funding process. Most specific details were then left for LEAs to decide.
3 Of course, individual schools might derive more or less than 75% of their budget share 
from the AWPN element of the formula.
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However, the Secretary of State offered advice in paragraphs 107-128 of Circular 
7/88 which sought to provide a ‘general indication of the approaches likely to 
prove acceptable* (ibid para. 106). Four hints were offered.
The first and, for this research, most important piece of guidance concerned what 
will, in later chapters, be referred to under the umbrella term ‘additional 
educational needs* or AEN. Only one paragraph of Circular 7/88 was devoted 
specifically to factors such as ‘special educational needs* and ‘social deprivation*. 
Even then, no mention was made of other types of additional educational needs - 
such as the needs of ethnic minority pupils - which LEAs might have wished to 
take into account. In connection to special educational needs the circular pointed 
out that it was up to LEAs ‘to determine the extent of variations ... between 
schools which should be taken into account in their formulae’ (ibid para. 115). 
For a definition of special educational needs, authorities were referred to the 1981 
Education Act4, however there was no advice on how these needs could or should 
be measured. Concerning variations in social deprivation between schools, LEAs 
were left ‘free’ to take these and other AEN factors into account if they so wished. 
Again no DES guidance on measurement was provided.
The other pieces of guidance bear little relevance to this study. The Secretary of 
State advised that differences in teaching costs should form the basis of LEA 
calculations to establish weightings for different age-groups. LEAs were also 
advised that they could protect small schools for two reasons: in order to maintain
4 See Chapter 3 of this thesis for the definition of special educational needs.
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the curriculum; and to compensate for higher than average staffing costs. And 
finally, the Secretary of State advised that whilst the costs of operating different 
school premises were, on the whole, closely related to pupil numbers, LEAs could 
include a specific premises component in the formula to compensate for differences 
in the area, type (e.g. split site), and / or the condition of school premises.
Basic formula structure
From the above, the basic formula structure, as envisaged by the Secretary of 
State, can be identified:
AWPN + AEN + Premises + Small school
Phasing-in formula funding
Local education authorities were required to have constructed a funding formula 
by April 1990 (1992 in inner London). But they were given the option of 
transferring from traditional resource allocation arrangements to formula funding 
gradually. A transitional period of four years was originally allowed (ibid para. 
127). For most authorities this meant that phasing-in would occur between 1990 
and 1994; for inner London authorities the dates were 1992 to 1996. That said, 
authorities were entitled to shift directly to formula funding in 1990 (1992 in inner 
London) if they thought that feasible and desirable.
SUMMARY
Given the amount of descriptive detail delivered in this chapter, a brief summary, 
which draws out the key issues for this research study, is now provided.
The first part of LMS - self-management for schools - is of minimal importance 
here. It is only important in as much as the government’s wish to see maximum 
delegation of responsibilities to schools led them to seek maximum delegation of 
funds to schools. In the government’s analysis, delegated management creates the 
need for schools to have individualised budgets and the need for LEAs to adopt a 
financial allocation mechanism (as opposed to previously when the norm was a 
staffing allocation plus minimal 'capitation’ funds).
The main concern for this study is the resource allocation regime created by LMS, 
and in particular the guidelines on formula construction. The limits imposed on 
LEA central spending are, again, of minimal importance to this study. It is 
sufficient to note that central government has forced the pace of financial 
delegation, and that financial delegation increases the importance of LEA formulae.
It is the third part of LMS - formula funding - which this study focuses upon from 
this point. The timetable for implementing formula funding was somewhat 
complicated, hence Figure 3 provides a summary of the schedule.
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FIGURE 3; Timetable for introducing formula funding
Year Month Requirement
1989 September Draft LMS schemes submitted to Secretary of State 
for approval / modification (except inner London).
1990 April Introduction of LMS (except inner London). 
Phasing-in of formula funding begins.
1991 September Inner London LEAs - draft LMS schemes submitted 
to Secretary of State for approval / modification.
1992 April Inner London LEAs - introduction of LMS. 
Phasing-in of formula funding begins.
1993 April Pupil-led funding to reach 80% ASB (except inner 
London).
Review of LMS scheme, including the formula, to 
have been accomplished (except inner London)
1994 April End of phasing-in period for formula funding 
(except inner London).
1995 April Inner London LEAs - pupil-led funding to reach 
80% ASB.
Inner London LEAs - review of LMS scheme, 
including the formula, to have been accomplished.
1996 April Inner London LEAs - end of phasing-in period for 
formula funding.
As has been detailed above, LEAs were ordered to develop ways of achieving an 
equitable allocation of money to schools. Equity was defined as a situation where 
schools receive resources according to their needs, but authorities were offered 
very little in the way of guidance as to how to construct equitable formulae. Much 
was left to local discretion, including decisions regarding:
35
[a] The percentage of the ASB budget to be allocated on the basis of age* 
weighted pupil numbers;
[b] The choice of which other factors to take into account, such as additional 
educational needs;
[c] The relative financial priority to be given to these other factors [i] in 
comparison to each other, and [ii] as a whole compared to the AWPN / 
pupil-led element;
[d] How factors such as additional educational needs should be defined, 
measured and funded in order to secure an equitable allocation of 
resources.
Details of LEAs* solutions to the policy problems involved in securing equity in 
resource allocation are sought in this study. However for now, it is sufficient to 
reiterate that within the legal framework of formula funding, it is for LEAs to 
operationalise the concept of equity and pursue it as a policy goal. Moreover, 
there is obviously great scope for inter-authority variations.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this chapter was to describe, in detail, the terrain in which my 
research study takes place. Hence, the Local Management of Schools policy as
specified in the 1988 Education Reform Act and subsequent ministerial guidance 
has been explained. The chapter highlighted both the constraints imposed upon, 
and the choices left open to, LEAs in implementing formula funding - a policy 
where the goal of equity is imposed. One particular choice relates to whether or 
not additional educational need factors are taken into account. To decide this, 
however, one presumably needs to know what is meant by ‘need*. The next 





In Chapter 2 I spelt out the policy detail of LMS and formula funding. In 
particular, I highlighted the fact that LEAs were ordered to achieve equity in 
resource allocation. Equity was not defined in any great detail, but authorities 
were told that the allocation of funds should reflect differences in schools* 
‘objective needs’. Thus, the policy-maker’s search for equity involves also the 
search for information and understanding on need. What guidance can the 
literature on need offer them about the concept?
This chapter reviews what is a huge, diverse and often baffling literature on need. I 
attempt to put myself in the position of a policy-maker seeking information about 
the meaning of, and also the practical operationalisation of, the concept of need. 
Thus, I plot a course through the literature dictated by the specific requirements of 
this study. First, I try and get to grips with the general concept of need. Then, I 
briefly and critically consider additional educational needs factors - social 
disadvantage, ethnic or racial disadvantage and special educational needs. Finally, 
I raise an issue which, despite appearing rather important in relation to practical
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policy-making, does not seem to be adequately addressed in the academic literature 
on need.
NEED
The concept of ‘need* sits alongside ‘equity* in the social policy pantheon. Indeed, 
Bradshaw (1972: 640) even proposes that:
The history of the social services is the story of the recognition of 
social needs and the organisation of society to meet them.
True, need is a well-used concept. So many social policy decisions are made in its 
name, so much research utilises the notion, so much has been written about it. 
However, this does not necessarily mean that a definitive understanding of the 
concept has been reached. Rather, in reviewing the literature on need one 
confronts a massive and diverse, sometimes confusing and often plain contradictory 
collection of theories, statements and uses o f ‘need*.
Being ‘in need*
What does it mean to be ‘in need’? Plant (1980: 106) states that ‘in all cases in 
which the verb ... "to need" [is] used there has to be a subject*. Hence, if 
individual A is to count as being in need, s/he must be in need of something (i.e. 
goods or services B) (Weale, 1978). But Plant, Lesser and Taylor-Gooby (1980: 
27) add another condition:
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A claim by A that B  is needed is fully intelligible only when the 
purpose for which it is needed is exhibited, and from this it follows 
that for any claim to ... need to be intelligible, the end or purpose in 
question has to be specified.
(adapted)
Similarly, Frankfurt (1984: 3) states that ‘nothing is needed except in virtue of 
being an indispensable condition for the attainment of a certain end*. This line of 
argument is important if, as Plant (1980: 108) argues:
... the citing of needs is not by itself a justification for any kind of 
distribution ... It is only when the ends for which needs are 
articulated are brought into play and regarded as justifiable, that the 
appeal to need has any cutting edge.
Thus, the contention is that statements referring to needs must take what Harris 
(1987) labels an ‘essentially triadic* form, namely ‘A needs B for the achievement 
of C*. Braybrooke (1987: Chapter 2) calls this A-B-C relationship the ‘relational 
formula of need*.
Means, ends and shortfalls
According to the literature, both B and C above can be referred to as needs, but of 
a different order - intermediate and final needs respectively. However it is perhaps 
best to view B and C as means and ends respectively: according to Taylor-Gooby 
and Dale (1981: 212), an intermediate need is ‘a way in which ... [to] satisfy some 
final need*, and a final need is a end ‘to which other activities are directed*. The
For reasons of consistency, letters A and B are used rather than those originally used by 
Plant et. al. {B andX respectively).
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basic message of the formula is that without B  - what Doyal and Gough (1991) 
term the ‘need satisfier’ - individual A will not achieve objective C. If this is true, 
A is said to be experiencing a welfare shortfall (Knapp, 1984). A welfare shortfall 
is defined as a gap between a real state and a desired state, between what is and 
what (it has been decided) ought to be.
As noted above, the literature suggests that needs become evident through 
comparing ‘is* with ‘ought*. The ‘ought* may take the form of an optimal 
standard.; for example the definition of need offered by Knapp {ibid,, p. 17) 
employs the rather abstract, ideal notion of ‘well-being*: ‘A need is said to exist 
when there is the potential for improving the well-being of an individual*. 
Alternatively, a minimal standard may be employed, for example a ‘poverty line’2: 
if income level is below that specified by the poverty line, the individual or 
household is classed to be in need. The use and implications of optimal versus 
minimal standards are issues discussed in detail by Doyal and Gough (1991, 
Chapter 6).
The use of this type of ‘is / ought’ comparison to detect need is a common but 
problematic approach. Minimum standards are relatively easy to define but tend to 
be disputed, whereas optimal standards are extremely difficult to define and use in 
practice. More importantly, differences in individuals’ capacities or potential to 
achieve specified standards confuse the issue (Sen, 1985; 1987), especially since
2 For a discussion of the use of poverty lines, see for example, Mack and Lansley (1985). 
Commonly used are poverty lines set at half the average income level (after taking 
account of taxes, benefits and housing costs, as well as adjusting for household size), or 
at income support level (see, for example: Oppenheim, 1993).
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such differences are extremely difficult to measure (Forder, 1974: 42-3). 
Furthermore, it appears that the demands of the relational formula are not met. 
This is because intermediate needs are not specified. For example, an individual 
may be identified as 'in need* because their health state departs from a specified 
standard, but the process of comparing 'is* with 'ought* does not in itself yield 
information on what that person requires in order to improve their health; is it a 
better diet, damp-free accommodation, medical treatment, a change in behaviour, 
or what?
Bradshaw’s taxonomy of need
A different form of ‘is / ought* comparison leads to the identification of what 
Bradshaw (1972: 641) in his well-known taxonomy calls comparative need (see 
also: Clayton, 1983). Comparative need is identified when individuals deemed 
equals in some respect - they have the same medical condition, say - receive 
different levels of provision. This approach does appear to conform to the 
requirements of the relational formula - those in comparative need, it is clearly 
implied, need to receive whatever it is their equals are receiving.
Bradshaw’s taxonomy also raises the issue of who may be involved in defining / 
identifying need. A distinction is drawn between normative need and fe lt need. 
Normative need is ‘what the expert or professional, administrator or social scientist 
defines as need in a given situation’ (loc. cit.). Needs defined in this way are very 
susceptible to change over time (as norms and values alter) and to dispute since the 
standards laid down by rival experts may well vary considerably due to differences
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in their ‘value-orientation’. Smith (1980: 69) develops a similar notion, suggesting 
that 'social need may be viewed as consisting in substantial part of the concepts 
and precepts of professional practitioners’.
Bradshaw’s explanation offelt need is, I believe, unhelpful; in effect, he offers two 
definitions: what people want, and what people fee l they need. Clearly it is 
possible to want something that is also needed, but it is also possible to want 
something without it being a need (and to need something without necessarily 
wanting it) (Doyal and Gough, 1991). Strictly speaking then, felt needs should be 
understood solely in terms of what people feel they need.
The fourth and final component of Bradshaw’s taxonomy is expressed need. 
Expressed need arises when felt need is translated into active demands for goods, 
services or policies. For Nevitt (1977: 125-6), expressed need is the be-all and 
end-all of need:
"need" can only be a useful concept if it is equated to a demand by 
governments or individuals for goods and services.
Not all of us would agree with the economists on this.
Need, scarcity and priorities
Whether or not Nevitt is justified in this assertion, it is generally accepted that 
needs and demands outstrip the availability of resources. Thus policy-makers are
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typically called on to undertake an ‘ordering of need to determine priorities* 
(Jones, Brown and Bradshaw, 1983: 26). In so doing, they rely upon there being:
gradations ... between those things which are needed more and 
those which are needed less. ... A person without any food at all is 
more "in need" than someone who does not have food which is 
adequately nutritious, but it makes perfectly good sense to talk 
about both people as being "in need".
(Spicker, 1988: 6).
Spicker’s point about gradations may be true, however Nevitt (1977: 127) is 
adamant that ‘If needs are ... without price tags, there is little that social scientists 
can do with the concept*. This raises the possibility that priorities may be shaped 
not only by the severity of need, but also by a range of other contingent factors, 
not least the estimated cost of the ‘satisfiers* for different types of need.
Analysts supporting the view put forward by Nevitt argue that details about cost, 
policy efficiency and / or policy effectiveness are required in order to assess the 
relative priority of different needs. Knapp (1984: 18) states the idea simply; need is 
a ‘social cost-benefit judgement*. Davies is more specific: needs should be 
expressed as ‘relative valuations of the welfare consequences of alternative 
interventions in relation to their costs* (Davies, 1977: 137). To achieve these 
relative valuations, not only the ‘relationship between inputs and outputs’, and the 
‘consequences for welfare of alternative allocations of physical resources’, but also 
the ‘relative prices of these resources’ must be known {ibid., pp. 140-1). There is 
little dispute that this is an extremely tall order.
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Relative
The existence - or not - of a set of objective, universal final needs (goals which all 
must be able to achieve for physical and social survival) is an issue which has been 
widely discussed in the recent literature (see, most notably, Doyal and Gough 
1984, 19913; also Braybrooke 1987). However, most authors, either explicitly or 
implicitly, treat need as an inherently relative concept. This means that the goals 
which form final needs are determined by social norms and values, and shaped by 
factors such as time and place, physical environment (Goodin, 1990). Moreover, 
there is a general consensus that (regardless of the nature of final needs), the things 
which are required in order to satisfy needs {i.e. intermediate needs) are relative to 
conditions and culture.
In the literature, the relativity of needs is often discussed / explained in relation to 
issues of poverty and deprivation (see: Townsend, 1979; Doyal and Gough, 1991). 
For example, the research of Mack and Lansley (1985) establishes what the public 
deem to be necessities for people living in modem Britain. Many of these 
necessities, however, have only relatively recently become available to the general 
population4. Moreover, most of those things classed as necessities in 
contemporary Britain would be classed as either luxuries or inappropriate items in 
a poor, hot, developing country {e.g. some of the clothing necessities).
Doyal and Gough, for example, argue that all humans have a basic need to secure 
survival and health, as well as autonomy and learning. They also argue that a range of 
basic societal needs can be identified. These refer to the characteristics which a society 
must possess in order to facilitate the meeting of individual basic needs - ie. production, 
reproduction, culture / communication and political authority.
For example, possession of an indoor toilet, refrigerator and washing machine (see Mack 
and Lansley, 1985, Table 3.1, p. 54).
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To go back for one moment to LMS and formula funding, it will be recalled that 
Circular 7/88 spoke of ‘objective needs’. This is a term which is little used in the 
literature on need, but where it is used - for example in the work of Doyal and 
Gough - it denotes something qualitatively different to that which Circular 7/88 
could possibly be referring to. What the Circular seems to do is confuse 
‘differences in objective needs* with ‘objective differences in needs’. The former 
actually makes no sense in relation to formula funding because all the needs 
relevant to that situation will be relative. The latter, does make sense, and raises 
the kinds of issues about need measurement addressed in Chapter, 5 which 
discusses decision-making.
Normative bv nature
As well as relativism, another key theme of the literature is that inherent in the 
concept of need is the imperative that needs should be met: ‘the very concept, 
"need”, implies judgements about interventions’ argues Bebbington and Davies 
(1980a: 165), and Knapp (1984: 17) asserts that:
For whatever reason, be it moral, ethical, religious or political, we 
are saying that an individual not only has some identifiable need 
which can be removed, but that it should be removed, (emphasis in 
original)
Barry (1990: 77) offers an explanation for this:
What makes need-satisfaction of overriding importance is that the 
failure to provide it is morally equivalent to harming someone.
46
But this stance is hard to follow through into practice. Surely, the ability to satisfy 
a need is conditional on the availability of the need satisfier? For example, it is not 
clear exactly who is harming who if there are no kidneys available for those in need 
of a transplant3. Moreover, Barry attempts to explain why needs should be met 
without specifying whose responsibility it is to meet them. This is a contentious 
issue. For example, from different moral and political perspectives, care of the frail 
elderly may be defined as the responsibility of the state, the community, the family, 
women family members, or the individual concerned (via savings).
Need in practice
Need remains a widely used and widely supported concept in the activity of social 
policy. But how should it be employed in practice? A crude prescriptive model is 
offered by Knapp (1984: 18-22). To begin with, goals or objectives - the ‘ought* - 
must be decided. Then, the existence of needs (in terms of welfare shortfalls) can 
be identified via comparison between what is and what ought to be. This leads on 
to an investigation into possible need satisfiers. Finally, there should be an 
evaluation of the likely cost and effectiveness of rival need satisfiers, which aids the 
policy decision.
Whether or not policy makers and researchers attempt to, or are able to, follow this 
model is a moot point; it certainly reflects an understanding of the policy-making 
process which is rationalist6 and uni-directional. Moreover, the model does not
s Even if it were legislated that all cadaver organs could be used for transplantation - ie.
maximum supply achieved - would this not cause some people and groups distress and
hence harm?
6 Models of decision-making are discussed later in Chapter 5.
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seem to offer much help at all to policy-makers who must decide how to ration a 
set sum of resources between rival institutions.
Or rather, the model only helps i f  we accept the economists’ cost - utility model 
and i f  policy-makers have access to all the required data. These are very big ifs. 
Indeed, as later chapters will show there is precious little evidence of practice 
bearing even the slightest resemblance to Knapp’s model.
Contention and confusion
Whilst it has not been the express purpose to do so, the brief literature review 
undertaken above does hint at the contentious nature of the concept of need, and 
of the many areas open to discussion even among its advocates. Can any goal be 
cited legitimately in need claims? How can the relative priority of different goals 
be assessed? To what extent does the relativity of need undermine the blanket 
assertion that needs should be met? Who, or which parties, should determine 
which needs are met and how they are met? Many taxing questions arise.
The review also illustrates some of the muddles which surround the concept of 
‘need’. Not least, there is no one usage or meaning of the term, ‘need’: it may be 
used as a verb or a noun; it may be used to refer to a goal, a condition or state, or a 
form of intervention.
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In moving on to review a more specific literature, that on additional educational 
needs (AEN) factors, a further issue is confronted: that in practice needs are often 
inferred, rather than clearly identified or explicitly stated.
ADDITIONAL EDUCATIONAL NEEDS
Chapter 2 pointed out that LEAs are able to take needs into account by means of 
building an additional educational needs component into their resource allocation 
formula. AEN is an umbrella term covering three main areas of concern for policy­
makers and researchers: social disadvantage, ethnic / racial disadvantage, and 
special educational needs. Each of these three areas is now briefly and critically 
reviewed, drawing on notable examples of relevant research.
Social disadvantage
A large and long-established literature exists to argue that children's educational 
experiences, opportunities and outcomes are significantly linked to factors 
associated with their social and economic circumstances, and that these inequalities 
create additional needs in the education system (see, for example: Glass, 1954; 
Plowden Report, 1967; Rutter and Madge, 1976; Halsey, Heath and Ridge, 1980; 
Essen and Wedge, 1982; Mortimore and Blackstone, 1982).
The most detailed and relevant evidence of the impact of social disadvantage upon 
education derives from two sources: analysis of National Child Development Study 
data (see, for example: Wedge and Prosser, 1973; Essen and Wedge, 1982); and
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data accumulated by the ILEA’s Research and Statistics branch in the process of 
operating an Educational Priority Index (EPI) to guide resource allocation. Here, 
ILEA’s work is chosen for discussion.
ILEA’s research into the social factors underlying educational inequality and low 
achievement began with the implementation of the recommendations of the 
Plowden Report (1967). From relatively crude beginnings, this work evolved into 
perhaps the most thorough and complex analysis in this area. Regular, mass 
surveys of pupils were undertaken, yielding data which recorded the extent of 
social disadvantage among pupils and the extent of cumulative disadvantage (i.e. 
where pupils experienced more than one disadvantaging characteristic), as well as 
educational performance data. Analysis then revealed statistical links between 
different social factors and pupils’ relative achievement, and also yielded 
statistically derived estimates of the degree to which different combinations of 
social factors impacted upon pupil attainment. The latter two features are 
illustrated by the data shown in Table 1 below, which shows the relative likelihood 
of pupils affected by different social factors (and combinations of factors) being in 
the lowest Verbal Reasoning band (VR3) at age l l 7.
All children were assigned to one of three VR bands at 10+ to facilitate a balanced entry 
group for all ILEA comprehensive schools.
50
TABLE 1: Percentages of secondary pupils with different combinations of 
characteristics in VR band 3.
Combination of characteristics
% pupils in 
VR band 3
No disadvantaging factors 10.8
Free school meals only 21.1
Large families only 13.0
Low social Class only 18.4
Disturbed behaviour only 35.8
Low social class and free meals 26.7
Low social class and large families 29.1
Free meals, large families and low class 31.8
Free meals, large families, low class and behaviour 55.7
(Source: ILEA, 1982: 9, 11)(adapted).
The value of these findings and the ILEA research is considerable, particularly in 
showing the impact of cumulative disadvantage upon pupils. However, I would 
argue that, as with the NCDS research, the ILEA findings actually reveal relatively 
little about need per se.
Final needs are not stated, but can be inferred. The implicit ‘ought* is that overall 
achievement should be comparable across groups of children defined in terms of 
certain (combinations of) social characteristics. Since achievement patterns are 
found to vary across different groups of children, need is primarily defined in terms 
of welfare shortfalls.
But quite what inter-group comparisons reveal about individual children’s needs is 
not at all clear. Need satisfiers - what it is that children with certain (combinations 
of) social characteristics (which may or may not generate needs) actually need if
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they are to perform on a par with their non-disadvantaged peers - are not identified 
via the research process, nor are the potential costs incurred by schools in 
providing for, or adapting to the needs of the child. Research involved in the 
creation of major programmes in this field, and the evaluation of these 
programmes, has generated disappointing conclusions about the potential 
effectiveness of compensatory provision (see, for example: Coleman et. a l , 1966; 
Plowden Report, 1967; Halsey, 1972; Shipman, 1980).
Furthermore, there seems to be some degree of confusion between causal factors 
and proxy indicators of need, and also between risk of need and presence of need. 
Is it the social factors such as those listed in the table presented above which 
actually cause differences in educational performance? Or is it that the presence of 
these factors has been found to provide a good indication of where needs might 
arise (even though there is uncertainty about why these needs have arisen)? 
Clearly, in the table of ILEA data, the free meals factor is used as a proxy indicator 
- it would be foolish in the extreme to argue that receipt of a free dinner causes the 
pupil concerned to experience greater educational need. However, with other 
factors, such as 'large families’ and also 'disturbed behaviour’, it is not clear 
whether these factors are again used as indicators or are thought causal of pupils' 
need. Either way, the data presented above clearly demonstrates variety in the 
performance of pupils affected by the same social factors. Whilst pupils on free 
meals may be twice as likely as those with no disadvantages to be in VR band 3, it 
is still only one in five of the pupils on free meals which fall into this band.
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The use of proxy indicators of need, and their pros and cons in practice, will be 
discussed further in Chapter 5.
Ethnic / racial disadvantage
The second main AEN factor - ethnic or racial disadvantage - overlaps 
considerably with social disadvantage. Again, needs tend to be inferred.
On the one hand, need may be inferred due to the higher levels of social 
disadvantage experienced by many ethnic minority groups, as compared to their 
white counterparts; thus Edwards (1995: 13) comments that ‘greater incidence of 
disadvantage [often] turns the morally arbitrary criterion of race or ethnicity into 
proxy measures of social need*.
On the other hand, needs are inferred from evidence which shows inequalities in 
achievement between ethnic groups, with pupils from ethnic minority groups 
achieving less well overall than white pupils. The Swann Report (1985: 62), for 
instance, found:
- In all CSE and GCE ‘O’ level examinations 6 per cent of West 
Indians8 obtained five or more higher grades compared with 17 per 
cent of Asians and 19 per cent o f ‘all other leavers’
- At GCE ‘A’ level 5 per cent of West Indians gained one or more 
pass compared to 13 per cent of Asians and 13 per cent of ‘all other 
leavers’
Swann concluded, in particular, that:
8 The term ‘ Afro-Caribbean’ would now be more appropriate.
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There is no doubt that West Indian children, as a group, and on 
average, are underachieving, both by comparison with their school 
fellows in the white majority, as well as in terms of their potential, 
notwithstanding that some are doing well 
(ibid, p.81)
In part, it is argued, these ethnic / racial inequalities are explained by the relative 
socio-economic position of different ethnic groups (Smith and Tomlinson, 1989; 
Swann Report, 1985; Archer, 1988). However, apart from general socio­
economic factors, there are factors specific to ethnic / racial groups and their 
individual members, such as individual and institutional racism experienced by 
pupils for example, which may cause additional educational needs. The Swann 
Report (p.325) also talks of ‘some* ethnic minority pupils continuing to have 
'certain educational needs which may call for particular responses from schools*, 
for example language needs.
As to how underachievement should or could be reduced, and additional needs 
met, the Swann Report had very few solid suggestions for policy:
We and many others offer views on where solutions lie, and it may 
be that society, mainly by hunch, will light on what prove to be the 
key ones
(Swann Report, 1985: 83)
As with the issue of social disadvantage, there are problems with inferences made 
in this way about the additional needs of ethnic / racial minority groups. There are 
also problems arising from the use of crude ethnic or racial typologies.
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Research which abandons such a crude three-way ethnic breakdown (as used 
above), such as that of the ILEA (1990) and Jones (1993), reveals the presence of 
far greater, and more complex, variations / inequalities between groups - see Table 
2 below. Such data complicates the inferral of need, not least because some ethnic 
groups are found to out-perform pupils from the white majority. Moreover, the 
more detailed the data comes to describing reality, the more difficult crude 
inferences are to support. For example, the introduction of gender as a variable in 
the analysis would serve to further complicate the picture of overall performance 
across groups and sub-groups (ibid).
Also - and this point applies equally well to social disadvantage - the diagnostic 
value of aggregated data is questionable. Aggregated data clearly reveals 
differences in the mean performance of pupils in different (socio-economic or) 
ethnic / racial groups but masks the distribution (i.e. range and standard deviation) 
of outcomes within groups. It is, in theory at least, possible for low achievement 
to be a relatively more common phenomenon among a group with a relatively high 
mean than it is among a group with a lower mean.
Special educational needs
Special educational need (SEN) provides something of a contrast to the other AEN 
factors discussed above. First, this type of need is defined in law. Second, there is 
a duty on all schools and local education authorities to identify, assess and provide 
for the needs of pupils with SEN. Third, in discussing needs associated with social 
disadvantage, the units of analysis tend to be groups, not individuals. Strictly











Indian Pakistan Bangladeshi Chinese African Other/
Mixed
All persons (16-24)
GCE A level/equivalent or higher 33 33 30 30 41 36 18 5 44 40 28
Of which: Degree/equivalent 4 4 5 1 13 6 2 2 12 5 7
Higher education below degree level 3 3 2 2 2 3 1 0 9 4 3
GCE A level/equivalent 26 26 22 26 26 27 15 3 24 30 18
Of which: BTEC (general)/ONC/OND 5 5 6 5 7 7 4 0 6 16 5
City and Guilds 10 10 7 12 7 8 4 0 4 7 4
GCE A level or equivalent 9 9 9 8 11 12 7 3 13 6 9
Trade apprenticeship 2 3 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
GCE O level/equivalent 30 30 25 28 20 25 18 16 31 30 31
CSE (not grade 1) 13 13 12 17 14 10 9 13 3 3 13
Other 3 3 5 3 7 5 5 10 5 8 6
None 21 20 27 21 18 22 48 54 15 7 20
(Never received any education) 0 0 2 0 1 0 8 5 0 2 0
Not stated/not known 1 1 2 2 0 2 3 1 2 2 2
(Source: Jones, 1993: Table 3.5, p. 49)
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speaking special educational needs are individualised, and should not therefore be 
inferred from aggregate data on group performance.
Section 1 of the 1981 Education Act states that a child has special educational 
needs if s/he 'has a learning difficulty which calls for special educational provision 
to be made for him* (or her). As for the terms / concepts of ‘learning difficulty* 
and ‘special educational provision*9, Section 2 of the Act states that a child has a 
‘learning difficulty* if s/he ‘has a significantly greater difficulty in learning than the 
majority of children’ of the same age10.
Section 3 declares that ‘special educational provision’ refers to:
... educational provision which is additional to, or otherwise 
different from, the educational provision made generally for children 
o f ... [the child’s] age in schools maintained by the local education 
authority concerned
In defining special educational needs in this way, and by employing the concept of 
learning difficulty, the 1981 Act reflects to a great extent the recommendations of 
the Wamock Committee of Inquiry which reported in 1978. Wamock argued that 
the term ‘educational sub-normality’ be abandoned, as should be the practice of 
categorising children and their needs in terms of physical, mental or behavioural 
conditions (Goacher, Evans, Welton and Wedell, 1988).
Here, for the sake of brevity and clarity, the Act’s provisions with regard to pre-school 
pupils and special school pupils are not presented.
There is one qualification to this general rule: difficulties arising because pupils have a 
home language other than English do not count as learning difficulties under the 1981 
Act.
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Overall, Wamock estimated that some 20% pupils would experience a special 
educational need sometime or other in their school years. It was also estimated 
that around 2% pupils would have such severe needs as to warrant a ‘statement of 
special educational needs’ - a document which states the child’s learning difficulties 
and how his / her needs are to be met. However, given the inevitably contingent 
nature of special educational needs, and the fact that the key phrase ‘significantly 
greater’ was not precisely defined, these estimates should be taken with a pinch of 
salt.
Special educational needs are inherently relative (Welton, Wedell and Vorhaus, 
1982) and determined by diverse factors: the child’s difficulty in learning compared 
to his / her peers; the type, level and standard of support and provision available in 
the school; the amount of support and help provided in the child’s home.
A child’s special educational needs are thus related both to abilities 
and disabilities, and to the nature and extent of the interaction of 
these with his or her environment.
(DES, 1989: para. 17)
The impact on practice of the Wamock Report and the 1981 Act has been great 
and, most analysts would argue, generally positive. However, despite its definition 
in law, the concept of special educational need remains problematic.
Need is again identified via comparison, this time between pupils of the same age. 
But what is the reference group for such comparisons? Implicitly, the comparison 
is between all pupils nationally - pupils have a SEN if they experience ‘significantly
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greater* difficulty in learning than their peers. However, in operationalising need in 
LEAs and schools, it would appear that local comparisons would have to be made. 
Clearly, this raises the potential for inter-area and inter-school inconsistencies in 
the identification of need, despite the strictures of national law (Audit Commission, 
1992).
Second, in trying to clarify the nature of final needs and welfare shortfalls, the 
circular nature of the definition of SEN (Goacher et. aly 1988) is confronted. The 
‘ought’ seems to be that all pupils who need ‘special educational provision* 
because they have a ‘learning difficulty’ due to experiencing a ‘special educational 
need*, receive the special educational provision that they need.
Third, as with the other AEN factors discussed above, need satisfiers are not 
inevitably identified via the process of identifying need. A pupil can be identified as 
having an SEN and being in need of special educational provision without the 
detail of that provision being stated, nor its likely cost.
IS IT ONLY INDIVIDUALS THAT HAVE NEEDS?
Thus far, I have been discussing need with constant reference to individuals, 
following the convention found in the literature. But this, I feel, has the effect of 
contaminating my own work, for this near exclusive focus on individuals is surely a 
notable weakness of the literature.
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In the literature, there are cases where other units are referred to: for example, 
Doyal and Gough (1984; 1991) talk of societal needs and Davies (1968) refers to 
the needs of areas. However, to Doyal and Gough societal needs are directly 
related to the needs of individuals11, and Davies is actually referring to the needs of 
an area’s population simply added together. Thus, despite appearing to break the 
convention, these authors are still ultimately referring to the needs of individuals.
But are all needs reduceable to individual requirements? Can a unit of need 
satisfaction only satisfy one person’s need at once? Is the need of a group of 
individuals the same as the sum of those individuals' individual needs? These 
questions are particularly pertinent to the process of ascertaining how resources 
should be allocated according to need. However their importance spreads beyond 
that specific context. I would argue that the lack of consideration of these issues is 
a major failing of the mainstream literature on need.
For now, I cannot plug the gaps I have identified. However, I can at least put 
forward a line of argument and pose further questions which others might fruitfully 
address. Consider, for example, institutional need as opposed to individual need.
I will take the unit of a school to illustrate my points. Among other things, a 
school requires heating in the winter. Obviously individual pupils and staff could 
be said to need warmth in which to work; children would not be expected to attend 
an unheated classroom on a freezing winter’s day. However, it would seem that
See footnote 3 above.
the necessity of heating is likely to be the same regardless of whether the room is 
used by four or forty pupils. This being the case, there are reasons to suggest that 
a school’s need for money to buy fuel might not rise in direct proportion to the 
numbers of pupils attending it, and perhaps should not be viewed as simply an 
aggregation of the needs of individual pupils attending it. Hence, although each 
child has a need of n, the need of the school is not necessarily as great as n 
multiplied by the number of pupils on the school roll. However, if the school is 
suffering from falling rolls, it may be that the school’s need is actually higher than n 
times the number of pupils.
Thus, it does not seem illogical to discuss the need of units other than individuals 
or aggregations of individuals, or to argue that needs are not always simply 
additive. But whether the argument I have pursued with reference to heat can be 
extended to cover other types of need, such as additional educational needs factors, 
is again an issue which does not seem to be explicitly addressed in the literature on 
need.
Moreover, practical policy issues relating to the aggregation and disaggregation of 
need, the potential of need satisfiers {i.e. a good or service) to meet more than one 
individual’s need at the same time, and the relative efficiency and effectiveness 
implications arising when one good or service is expected to meet multiple or 
diverse needs simultaneously (as a teacher is, for example, in meeting the diverse 
needs of pupils in a class) are rarely discussed. Doyal and Gough (1991:233) 
provide a notable exception to this general rule in briefly discussing the examples
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of malaria eradication teams and vaccination teams. But one of my concluding 
remarks in Chapter 14 is that these are areas and issues ripe for future research in 
the field of education and more generally. For the present, how or indeed whether 
local education authority policy-makers recognise and confront such issues will be 
seen later.
CONCLUSION
The relational formula - A needs B  for the achievement of C - is an intuitively 
appealing means of understanding the concept of need. And the urgings of Nevitt, 
Davies and others to add price tags to, and analyse the policy effectiveness of, need 
satisfiers seem to constitute good advice. However, in academic, political and 
professional discourse, it appears that needs are not always and perhaps not even 
usually discussed in these ways (Weale, 1978: 68; Taylor-Gooby and Dale, 1981: 
211). For example, Edwards (1987: 104) observes that:
... calls for ‘more’, ‘extra’, or ‘additional’ resources ... tend to be 
the social administrator’s equivalent of Pavlovian salivation. Ring 
the ‘most deprived’ bell and out pours the ‘extra resources* 
response. Rarely, if ever, is it explained what the resources should 
be extra to or why they are required.
Indeed, consideration of the additional educational needs factors of social and 
ethnic / racial disadvantage showed that need tends to be inferred from differences 
in group achievement, and that needs can be - and are - able to be identified despite
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the absence of information on need satisfiers. The latter was also found in relation 
to special educational needs.
So much - for the time being - for one of the key concepts in social policy: need. 
Chapter 4 now switches attention to a second key concept, that of equity. LEAs 





Under LMS, LEAs are ordered to achieve equity in their allocation of resources to 
schools. But what is equity? This chapter turns to the academic literature in 
search of answers. In so doing, much is learned about this key concept in social 
policy. But the literature is as good at generating confusion and ambiguity, as it is 
at spreading enlightenment. Authors often do not clarify what they mean by 
‘equity’, and when they do, or the meaning can be inferred, a whole range of 
distinct applications or interpretations of equity are discovered, which carry 
different implications for policy and analysis. Moreover, the literature pays little 
attention to how or why these different versions of the concept arise, and offers no 
suitable means of sorting them.
Therefore, in this chapter I not only seek to review the literature on equity but also 
to add to it. I first illustrate just how tricky and confusing it can be to try and 
clarify what ‘equity’ means by referring to other concepts, such as justice and 
equality. To avoid this confusion, I go back to first principles and identify the key 
issues pertaining to equity. In this way I am able to explain the meaning of equity 
drawing on theoretical / conceptual analysis, rather than relying on colloquial usage
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of the term. I am also able to show how and why different versions of equity 
occur, and develop a method by which to distinguish between them (which I will 
use in later chapters in analysing LEA allocation formulae). I argue that we should 
think in terms not of equity, but of equities in recognition of the diverse meanings 
and implications of these versions. I also argue that equity is a broader and less 
specific concept than colloquial usage might lead us to believe.
EQUITY et. al
If policy-makers were to turn to the academic literature in search of clarity over 
equity, they would immediately confront problems of terminology. These problems 
arise in a number of ways. First, there is no general consensus about the meaning 
of ‘equity*. Partly as a result of this, there is no consensus about whether ‘equity’ 
means the same as, or something different to, other key concepts such as ‘justice’, 
‘equality’ and ‘fairness’. Additionally, authors sometimes, but not always, 
distinguish between different types of ‘equity’, different types of ‘justice* etc.. 
Moreover, if this occurs, authors do not always make the same types of distinctions 
or use similar terms to denote what is in effect the same type of distinction. 
Finally, authors sometimes display a promiscuous use of terminology, inasmuch as 
key terms are used as if their meanings are given, uncontested and hence not 
requiring clarification.
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To illustrate some of these problems first consider the work of four eminent 
authors - Aristotle, Rawls, Le Grand, Titmuss - and the relationships they posit 
between equity and justice, equity and fairness, and fairness and justice. Aristotle 
(1976, Book Five) meant something specific by ‘equity* - the rectification of 
injustices caused when exceptional cases are not adequately covered by general 
laws. He thus saw equity as:
[a] better than one type of justice, namely ‘legal justice*, which simply involves 
the consistent and impartial application of general laws;
[b] not better than another kind of justice, namely absolute justice; and
[c] a form of justice in its own right, since it involves the rectification of 
injustices.
Rawls (1971) considers many Aristotelian ideas, but rarely uses the term equity. 
Moreover, he develops a Theory o f Justice which embodies issues of liberty and 
aspects of utilitarianism. Le Grand (1991: 8-9) points out that, seen in these terms, 
equity and justice carry distinctly different meanings. Yet Le Grand himself opts to 
treat the terms as synonyms (ibid, p. 11).
Going back to Rawls’, his is a theory of ‘justice as fairness* (see: Rawls, 1971, 
Chapter 7), and Titmuss (cited in: Abel-Smith and Titmuss, 1987: 222) 
categorically states ‘"Equity" I define as "fairness"*.
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Thus Aristotle treats equity as a type of justice, something different and better than 
another type of justice, and something different but not better than yet another type 
of justice. Rawls develops a theory of justice which seems unrelated to issues of 
equity, but is related to fairness. For Titmuss equity means fairness. But Le Grand 
argues that Rawlsian justice cannot be treated as the same as equity.
Now consider the relationships authors have posited between equity and equality. 
To Sen (1992), equity is one specific type of equality (and hence a form of 
egalitarianism). Others, on the other hand, appear to treat equity and equality as 
synonyms: what Le Grand (1982) once referred to as ‘five types of equality’, he 
later, in the company of others, calls ‘interpretations of equity* (Evandrou, 
Falkingham, Le Grand and Winter, 1992). However in Equity and Choice (Le 
Grand, 1991: 11) the same author states:
Debates on distributional issues are often confused by a failure 
properly to distinguish between equity and equality. ... the two 
concepts are in fact quite distinct. Equality of various kinds may be 
advocated for reasons other than equity; equitable outcomes may be 
quite inegalitarian.
If equitable outcomes can be inegalitarian then how can equity be a type of 
equality? And if equity and equality are ‘quite distinct’ then how can ‘types of 
equality’ be ‘interpretations of equity’?
Finally, consider a range of justice-related terms authors use to refer to versions of 
the concept of equity and some of the confusion that arises. These terms are:
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‘social justice* (Barr, 1987: 427; Curtis, 1989: 4), ‘distributive justice* (Messick 
and Cook, 1983), ‘territorial justice’ (Davies, 1968), ‘legal justice’ (Aristotle, 
1976: 198-200), and ‘formal justice* (Rawls, 1971: 58).
However, whilst these are all used as synonyms for equity, they are not necessarily 
seen as synonymous to each other. For example, both Barr and Curtis explain the 
meaning of equity by referring to the concept of social justice, and Davies* 
territorial justice is clearly a form of equity. But, to Davies at least, territorial 
justice and social justice are distinct from each other. Davies (1968: 16) states 
‘Territorial justice is a necessary condition, but not of course a sufficient condition, 
for achieving social justice*, since a ‘just’ allocation between areas does not ensure 
a ‘just’ allocation between individuals.
These brief excursions into the literature highlight not only some of the difficulties 
involved in discussing equity, but also provide the first indications of the diversity 
of forms which the concept of equity can take. This diversity arises because at the 
heart of the concept of equity lie two propositions, rather than a single idea, and 
because both propositions are imprecise.
CORE PROPOSITIONS
I would argue that the only way to develop a clear understanding of what equity 
does and does not mean is to begin with its core propositions, the issues they
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specify and the areas they leave vague. In this way, I am able to both clarify the 
concept and also show its complexity.
What are the core propositions of equity?
First, 'equity* is used as shorthand for the principle that 'equals be treated equally, 
and unequals unequally* (Barry, 1965: 152). Issues relating to the first half of the 
demand - equal treatment of equals - are commonly referred to as those of 
horizontal equity, and issues relating to the latter half - unequal treatment of 
unequals - those of vertical equity (see, for example: Barr, 1987: 427, 431; West, 
1981; Knapp, 1984; Plotnick, 1982).
Second, ‘equity* is also used as shorthand for the principle ‘to each X  according to 
its T  (Elster, 1992: 22, adapted)* where X  refers to the units which are classed as 
eligible to receive shares of the resource being allocated and Y  refers to some 
characteristic or quality of the units, for example need. More accurately, Y  refers 
to a measure of the characteristic or quality, e.g. amount or degree of need. By 
inference, there is also a ‘Z* somewhere in the equation, standing for a resource to 
be shared out between the eligible units according to relative measures of Y. By 
referring to the characteristics or qualities of rival units as ‘inputs’, Adams (1965) 
expresses equity in the form of a prescriptive equation:
Typically, this principle is stated in different terms, such as ‘to each according to his 
need' or ‘to each according to his merit', etc.. However this is unsatisfactoiy for two 
reasons: (male) individuals are not the only units to which allocations are made; and 
need and merit are only two of a range of criteria which can be used in considerations of 
equity.
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outcomes A = outcomes B 
inputs A inputs B
In both of these core propositions, issues of comparison and consistency are 
central. However, a difference in emphasis is evident, which can be reflected in 
terminology (Blalock, 1991).
The emphasis in the second proposition is more on outcomes - i.e. what share 
rivals should receive - hence the term outcome equity. Outcomes would be classed 
as horizontally equitable if units defined as equals receive the same. Outcomes 
would be classed as vertically equitable if differences in the shares received by rival 
units are explained by differences in their Y factors.
The emphasis in the first proposition is more on procedures - i.e. on treating equals 
equally and treating unequals unequally (Goodin and Le Grand, 1987: 7). Hence 
the term procedural equity is used to refer to when equals are treated equally and 
unequals unequally. Strictly speaking, however, two separate aspects to 
procedural equity may be identified.
The first concerns how the rules2 governing an allocation are applied. In this 
context, procedural equity denotes a situation where the rules are impartially and 
consistently applied. Aristotle (1976: 198-200) uses the term ‘legal justice’, and 
Rawls (1971: 58) ‘formal justice’, to cover this aspect of procedural equity.
2 Not all allocations are governed by ‘rules' in the strict sense of the term. However, since 
formula funding is a rules-based allocation policy rather than one reliant on individual 
discretionary decisions, the discussion will be restricted to allocations which are rules- 
based.
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The second aspect of procedural equity concerns the nature of the rules governing 
an allocation, rather than how they are applied. For rules to be horizontally 
equitable by nature, they would have to ensure that units defined as equals are 
treated in the same way. For rules to be vertically equitable by nature, they would 
have to ensure that units are treated in different ways according to differences in 
their Y  factors.
Thus, examination of the core propositions provides the first evidence of the 
plurality of applications enjoyed by the concept of equity. Equity can be examined 
in relation to:
[a] the nature of rules governing an allocation;
[b] the application of those rules; and
[c] the nature of outcomes resulting from an allocation.
Issue [b] is in many ways distinct from the others. If the allocation rules are 
known, this aspect of procedural equity can be analysed in a value-free way. Barry 
(1965: 152) makes this point by stating:
The advantage of appealing to ‘equity* is that ... one can derive 
results from it without having to bring in any independent criteria at 
all; they may instead be found within the system to which the 
principle of equity is being applied. ... All that is needed is a sharp 
eye for inconsistency.
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Scanning the literature, many analyses of equity / inequity in the application of 
rules can be found. These predominantly focus on the allocation of services or 
opportunities, rather than money, however they merit a brief mention. In 
particular, issues of racial discrimination have provided a fertile area for research. 
MacEwan and Verity (1989), for example, studied the allocation of local authority 
housing in Edinburgh, and found that black tenants had been subjected to unlawful 
discrimination - i.e. forms of discrimination proscribed by law and hence not 
intended according to the local authority’s rules for allocating tenants to council 
accommodation. Issues of racial discrimination in the health service (Cox and 
Bostock, 1989) and employment (McIntosh and Smith, 1974; Brown and Gay, 
1985) have also been examined.
Whilst relevant and important to studies of service delivery, and particularly 
important where decision-makers are granted discretion in the interpretation of 
rules, this aspect of procedural equity will be considered no further in this research. 
Legal controls and the policy framework of LMS ensure that, once agreed, the 
rules embodied in LEAs’ funding formulae are consistently and impartially applied. 
For this reason, in what follows the term procedural equity will refer solely to 
issues related to the nature of allocation rules and not their application.
Hence, the discussion now focuses on issues [a] and [c], which refer to the nature 
of rules governing an allocation, and the nature of outcomes resulting from an 




The core propositions of equity prescribe certain relationships between equals and 
unequals, and between inputs and outcomes. However, the propositions are short 
on detail. In reality equity is a less exact concept than many assume. A range of 
authors (Titmuss, cited in Abel-Smith and Titmuss, 1987: 225; Blalock, 1991: 29; 
Le Grand and Robinson, 1976: 9; Le Grand, 1991: 71; Weale, 1978: 28) have 
asked the following:
[a] What is meant by treatment?
[b] Who or what are ‘equal*, ‘unequal*, and why, i.e. what are the X units?
[c] Which characteristics or qualities (i.e. Y factors) are to be taken into
account?
[d] How unequally should unequals be treated?
Many different answers to these questions are possible, as will be illustrated below. 
And it is argued here that different answers create a variety of distinct versions of 




First, different types of characteristics - Y factors - can be chosen. To explain, 
what Sen (1992: 2) writes of equality and inequality is equally applicable to issues 
of equity / inequity:
Equality is judged by comparing some particular aspect of a person 
... with the same aspect of another person. Thus, the judgement and 
measurement of inequality is thoroughly dependent on the choice of 
the variable ... in terms of which comparisons are made. I shall call 
it the ‘focal variable* - the variable on which the analysis focuses, in 
comparing different people.
Equities can and do utilise a range of different focal variables. For example, 
influenced by the work of Aristotle, many authors discuss equity in relation to 
desert (see: Deutsch, 1975; Goodin and Le Grand, 1987). Recently, Le Grand 
(1991) has developed a version of equity which utilises two, related focal variables 
- choice and constraint. He states:
Define the factors beyond individual control as constraints. These 
constraints limit the range of possibilities over which individuals can 
make their choices. Define the set of possibilities bounded by the 
constraints as the choice set. Then, a distribution is equitable i f  it 
is the outcome o f informed individuals choosing over equal choice 
sets
{ibid, p. 87) (italics in original).
Then there is the focal variable of need. To Titmuss (cited in Abel-Smith and 
Titmuss, 1987: 222) the achievement of equity demands that individuals ‘in like 
circumstances of need ... should be treated alike in ... spheres of social and 
economic life*. And Davies (1968: 16) refers to ‘the most apparent appropriate 
distribution between individuals* being ‘to each according to his need*, and ‘the
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most appropriate distribution between areas’ being ‘to each area according to the 
needs of the population of that area’.
Rarely do analysts acknowledge the potential or actual diversity of focal variables, 
but Le Grand (1982) and Mooney (1982) offer notable exceptions to this rule. For 
example, analysing policy and practice in health, Mooney identifies seven versions 
of equity:
[a] equality of expenditure per capita
[b] equality of inputs (resources) per capita
[c] equality of input for equal need
[d] equality of (opportunity of) access for equal need
[e] equality of utilisation for equal need
[f] equality of marginal met need
[g] equality of health
Conducting a more general evaluation - of the post-war ‘Strategy of Equality’ - Le 
Grand identifies five ‘interpretations of equity’3 which employ focal variables of 
public expenditure, final income, use, cost and outcome.
Such typologies enable interesting analyses to be undertaken. Unfortunately, 
however, they are woefully inadequate as tools for those wishing to analyse 
manifestations of equity in practice, as I do in this study. They provide an
3 As noted earlier in this chapter, what Le Grand once referred to as types of equality, he
later called interpretations of equity.
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incomplete map of colloquial usage, have no conceptual or theoretical base, and 
simply cannot cope with the diversity of versions of equity which are possible.
Thus, the first way in which differences between equities arise relates to the choice 
of focal variable. These differences are potentially very important - they can create 
very different versions of equity. As Plant, Lesser and Taylor-Gooby (1980: 63) 
point out, an allocation equitable according to measures of desert would be 
unlikely to correspond to an allocation equitable according to measures of need. 
Moreover, the versions of equity in health identified by Mooney clearly vary in 
both their desirability, feasibility and distributional impact if used to provide a goal 
in resource allocation.
Focal units
While focal variables are the Y in the proposition ‘to each X  according to its Y , 
focal units are the X. The second way in which differences between equities arise 
relates to the choice of focal units. Whilst it appears to be a convention among 
authors to phrase discussions of equity almost exclusively in terms of individuals, a 
range of different focal units can be and, crucially, are employed in versions of 
equity. Focal units may be individuals, institutions, areas, social groups, etc. .
For example, Davies (1968) has defined and assessed equity across geographical 
areas in his study of ‘territorial justice*. Davies defined territorial justice as 
follows:
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a situation in which there is a perfect positive correlation between 
indices of standards of provision and [an] index measuring the 
relative needs of each area for the service, the relative inequality of 
the standards indices being the same as that of the index of relative 
needs.
(ibid., p. 39)
The work of Le Grand (1982) also illustrates the use of alternative focal units in 
social policy analysis. Despite constantly referring to individuals, Le Grand 
actually uses social and income groups as the focal units for his analysis of the 
impact and utilisation of welfare state policies. Using different types of social and 
income groups in different parts of his analysis, he concludes:
... equality, in any sense of the term, has not been achieved. In all 
the relevant areas, there persist substantial inequalities ... Moreover, 
in some areas (though by no means all) there is evidence to suggest 
that the policies concerned have failed even to reduce inequality 
significantly.
(ibid , p. 4)
What is not clear, is why Le Grand employed the particular focal units which he 
did; he does not assess whether conclusions would have been similar or different if 
alternative units had been employed. This is an important issue since choice of 
focal unit may have serious implications for policy and analysis. For example, 
Barnes and Lucas (1974) conducted a complex statistical analysis which showed 
that resource allocation policies aimed at meeting the needs of individual 
schoolchildren, but which rely on measures of pupils’ needs aggregated to the level 
of the school, may be seriously flawed. Studying the inner London Educational
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Priority Area, Barnes and Lucas found that the majority of children in need4 did not 
attend those schools deemed the most needy and hence deserving priority in the 
allocation of resources. Indeed, for every two pupils in need who attended 
prioritised schools, there were five pupils in need who attended non-prioritised 
schools. And even within the prioritised schools, for every three children in need 
there were four who were not.
Such evidence suggests that although equities with different focal units are, in a 
sense, variations on a theme, it pays to view them as potentially discrete forms. 
Also, it can be seen that the literature discussing equity is perhaps more diverse 
than at first realised, and that authors writing about equity are less clear than they 
perhaps could be in stating their reasons for choosing particular variables and units, 
and the implications of their choices.
Input-outcome relationships
Two ways in which equities are differentiated have so far been identified. The third 
way relates to the relationship between inputs and outcomes. What form of 
relationship denotes equity? There is a general presumption in the literature that 
equity demands that as measures of a unit’s focal variable increase, their 
entitlement to whatever is being allocated should increase also. Hence if we look 
at equity according to need, then the presumption is that if A has needs which 
measure 10 on some scale, and 2Ts needs measure 100, then B  should receive more
In this case, children in need were defined as those at risk of being socially 
disadvantaged.
78
than A. Two observations are relevant here, and the example of A and B  will be 
retained for making them.
First, a minor point: the prescription that B  receive more than A is not to be found 
in the core propositions of equity; strictly speaking, all that the core propositions 
require is that B  receives a different amount to A because they have different levels 
of need.
Second, even if it is accepted that those with greater needs should receive more 
than those with lesser needs, it is unclear how much more the former should receive 
to secure equity. For example, B  may be ten times more in need o f food  than A , 
but does this necessarily mean that s/he should receive ten times more food} Or 
would twice the amount of food allocated to A satisfy B 's needs?
In relation to this issue, Davies* classic study (mentioned above) has been criticised 
for prescribing that only a linear relationship between needs and provision denotes 
justice. Boyne and Powell (1991: 267-8) question whether ‘the rate of response of 
provision to an extra unit of need must be the same whatever the level of need*. 
Moreover, Doyal and Gough (1991) - exploring these issues further in relation to 
health - note that although:
... a particular level of satisfaction of each intermediate need is 
required if human health and autonomy are to be optimised ... 
beyond that point no further additional inputs will improve basic 
need satisfaction. For example, the ratio of doctors to patients is 
positively associated with certain measures of survival in low 
income countries, but not in high income countries, this suggests 
that the effect of quantity of medical provision on physical survival 
reaches its asymptote at some intermediate level.
(ibid, p. 162)
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Whether a linear relationship between input factors and outcomes is required for 
the achievement of equity is debatable. Looking to the literature, no general rule is 
found which legislates on these matters. Rather, analysts and policy-makers must, 
and do, create their own rules given the knowledge, skills, empirical data and 
assumptions at their disposal. Given that allocations in social policy typically 
involve tens or hundreds of rival units, rather than just two, and that more than one 
type of need will often have to be taken into account at one and the same time, this 
appears to constitute an extremely complex task.
Thus three ways in which different versions of equity or equities arise have been 
considered: different focal variables may be employed in equity considerations; so 
may different focal units; and diverse relationships between inputs and outcomes 
may be chosen.
Marking out the essential elements of equity in this way yields a useful tool, not 
only as an aid to showing the diversity of forms that equity can take, but also as a 
means by which policy-makers* versions of equity can be compared and contrasted.
EQUITIES - ANALYTICAL TOOLS AND POLICY GOALS
Earlier it was stated that the concept of equity can be used in different contexts, 
namely in matters relating to the nature of rules governing an allocation; the
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application of those rules; and the nature of outcomes resulting from an allocation. 
But there is a further distinction to be drawn concerning the use of equities in these 
contexts.
Equity is commonly referred to as ‘a goal relating to the way in which resources 
should be distributed or shared* (Barr, 1987: 427). Indeed, Le Grand (1991: 1), 
Le Grand and Robinson (1984: 1-2) and Bebbington and Davies (1983) are among 
those who identify the achievement of equity as a primary social policy objective. 
Given the diversity of forms that equities can take, such blanket statements must be 
called into question; I cast doubt on the value of imposing ‘equity’ as a goal of 
policy in my final chapter.
Even when there is clarity and agreement about goals, policy-makers and 
researchers are not necessarily out of the woods.
This is because conceptions of what do or should constitute equitable procedures, 
and what do or should constitute equitable outcomes, may exist in isolation from 
each other. Cohen (1986: 21-2) discusses this same issue of the links between 
means and ends in relation to just procedures and outcomes; there seems little 
reason to suppose equity is less problematic in this respect.
Thus policy-makers may be able to agree that a certain distribution of resources 
achieves their goal of equity of outcomes, but have little idea about which 
procedures would result in those outcomes. Alternatively, policy-makers may
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agree on what constitute equitable procedures - i.e. agree on which focal variables 
and focal units to employ, and what type of relationship between inputs and 
outcomes seems appropriate - but find that the outcomes resulting from those 
procedures do not seem appropriate. Whether such problems arise in practice, and 
if they do, how they are resolved, are matters which appear to be ignored in the 
literature on equity, but are discussed in this study.
Versions of equity are not only used as goals, however. They can be, and are, also 
used as analytical tools i.e. as a means by which to assess policy and practice. This 
was shown above, in considering the work of Le Grand (1982). Here, however, 
the focus is specifically on the resource allocation process and not on the general 
use of equity as an analytical tool in social policy analysis.
There is a relatively small literature in which the nature of allocation rules is 
analysed, from which to draw illustrations. DHSS (1976) and West (1981) have 
analysed the procedures and information which would be required to construct an 
‘ideal* method of determining budgets for health service regions. Senior (1991), 
after critically analysing the method by which the Department of Health calculates 
‘deprivation payments’ for GPs {i.e. the Jarman Underprivileged Area Index), 
proposes a more ‘sensible* and ‘fair’ alternative. Campbell, Radford and Burton 
(1991) have done much the same. And as a final example, a pair of articles by 
Bebbington and Davies (1980a, 1980b) discuss the theoretical underpinnings and 
practical application of ‘a method of determining an equitable pattern of 
expenditure on the elderly so as to provide a standard level of social service
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provision between local authorities’ (Bebbington and Davies, 1980b: 433). In 
these studies, it is relatively rare to find authors explaining why they chose the focal 
units and variables which they have used.
Examples of analyses of equity / inequity in the application of rules (in particular 
referring to racial discrimination) were offered above in an earlier section of this 
chapter. It was pointed out that, if allocation rules are clearly stated, a value-free 
form of analysis is said to be possible.
To be able to analyse issues relating to the outcomes of an allocation, the analyst 
must hold, or develop, an opinion as to what constitute equitable procedures or 
equitable outcomes. This may be a very difficult task; as noted in the section 
above, deciding who should get what across hundreds of eligible units appears to 
constitute an extremely complex task. Once a picture of desired outcomes has 
been established however, comparisons can then be made between existent 
outcomes and their ‘ideal* counterparts. The studies of outcomes by Davies 
(1968), mentioned above, is a prime example of this type of analysis. Many have 
followed a similar approach5.
The relevance of this distinction - between analytical tools and goals - is clarified 
when the circumstances of LMS and formula funding implementation are 
considered. There is much potential for conflict between equities. This is due to
5 In relation to health: Forster (1979); Powell (1986); Evandrou, Falkingham, Le Grand 
and Winter (1992). In relation to education: Danziger (1978); Howick and Hassani 
(1980); Jesson, Gray, Ranson and Jones (1985). In relation to personal social services: 
Boaden (1971), Bebbington and Davies (1982). In relation to housing: Danziger (1978).
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the accommodating nature of the equity concept - there is scope for different 
parties to create, seek to achieve, and analyse achievements in relation to, quite 
different versions of equity. The fact that versions of the concept of equality, or 
equalities, could conflict with each other was undoubtedly the most important 
finding to emerge from the research of Rae (1981), whose conclusion states:
Intellect resists equality by counterpoising rival ideas such as 
efficiency, freedom, and order. Actuality is smarter, for it chooses 
the one idea that is more powerful than order or efficiency or 
freedom in resisting equality. That idea is, of course, equality itself.
{ibid., p. 150)
It appears that equities might also be able to conflict with each other in this way; 
whether they in fact do will be seen later.
CONCLUSION
Authors often refer to equity as an essentially contested concept, but in so doing 
they are usually only offering a platitude. The complexity and problematic nature 
of the notion is usually inadequately explored; not many stop to analyse the 
concept itself; most just use equity, typically uncritically.
In this chapter I have sought to develop our understanding of equity - what it does, 
can and does not mean. I have emphasised that there is very little prescriptive 
detail at the heart of the concept of equity, but that by adding detail to the core 
propositions myriad versions of equity - equities - can be created. I have shown
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how versions of equity - equities - arise, what distinguishes them, and also how 
they can be and are used, both as analytical tools and policy goals. Moreover, I 
have further argued that the immense scope for divergent interpretation that equity 
offers to policy-makers may generate confusion and conflict.
Finally, this chapter and the last have served to indicate that policy-makers ordered 
to achieve equity according to need face a considerable challenge. They must 
presumably interpret both need and equity, decide what they want to do, and 
discover means of doing it. But is this how policy-making proceeds in practice? 
The next chapter considers policy-making in more detail.
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CHAPTER 5
THEORY AND PRACTICE IN DECISION-MAKING 
INTRODUCTION
This research is not a study of decision-making per se; neither an anthropology nor 
a pathology of policy-making is attempted, no new theories or models generated. 
However, if there are factors and problems to do with the process of decision­
making which influence the solutions policy-makers adopt in the search for equity, 
these are obviously important considerations. Therefore, models and theories of 
decision-making are reviewed below, with the aim of providing information which 
may prove helpful in making sense of the empirical findings presented later. 
Traditionally, two models of decision-making - rationalism and incrementalism - 
have cornered the market. These are briefly reviewed below. Then, the so-called 
‘garbage-can’ model of decision-making is considered. The latter model, along 
with incrementalism, have much to offer in terms of explaining real decision­
making. The final part of the first section of this chapter discusses the notion of 
‘bottom-up’ policy-making.
The other concerns of this chapter are to illustrate and discuss the practical issues 
and problems faced in decision-making, in particular drawing on sources which
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elaborate upon processes of resource allocation, formula and needs index 
construction, and the use of indicators as proxy measures of need.
MODELS OF DECISION-MAKING 
The rationalist model
Rationalist models of decision-making come in a number of forms, serve diverse 
purposes, and have been roundly criticised. Both Ham and Hill (1984) and 
Hogwood and Gunn (1984) provide a critical discussion of rationalist (and 
incrementalist) models of decision-making.
Based on the work of Simon (1957), an ideal model of rational decision-making 
has been concocted. This portrays decision-making as a process which begins with 
the thorough analysis of current and future problems; involves the identification 
and then comprehensive evaluation of all policy options; and results in the 
adoption of solutions which are optimal given the values of the decision-making 
body (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984: 45).
The ideal-type model is of little use to those seeking a description of practice or 
even a feasible prescription for practice. But Simon would argue that it must be 
understood if sense is to be made of practice since it is his belief that decision­
makers constantly strive to act according to the ideal even though circumstances 
limit their ability to do so. These limiting factors may be general and insoluble or
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situational, either endogenous or exogenous to the individual decision-maker: 
constraints on time and resources, lack of consensus over goals and values, and 
organisational obstacles caused by the division of labour, etc. (see: Hogwood and 
Gunn, ibid., pp. 50-1; Ham and Hill, 1984: 77-9; Simon, 1982: 161-2). Most 
restricting, however, are problems relating to the quantity and quality of 
information that decision-makers have access to (Simon, 1957: 40-1), and the issue 
of what constitutes ‘fact’ (Smith and May, 1980; Wildavsky and Tenenbaum, 
1981). As March (1978: 589) argues, given current knowledge even so called 
‘rational choice* inherently involves a significant degree of guess-work, in 
particular ‘guesses about future consequences of current actions and guesses about 
future preferences for those consequences*.
Aware of these factors, but still working to the assumption that decision-makers 
strive to be rational, Simon (1957, 1982) proposes that decision-making practice is 
best described as a process of bounded ra tio n a lity His claim is that in conditions 
where endless options for achieving objectives cannot be collated and individually 
evaluated, and where incomplete information is available, decision-makers engage 
in ‘satisficing*, i.e. they ‘develop decision procedures that are sensible, given the 
constraints, even though they might not be sensible if the constraints were 
removed’ (March, 1978: 590).
Despite these concessions, bounded rationality remains problematic as a 
description of practice. In particular, there remains a built-in assumption that the
A somewhat similar notion - limited rationality - is developed by March and Simon 
(1958).
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evolution of decisions begins with the statement of explicit goals and thereon 
follows a straight path through discrete, consecutive stages. This assumption is 
challenged by many analysts (e.g. Kingdon, 1984; March, 1978), not least those 
who have constructed alternative models and theories to describe decision-making 
processes (Lindblom, 1959; Cohen, March and Olsen, 1972).
If decision-making in relation to formula funding and AEN were to proceed 
according to the rationalist model, it would be expected to have the following 
features: clear statement of goals, including a detailed picture of desired outcomes; 
rigourous appraisal of means (possible within constraints) by which to achieve 
goals; a clear decision about which option to pursue.
The incremental model
Advanced both in criticism of idealistic rationalism and as an alternative and better 
means of describing practice than bounded rationality, incrementalist models 
depict decision-making as a process of ‘muddling through’; of policy-makers 
pursuing marginal changes to pre-existing policies; of viewing ends, means and 
values as inherently and reciprocally inter-related in the decision-making process.
‘Muddling through’ is the phrase used by Lindblom (1959) to capture the reality of 
decision-making. Lindblom argues that the status quo - the range of existing 
policies and programmes - forms the key reference point in decision-making 
processes. Given that existing policies reflect compromises or the results of 
disputes between diverse and often competing interests, Lindblom suggests that it
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makes sense for decision-makers to make policy changes only as and when they are 
necessary, and then only pursue marginal adjustments. In more detail, Hogwood 
and Gunn (1984: 52-3) identify that Lindblom’s basic views are that:
[a] it makes considerable sense for decision-makers to keep quiet about goals 
and objectives. Reaching an agreement between competing interests is 
easier in the absence of explicit goals;
[b] when change to existing policies seems unavoidable, only marginal 
alterations are considered. These build on, or deviate only marginally from, 
what is already known and done - great leaps into the unknown are 
avoided;
[c] decision-making is an iterative process, and decision-makers do not 
presume they can address all issues at once or solve problems once and for 
all;
[d] many individuals and parties tend to be involved in and exert an influence 
over the making of decisions;
[e] since [d] is the case, reaching decisions necessitates "partisan mutual 
adjustment’, i.e. negotiation and compromise;
[f] policies which are adopted tend to be those on which the widest agreement 
can be found, rather than those which are perhaps viewed as the "best*.
That practice in general conforms more to incrementalism than rationalism is 
generally agreed (Ham and Hill, 1984) and has been the conclusion of research 
studies such as that by Wildavsky (1966, cited in Kingdon, 1984). Moreover, the
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criticisms which are made of incrementalism (see, for example: Smith and May, 
1980) relate almost exclusively to incrementalism as a prescription for practice 
rather than a description of how things operate in reality. However, there are 
authors whose work implies that even Lindblom, in a sense, retains too rational a 
view of decision-making, that he fails to acknowledge the organised anarchy which 
characterises many organisations and decision-making situations (Cohen et. ah, 
1972). Cohen et. aV  s model of decision-making is considered shortly.
If the search for equity in relation to formula funding and AEN were to proceed 
according to the incrementalist model, the following main features would be 
expected: lack of clearly stated goals; lack of analysis of the policy problem; 
marginal change to past policy; bargaining between competing interests; and policy 
would reflect compromises struck between competing objectives.
The garbage can model
Cohen et. a V s ‘garbage can* model of decision-making is based on three 
assumptions / observations about organisations. The first - labelled ‘problematic 
preferences’ - is that an organisation is best viewed as ‘a loose collection of ideas* 
which ‘discovers preferences through action more than it acts on the basis of 
preferences* (ibid, p. 1). As with incrementalism, the garbage can model assumes 
decision-makers can and usually do operate without clearly defined goals. The 
second assumption / observation relates to ‘unclear technology*. ‘Technology’ 
refers to the workings of the organisation - Cohen et. al. argue that few if any 
individuals develop a holistic view of an organisation’s workings; individual
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members and sections tend to know only how their particular bit of the 
organisation works. Third, there is ‘fluid participation*, i.e. diverse people and 
parties enter and exit the decision-making arena at various stages, and the decision­
making ‘audience* changes continually.
Without great effort, these assumptions / observations could be accommodated 
within models of bounded rationalism or incrementalism. However, the garbage 
can model is distinct in that it treats problems, solutions, participants and decision­
making opportunities as semi-independent, influential factors in the production of 
policy choices.
To Cohen et. al., problems are things which members of the organisation and / or 
people from outside its boundaries deem to merit attention. Solutions may take the 
form of answers to these problems, but they often exist in their own right. 
Sometimes they wait for an appropriate problem to crop up which they can be used 
to solve, and at other times they facilitate the discovery of problems which have 
not previously been acknowledged. The observation that problems and solutions 
can be generated and exist in isolation from each other leads Cohen et. al. to create 
the image o f :
... a garbage can into which various kinds of problems and solutions 
are dumped by participants as they are generated. The mix of 
garbage in a single can depends on the mix of cans available, on the 
labels attached to the alternative cans, on what garbage is currently 
being produced, and on the speed with which garbage is collected 
and removed from the scene.
(ibid., p. 2)
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As for participants, Cohen et. al. observe that members of an organisation are often 
involved in numerous activities. This means that participants in decision-making 
tend to enter from and exit to various other decision-making situations in a rather 
haphazard way. Quite simply, all sorts of people seem to have different degrees of 
influence on the evolution of a decision. Lastly, decision-making opportunities 
often arise regardless of the volition of members or the organisation itself, e.g. 
spending plans must be decided by a certain date, new procedures implemented by 
a certain deadline, and so on. In summary, then, according to garbage can 
theorists, certain organisations are best viewed as:
collections of choices looking for problems, issues and feelings 
looking for decision-situations in which they might be aired, 
solutions looking for issues to which they might be the answer, and 
decision makers looking for work.
(ibid, p. 1)
Thus it can be seen that the garbage can model poses an alternative to rationalism. 
Decision-making does not follow a set routine, is not solely a business of finding 
solutions to problems, and may continue in the absence of explicit goals. But the 
garbage can also challenges incrementalism as a description of practice. Since 
problems, solutions, participants and decision-making opportunities exist as 
separate ‘streams’ in the organisation which may come together in various 
combinations at different times, Kingdon (1984: 91) argues that:
the coupling of streams in a decision context can ... produce quite 
an abrupt change, as a new combination previously untried comes 
into play.
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Thus, if LEA decision-making in relation to AEN and formula funding were to 
proceed as outlined in the garbage-can model, lack of clearly defined goals, 
solutions chasing or existing apart from problems, and a semi-chaotic process 
would be witnessed. Also, it might prove very difficult to establish why policy 
takes the form it does or why it changes when it does.
‘Bottom-up* policy making
Although there are clear differences between the above models / approaches, they 
are all open to the criticism that they seem to imply that policy is decided on high - 
whether rationally, incrementally or semi-chaotically - and hence merely put into 
practice by, or experienced by, those lower down the hierarchy. In so doing, they 
perpetuate a ‘top-down* view of policy-making. But there is an alternative view 
worthy of consideration - the ‘bottom-up* approach. Whilst not offering a full­
blown theory or model of decision-making, the bottom-up approach may prove 
useful or indeed a necessary tool in later chapters where I attempt to make sense of 
my empirical findings.
The top-down view is challenged by those who argue that ‘street-level* or ‘front­
line’ workers are not merely the administrative agents of higher-level decision­
makers. Analysts such as Lipsky (1980) contend that policy can be not only 
shaped, but in effect also ‘made’, by workers such as teachers, social workers and 
police officers. Bottom-up theorists emphasise the ability of lower level workers to 
exercise discretion in the practical application of policy, and to resist or even alter 
policy decided by those at a higher level. Moreover, they argue that practice may
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conflict with or even contradict higher level policy declarations because street level 
workers do not share the aims and objectives agreed by their superiors. For this 
reason, Lipsky (1980: xii) claims that:
public policy is not best understood as made in legislatures or top- 
floor suites of high ranking administrators,... in important ways it is 
actually made in the crowded offices and daily encounters of street 
level workers
These claims have implications for our understanding of the relationship between 
policy-making and implementation, and between higher level and lower level actors 
in the policy process. Traditionally, policy-making and implementation are viewed 
as distinct activities, with the former taking place first and being a characteristically 
political business, and with the latter taking place subsequently and being primarily 
a technical business of putting policy into effect.
Bottom-up theorists resist this hard and fast distinction between the making of, and 
the implementation of, policy. Rather, they urge that the policy process be 
understood as an ‘iterative and negotiative process ... taking place over time 
between those seeking to put policy into effect and those upon whom action 
depends* (Barrett and Fudge, 1981: 25). The benefit of adopting such a view is 
claimed to be that it provides ‘a method of identifying more clearly who seems to 
be influencing what, how and why* (Barrett and Hill, 1981, cited in Ham and Hill, 
1993: 109).
If bottom-up policy-making occurred in relation to formula funding and AEN, 
there would be evidence of schools challenging or influencing LEA policy, or even
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LEAs challenging or influencing central government policy. Higher level decision­
makers would not be in complete control of the policy process, and a clear 
distinction between policy-making and policy implementation would not be 
evident.
ISSUES AND PROBLEMS IN DECISION-MAKING
To what extent real decision-making in the search for equity is characteristic of 
either the garbage-can, bounded rationalist or incrementalist models, is yet to be 
seen. However, it must be noted that the models reveal relatively little about what 
decision-makers actually get up to, what the key issues are for them, and the nature 
of the practical problems they confront. The remainder of this chapter addresses a 
diverse range of factors relating to these issues.
Information
Information is a key ingredient in decision-making. In crude terms, common sense 
would seem to dictate, and rationalism presuppose, that the more information 
decision-makers have to hand, the better the decisions that are taken. However, is 
information a good thing which decision-makers can have too much of?
Hogwood and Peters (1985) identify a range of problems that may arise as the 
amount of information increases. For example, organisational paralysis may occur
96
if channels of communication become obstructed and decision-makers swamped by 
the sheer volume of information in circulation. Moreover, it is claimed that the 
presence of excessive amounts of data may encourage ‘a veritable orgy of 
statistical analysis’ which tends to ‘obscure rather than illuminate fundamental 
issues in resource allocation* (Sheldon, Davey Smith and Bevan, 1993: 835)2. The 
warning is that data cannot, in itself, make policy.
There may be various costs involved in collecting information other than financial 
costs. This is perhaps particularly true in the case of data on needs. The collection 
of certain types of data may be viewed as suspicious or unacceptable intrusion 
(Elster, 1992), or stigmatising to the intended beneficiaries of policy. Also, 
primary data collection and processing may be extremely time-consuming and 
costly. For example, the ‘Needs in Leeds’ project reported by Percy-Smith and 
Sanderson (1992) involved nine main stages, including a large postal survey, in- 
depth interviews with selected respondents, and a series of structured discussions 
with local groups, organisations, professionals and front-line workers. Adopting 
such a broad fronted approach to assessing need may be very successful, but it is 
certainly not cheap on time and money.
In light of these costs, it is unsurprising to find a bias towards ready made data and 
information which is easily available (Edwards, 1975). For example, in his major 
study of Local Needs and Resources, Davies (1968: 41) admitted that:
Sheldon et. al. predicted that an ‘orgy of statistical analysis’ would ensue when vast 
amounts of new data from the 1991 census became widely available.
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the choice of indices has been biased to a considerable extent 
because we were virtually restricted to centrally collected or 
published data
The same explanation applies to the choice of mortality data as an indicator of 
health need in the Resource Allocation Working Party formula, and to the use of 
Census data in the Standard Spending Assessment / Revenue Support Grant 
process.
In education, readily available data might include information concerning free 
school meals3, possibly educational test results routinely gathered by individual 
LEAs, national test results from the SATs, and results from ethnic monitoring by 
schools.
Needs measurement
One key task for policy-makers is to decide how to identify and measure needs, 
and sort out what type data they will require to do so. One option is to rely on 
discretionary judgements of professionals and other staff. In many circumstances 
discretionary decision-making has the advantage of being a cheap, simple and 
flexible process which assesses needs directly (Elster, 1992). However, in other 
circumstances, discretion has less to commend it (ibid) and may even be 
proscribed by government due to fears of inconsistency or the power it yields to 
professionals4. Indeed, all large scale processes of resource allocation - for 
example, the allocation of grants from central to local government, grant allocation
3 Children of families in receipt of Income Support are eligible for free school meals.
4 As reported in Chapter 2, Circular 7/88 appeared to proscribe the use of discretionary 
judgements as a means of assessing needs for formula funding.
98
to health regions and districts, and now the LMS / formula funding process in 
education - are characterised by a different approach: the use of allocation 
formulae fed with information on needs derived from indicator data.
Indicator data provides a proxy or surrogate for direct measurements of need. In 
simple terms this means that it does not measure ‘exactly what we wish to 
measure*, but nevertheless is assumed to provide a fairly accurate indication of the 
state of affairs (Sandford, 1977: 19). Thus, for example, the RAWP formula 
utilised mortality data as a proxy means of measuring need for health care (DHSS, 
1976; Mays and Bevan, 1987); and in education indicators such as the number of 
children from large families or the number of children from families in receipt of 
social security benefits have been used as proxy measures of educational need 
(Little and Mabey, 1972; Hunter, 1989).
Indicator data finds favour because it tends to be cheap to collect and use; much 
valuable data is collected routinely, with others often footing the bill. However, 
equally, there is sometimes no alternative to using a proxy measure: some of the 
phenomena to be measured are so multifaceted and complex (for example, ‘health* 
or ‘social disadvantage*) as to make direct measurement impossible (Shonfield and 
Shaw, 1972; Carley, 1980).
Despite these advantages, proxy measures are potentially problematic. As Elster 
(1992: 65) points out, ‘type 1 and type 2 errors may occur*. In resource allocation 
it is therefore possible that ‘some of the people who should get the good don’t get
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it and some get it who shouldn’t*. Moreover there is a danger that decision­
makers may ‘overvalue the explanatory power of indicators’ (Carley, 1980: 194). 
Bauer (1966) highlights the danger of surrogate measures becoming accepted as 
true measures of need, thereby masking the influence of value-judgements and 
practical constraints in the choice of indicators.
In general, Percy-Smith and Sanderson (1992: 38) argue that existing sources of 
data must be subjected to the following questions:
* Is the information valid? Does it measure what we want it to 
measure?
* Is the information reliable? Does it give an accurate picture of 
what we want to measure?
* Is the information comprehensive? Does it give us a full picture?
* Does the information relate to the relevant area or population?
* Is the information up to date?
The answers to these questions will often, they argue, show that pre-existing data 
‘has serious limitations in terms of its contribution to the process of needs 
assessment’ (Joe. c/7). Therefore, they suggest that pre-existing data is of most use 
as an aid to identifying the target population(s) for a needs audit or contextualising 
the findings of the audit (ibid, p. 42).
This is all very well, but do policy-makers have much choice in these matters of 
data collection and use? I would argue that Percy-Smith and Sanderson seem
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insufficiently aware of the constraints under which policy-makers operate, i.e. their 
inability to afford large-scale primary data collection.
Index construction
If indicator data is to be used to measure needs, a choice must be made between 
using a single indicator or a combination of two or more indicator reading in a 
needs index. In deciding which route to take, policy-makers are urged to first 
produce a clear definition of what it they seek to measure (Edwards, 1975; 1985). 
The definition should, it is argued, identify the nature of the need in question and 
the focal unit for policy, i.e. is it the needs of individuals, groups, institutions, 
communities or areas which is the concern?
The focal unit should be borne in mind by policy-makers and researchers in 
deciding which indicators of need to use (Hannan, 1971). If issues of aggregation 
and disaggregation are ignored, a policy’s potential for success may be severely 
limited. For example, as noted in the previous chapter, Barnes and Lucas (1974) 
revealed the flaws of a policy which sought to address the needs of individual 
children in need but which targeted resources according to measures of need at the 
school level: the majority of needy children did not attend the most needy schools, 
and the majority of pupils in the most needy schools were not themselves in need.
As noted above, policy-makers must choose how many indicators to use in 
measuring needs. A single indicator may suffice in terms of providing an 
assessment of need, and be simple and cheap to use in practice. However, ‘need’,
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'social disadvantage*, 'health* and so on are not easily quantifiable phenomena and 
it may be presumed that the broader the range of factors taken into account (in a 
need index), then the more realistic and accurate measures will be. If more than 
one indicator is used in measuring need, the issue of weighting arises.
Weighting means giving a greater relative value to one indicator than another. The 
logic of weighting seems sound: many factors may influence or be statistically 
linked to needs, but surely they cannot all affect needs to the same degree. 
Moreover, weighting is accepted practice. For example, in the Additional 
Educational Needs Index used in the Standard Spending Assessment in 1990, three 
indicators were used - percentage of children from lone parent families, percentage 
of children from families on Income Support, percentage of children from ethnic 
minority households - and weighted 1.5, 1.5 and 1 respectively (DOE, 1990).
In other situations, however, policy-makers have found it impossible to find any 
‘theoretical or empirical justification for a differential weighting scheme*; such was 
the conclusion of those first entrusted with creating an Educational Priority Index 
for Inner London (Little and Mabey, 1972: 92). Thus Little and Mabey opted to 
weight all indicators in their index equally. But this was not a neutral decision: 
when equal weights are given to all indicators, it is the choice of indicators which 
becomes the de facto means of adjusting the index in favour of different types of 
factors (Carley, 1980). Indicator choice as a means of weighting is an intriguing 
issue, given the factors which may influence choice, e.g. availability of data.
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RESOURCE ALLOCATION DECISION-MAKING
Many analysts and commentators discuss the general points made above, regarding 
information issues and the constraints under which decision-makers operate. 
However, Blalock (1991) and Elster (1992) directly address the practical activities 
of resource allocation decision-making, the pursuit of equity, and also the issue of 
claims regarding need in such situations. Their main contentions are now discussed 
in the final section of this chapter.
In relation to equity, Blalock specifically refers to the type of situation exemplified 
by LMS formula funding: a recurring allocation process which involves a relatively 
stable group of political representatives making decisions governing a relatively 
stable group of recipients. In relation to such situations, Blalock makes three key 
points. First, he claims that decisions may be skewed by considerations less worthy 
than those of equity:
It may not be so much a consideration of equity that prevails ... The 
overriding concern among the allocators may be the objective of 
remaining in office or of being reelected by their constituencies.
(Blalock, 1991: 44)
Second, there is a strong bias towards incrementalism. Indeed, he warns that:
... pre-existing inequities are likely to be perpetuated for 
considerably periods of time ... because at the time of each specific 
allocation, the agents concerned are most likely to be placing their 




This may be true, although it could be argued that the position of allocators may be 
made equally vulnerable if they persist in pursuing incrementalism when the status 
quo is evidently unfair or if their self-serving objectives are exposed. The issue of 
visibility - the degree to which rationing decisions are open to public scrutiny - is 
obviously an important issue (see Chapter 1).
Third, Blalock operates from the assumption that allocators will have multiple 
goals in mind and, moreover, that:
under most circumstances no single goal will so dominate the others 
that compromises and dilemmas will not play important roles in the 
decision process.
(pp. cit., p. 101)
How the goal of equity fares in comparison with its rivals is an issue to consider in 
later chapters.
Blalock’s main argument in relation to need takes the form of a warning: the 
concept is wide open to exploitation. Due to inadequate understanding of the 
causes and effects of social phenomena,
I t ... becomes possible to select out whatever subset of explanatory 
factors is most compatible with one’s vested interests or ideological 
biases so as to decide which kinds of persons "in need" are indeed 
deserving of receiving a slice of whatever pie is being allocated.
(Blalock, 1991:211)
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If Blalock is correct, the concept o f ‘need* is best seen as a cover; a front; a means 
by which to legitimate whatever type of distribution allocators desire. It would 
therefore be likely that decision-making would not necessarily involve either a clear 
statement of goals (final needs) or the identification of need satisfiers.
This is an interesting and contentious claim regarding need, but it can be argued 
that Blalock surely overstates his case. In real decision-making situations, is data 
usually so plentiful and so open to interpretation and manipulation as to allow any 
kind of allocation to be justified by the claim to be meeting need? Need may be 
used as a legitimating device, a ruse by which to gain acceptance for policy. But 
there is little to suggest that absolutely ‘anything goes’; there are surely limits to 
the vested interests or ideological biases that can be concealed by and legitimated 
by a claim of need.
Elster (1992) also discusses the practicalities of resource allocation decision­
making. But he also attempts to identify and explain some of the general factors - 
he calls them ‘mechanisms’ - which influence the formation of allocation 
preferences and practices. Most relevant is the idea of professional norms5, two of 
which are discussed here.
The first is the ‘norm of compassion’ whereby a resource is allocated to the most 
needy even though its allocation to another might have yielded more benefit in 
terms of improved outcomes. Elster suggests that this norm has developed
5 Elster’s discusses professional norms in the medical profession. However, the points he 
makes are general and are here cited without reference to the original context
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because decision-makers tend to make decisions with a view to the likely outcomes 
for recipients if left untreated rather than comparing likely outcomes if treated. He 
states:
A similar framing effect can occur ... if the allocation of funds for 
social issues is a function of how important the problems are, and 
not o f how effective the funds would be in solving them. Some 
educational programs for disadvantaged groups fall into this 
category.
(Elster, 1992: 147)
Whether, or to what extent, LEA policy-makers have an idea of the potential 
effectiveness of the AEN funds they allocate under formula funding will be 
interesting to see later.
The second professional norm discussed by Elster is the ‘norm of thoroughness*. 
As its title implies, this norm dictates that once a recipient has been accepted as 
needy, as a legitimate receiver of allocated resources, then "he or she should get 
"the full treatment"* {ibicL, p. 148). Elster suggests that this norm has developed 
because policy-makers sometimes (perhaps often) find it difficult to cut their losses.
It is hard to tell how to interpret this norm. On the one hand, it is a norm which 
feeds into incrementalist practice. However, it could also indicate a penchant 
among policy-makers for procedures by which to target resources so that fewer 
recipients receive more resources (and hence can benefit from more like the ‘full 
treatment*).
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The idea of professional norms is interesting, although Elster* s list of norms is by 
no means comprehensive. Research results may enable additions to be made.
CONCLUSION
In this chapter I have identified and discussed factors and problems to do with the 
process of decision-making which might influence the solutions policy-makers 
adopt in the search for equity. General models of decision-making were described 
and critically analysed, issues relating to information and the construction of 
indices of need were discussed, and finally the work of Blalock and Elster - which 
directly address the practical activities of resource allocation decision-making - was 
selectively plundered. In all, a wide range of issues have been raised, not all of 
which sit easily together. The weight of the evidence points to policy-making as a 
business heavily influenced by compromises and constraints, wherein diverse goals 
and aspirations, be they explicit or hidden, shape events and outcomes. The link 
between issues of decision-making and what takes place in the search for equity, 
and the importance of decision-making issues in relation to the concept of equity, 





RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODS 
INTRODUCTION
‘Equity* is undeniably a key concept in social policy, important in terms of both 
research and practice. But it is an ‘essentially contested* and imprecise concept, as 
consideration of the relevant academic literature has shown. Thus, ‘equity according 
to need* must be given meaning by those entrusted with policy-making. What do they 
decide, and what influences their decisions? These issues, which are virtually 
unexplored in the social policy literature, are central to this research.
Previous chapters have laid the policy and conceptual foundations for this research. I 
have described formula funding (the policy laboratory for this study), explained why 
this policy provides an excellent example for research purposes, and reviewed the 
relevant literature on policy-making. I have also critically analysed the key concepts of 
need and equity. Indeed, in analysing equity the first aim of this research project was 
realised. In Chapter 4 I generated a conceptual framework with which to map 
differences between equities.
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In this chapter, I come on to describe the empirical element of my research, starting 
with the research questions, then providing details of the research methods used, and 
finally acknowledging the minor problems encountered in the research process.
To aid understanding of what follows, I first provide an overview of the research 
undertaken.
OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH
The empirical element of my research had two main aims. First, to find out what 
equity according to need looks like when brought to life and whether similar or diverse 
interpretations of the concept are evident in the practice of different decision-making 
bodies. Second, to investigate the search which goes on for equitable solutions and 
the interrelationship between equity and other policy-making goals and concerns.
This suggested the need for two different types of fieldwork: survey research to 
generate factual data about LEA funding formulae, and case study research to 
investigate the search for equity. In the event, three censuses of LEAs in England 
were conducted and four case studies of individual authorities made. The research 
fieldwork took place over a period of two and a half years, from Autumn 1989 to 
Spring 1992. The order of events was as follows.
110
In the Autumn of 1989, a census of LEAs was undertaken at the time when authorities 
were submitting their formula funding proposals for Ministerial approval1. This census 
established whether or not LEAs were planning to include an additional needs 
component in their funding formulae and, in the case of those planning to do so, what 
methods of measuring needs and allocating resources were proposed. Overall, the 
findings showed great diversity in LEAs1 plans.
Using data from the first census, four authorities were chosen as case studies for 
further investigation between Autumn 1990 and Spring 1992. The case studies were 
used to investigate key issues relating to the search for equity and the factors which 
influenced that process.
Two further censuses were conducted, in Spring 1991 and Spring 1992. Taken 
together, the findings of the three censuses provide information on policy evolution, 
i.e. consistency or change over time in terms of what constitutes equity according to 
need.




In this research I seek answers to two different types of questions. First there are 
questions concerning what equity according to need looks like in practice. Basic 
quantitative information is sought here. Phrased in general terms, these questions are: 
Does equity according to need take one or a variety of forms? Which needs are taken 
into account? What input-outcome relationships are set in place? Now applied to the 
case of formula funding, the questions are:
[a] How many authorities include an additional needs component in their formula, 
and how many do not?
[b] If LEAs do include an AEN component in their formulae, what percentage of 
their Aggregate Schools Budget do they devote to the AEN component?
[c] Which types of needs do LEAs take into account in their AEN components?
[d] How are these needs measured?
[e] What methods do LEAs use to calculate the amount of money to be allocated 
to individual schools in respect of AEN factors?
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The second type of questions relate to the search for equity and the relative 
importance of equity as a policy goal. What are the main factors which play a part in 
shaping manifestations of equity and definitions of need? Does equity stay the same 
and hence facilitate policy stability, or change and demand policy revision? Does 
equity peacefully co-exist or conflict with other policy goals? These questions can be 
applied to the case of formula funding as they stand: of interest are the factors and 
considerations which fed into the decision to take account of additional needs factors 
in the formula, how the proportion of resources to be allocated in respect of additional 
needs was decided, and how and why formulae evolve over time.
Distinctly different kinds of research questions and issues are best addressed by 
different research methods. Questions [a] to [e] listed above relate to the outcomes of 
decision-making, i.e. what has been decided by LEAs. They beg for basic quantitative 
data. Surveys, of which censuses (including the Decennial Census of the entire 
population) are a particular type, are an especially common and useful means of basic 
‘fact finding*. Moreover, they can be repeated at various intervals to provide 
comparative, time-series data.
When it comes to investigating how and why certain decisions were arrived at, or 
researching events as they unfold, however, alternative research methods are more 
appropriate, especially the case study approach (Yin, 1989).
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CENSUSES OF LEAs
The censuses conducted as part of this research had three distinctive characteristics. 
First, the respondents were local education authorities and not individuals, even as 
‘role-holders* (Hakim, 1987: 5). Second, published documents were sought. Third, 
all local education authorities in England were invited to participate in a postal census; 
no sampling was used.
These decisions were shaped by methodological and pragmatic considerations. LEA 
documents were sought for two main reasons. First, because under the provisions of 
LMS local education authorities are required to produce public documents which 
should contain, among many other data, all the basic factual information sought. 
Second, there was a wish to minimise the time-burden on those wishing to co-operate 
with the research; it was assumed that completing a fairly detailed questionnaire would 
take longer than placing a document in an envelope. By relying on published 
statements of LEA policy rather than individuals completing questionnaires, it was also 
hoped that bias and misinformation could be avoided.
Censuses rather than sample surveys were undertaken partly because there is a 
relatively small number of LEAs in England, and partly because there was uncertainty 
concerning the response rate. Moreover, the usual arguments in favour of sampling 
(see: Moser and Kalton, 1983) were insufficiently relevant or compelling. The number
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of authorities contacted varied between the first and subsequent censuses. This is 
because in 1990 the Inner London Education Authority was abolished, and thirteen 
new LEAs created in its place. Hence, 96 authorities were contacted in 1989 as 
opposed to 109 in both 1991 and 1992.
Documents sought
There were two main types of documents requested from LEAs - LMS schemes and 
Section 42 budget statements.
In all three censuses, authorities were asked to send copies of their LMS schemes. In 
1989, only draft schemes were available, i.e. schemes containing proposals for 
implementation in April 1990. In 1991, approved schemes were requested from non 
inner-London LEAs and draft schemes were requested from the new inner London 
authorities {i.e. schemes containing proposals for implementation in April 1992). In 
1992, only approved schemes were sought.
DES Circular 7/88 (Annex C of the Appendices) had proposed that LMS schemes - 
draft or approved - should contain the following main sections:
A Summary
B Introduction
C Schools within the scope of the scheme
D Items of expenditure to be delegated and excepted items
E The formula
F Conditions and requirements
G Arrangements for implementation
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In Section E, LEAs were advised to provide, among other information, a full 
description of their formula and an ‘illustration of the effect of the formula on a range 
of individual schools’ (DES, 1988: 53-4). This advice was not always followed, hence 
the decision to collect additional documentation was based on the experience gathered 
in conducting the first census (where only LMS schemes were collected).
The second type of document - the Section 42 budget statement - was not available at 
the time when the first census was conducted. However it was available and was 
requested in 1991 and 1992. This smaller yet more detailed document is intended to 
provide accurate data specifically about an authority’s resource allocation plans for the 
following financial year. It was hoped that if detailed information was not to be found 
in authorities’ LMS schemes, it would be contained in the Section 42 budget 
statement.
Data collection period and response rate
The data collection period for the censuses lasted for roughly three months in each 
case: from October 1989 to January 1990, and from April to June in both 1991 and 
1992. The following general response rates were achieved:
1989 : 84 replies out of 96 LEAs = 87% response rate
1991 : 58 replies out of 109 LEAs = 53% response rate
1992 : 70 replies out of 109 LEAs = 64% response rate
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The censuses sought three main types of data from education authorities: the 
percentage ASB devoted to AEN; the AEN indicators used; and the allocation 
methods used to distribute AEN money. LEAs varied in terms of whether the 
materials they provided proved adequate information on one, two or all three of these 
factors. This variation in the quality of response is shown in Table 3. The importance 
of the data contained in the table will be seen in Chapters 7 and 8 - which present and 
discuss the census data - since the number of respondents to draw on varies from issue 
to issue in any given year.




Tvpes of data Id thl Id Id lb] Id Id m Id
% ASB 42 51 45 41 72 38 59 84 54
Indicators 82 98 85 55 96 50 68 97 62
Allocation methods 61 73 64 49 86 45 65 93 60
KEY:
[a] number of LEAs supplying data
[b] percentage of the authorities responding to the census which supplied this data
[c] percentage of all authorities supplying this data (all refers to 96 LEAs in 1990- 
91 and 109 LEAs in both 1991-2 and 1992-3.
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Thus it can be seen that good response rates were achieved in all three of the censuses. 
Where LEAs did not initially reply to my request for information, follow-up telephone 
calls were made. Eventual non-response was not analysed This was for a simple 
reason. In order to establish whether non-response affected my overall research 
findings, I would have had to know the details of the AEN components of the non­
responding LEAs. But if I had been able to discover these details, I would obviously 
have included the data in my research. The characteristics of the formulae of non- 
responding LEAs remained unknown.
Analysis of responses
The analysis of schemes and statements and the process of clarifying details contained 
therein proved to be very time-consuming. Often documents did not contain the 
required information, government recommendations concerning the contents of 
schemes having been ignored. Sometimes an authority’s LMS scheme would contain 
conflicting information within its pages, or information which conflicted with that 
presented in the authority’s Section 42 budget statement. In such cases, attempts were 
made to clarify details by means of telephone calls. Although this method did not 
prove universally successful, many gaps in the data were plugged and anomalies ironed 
out.




The primary aim of the censuses was to provide a means of collecting basic empirical 
data. However, as mentioned above, the first census in 1989 served an additional 
purpose: to inform the choice of case studies. This inter-relationship between survey 
research and case studies is described by Hakim (1987: 62):
After a body of research evidence has accumulated on a topic, selective 
case studies can focus on particular aspects, or issues, to refine 
knowledge. For example, case studies can be used to provide a more 
richly detailed and precise account of the processes at work within 
particular types of case highlighted by surveys ...
Like most research methods, the case study has been defined, explained and used in a 
variety of ways. This is not the place to enter into a full discussion of these differences 
(for that see Yin, 1989; Hakim, 1987). Rather the fundamental aspects of the method 
are briefly outlined and some of the main criticisms noted before explaining how and 
why the four case studies chosen for this research were identified.
Hakim (1987: 61) describes the case study as ‘the social research equivalent of the 
spotlight or the microscope*. The emphasis is on studying one or more selected 
examples in depth and from a variety of angles. The examples need not be 
representative, in the first instance the aim is ‘to understand the case itself; only later 
might there be efforts to generalise from the case to broader principles’ (Carroll and
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Johnson, 1990: 38). The number and choice of cases is obviously important. If 
multiple case studies are undertaken the aim is usually either to attempt to ‘ achieve 
replication of the same study in different settings or to compare and contrast different 
cases’ (Hakim, 1987: 63). Thus cases may thus be chosen either because they are 
thought typical or because they are thought distinct.
Once cases have been identified, multiple methods of research and data collection are 
typically employed, with two reasons (or potential benefits) in mind. First, using a 
range of methods is intended to enable the researcher to understand the case in great 
detail and reveal a more holistic picture of circumstances, events, processes or 
whatever. And second, findings can be cross-referenced in order to test their validity; 
this is referred to as ‘multiple triangulation’ (Denzin, 1978 cited in Hakim, 1987: 144- 
5).
Case study research has been criticised on a number of grounds. First, the approach is 
criticised for lacking scientific rigour because of the apparently idiosyncratic way 
researchers choose topics and exploit the flexibility of the case study approach by 
taking up and putting down different research methods at different times. Second, it is 
argued that it is rarely possible to check whether information was correctly recorded in 
the first place or whether the researcher’s preconceptions intruded on the 
interpretation of evidence (Carroll and Johnson, 1990: 42-3). Third, the reporting of 
case studies is not without its criticisms. Carroll and Johnston (1990: 42) argue that
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all too often they are ‘little more than good stories or window dressing for the 
opinions of researchers*. And Hakim (1987: 74) points to two commonly-found 
faults: researchers only reporting their conclusions or presenting a mass of poorly 
sorted and ‘indigestible* data. I have attempted to avoid these pitfalls in Chapters 9 to 
12.
These points noted, Yin (1989: 19-25) maintains that the case study approach tends to 
have a ‘distinct advantage’ over other methods when research is directed towards 
answering questions of ‘how’ and ‘why*; when the topic of research is contemporary, 
as opposed to historical, events; if ‘the boundaries between phenomenon and context 
are not clearly evident’; and when the researcher either does not seek or can have little 
influence over events or phenomena. For these reasons, decisions, decision-makers 
and decision-making processes are frequently investigated in case study research 
(Carroll and Johnson, 1990; Schramm, 1971 cited in Yin, 1989: 22-3).
Selection of case study LEAs
The case studies explored in this research were chosen via a two-stage process. First, 
a crude sampling frame was constructed and authorities sorted accordingly (using data 
from the 1989 census). This two-by-two grid distinguished between authorities on the 
basis of two variables: level of additional educational needs, as indicated by 
Department of the Environment AEN index scores2; and the degree of complexity of
2 The DoE Additional Educational Needs index is used by central government in the 
calculation of Standard Spending Assessments for local authorities. For further details, see 
DoE (1990).
the methods used to measure and allocate resources in respect of additional needs 
factors. Hence, the following grid was constructed:
HighAEN
Complex methods Simple methods
Low AEN
The second stage involved deciding which authorities to choose from each of the four 
boxes. The LEAs selected were in no way intended to form a representative sample - 
neither a representative sample of all authorities nor individually representative of 
other authorities located in the same box on the above grid. Rather cases were 
specifically chosen to provide a means of investigating an illustrative range of relevant 
issues which emerged from the findings of the first census. As a result, the case 
studies examined the general issues which were set out above, as well as issues 
particularly relevant to the individual authorities concerned.
Factors such as the distance and cost of travel to different authorities did not impinge 
on the selection of cases. Access was negotiated with either the Chief Education 
Officer or a senior officer responsible for implementing LMS. Confidentiality in the 
reporting of the case studies was offered, and in all cases access was granted.
The four case study authorities were as follows:
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Authority A
A Labour controlled Metropolitan Borough with higher than average AEN3 when 
compared to other Metropolitan Boroughs, and using a very simple method of 
measuring needs / allocating resources. Specifically, this authority was chosen because 
it allocated a very high proportion of its budget in respect of'social deprivation’.
Authority B
A Conservative controlled County Council, with lower than average AEN when 
compared to other County Councils, and using a complex method of measuring 
'special educational needs’. This method - professional, discretionary assessments - 
was unusual and provided the reason for choosing this authority.
Authority C
A Conservative controlled County Council, with lower than average AEN when 
compared to other County Councils, and using a relatively simple method of 
measuring needs / allocating resources. Specifically this authority was chosen because 
it began LMS with one method of measuring needs / allocating resources while stating 
that new methods would be developed and introduced in the near future. The specific 
aim here was to study policy revision.
To avoid identifying the case study authorities, precise AEN index scores, as calculated by 
the Department of the Environment, are not reproduced here.
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Authority D
A Labour controlled inner London Borough with one of the highest AEN ratings in 
England. It is one of the new LEAs created in 1990 on the abolition of the ILEA. 
Specifically, this case study followed the way the authority developed its plans for 
formula funding and particularly its plans for taking account of additional needs in the 
two year run-up to implementing LMS.









Data collection and sources
The case study authorities were initially approached in the Autumn of 1990 and the 
research proper spanned roughly fifteen months, from the beginning of 1991 to the 
Spring of 1992, when plans for the financial year 1992-3 had been formalised. More 
importantly, however, the research spanned a period in which authorities twice had to 
decide on their formula funding plans for the forthcoming year, i.e. in the run-up to
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April 1991 plans for 1991-2 were decided, and in the run-up to April 1992 plans for
1992-3 were decided.
The chosen authorities were studied by various means: analysing LMS schemes, 
financial statements, working and discussion papers, research reports, etc. ; conducting 
interviews with policy-makers, relevant professionals (e.g. educational psychologists) 
and, in a limited number of cases, elected members; sitting in on meetings and 
discussions, where possible; and correspondence by letter and telephone. Full details 
of the sources tapped for the case studies are contained in Appendix A which, for 
obvious reasons, must remain confidential.
The number of visits made to the chosen LEAs varied between cases. The amount of 
information that could be collected without travel varied considerably, as did the 
willingness and indeed the ability of the officers concerned to spend time arranging 
visits and meetings and being interviewed. Thus, seven visits were made to authority 
D, as compared to one visit to authority B, for example4.
Problems encountered
The case study research proved more problematic than the censuses, but not unduly 
so. Indeed, there were only two problems worthy of note.
Meetings with officers from authority B did, however, take place at other venues, such as 
seminars and conferences.
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First, it proved very hard to discover the reasons underlying some of the decisions 
authorities had taken. However, this in a sense was not only a problem but also a 
research finding, as will be clarified later.
Second, a problem arises in writing up the census and case study research. The four 
case study authorities were given an assurance that they would not be nameuld not be namec 
pledge is upheld. However, these authorities were chosen precisely because of some 
distinctive aspect of their policy. Therefore, it is not inconceivable that other 
researchers in this field will recognise or, if sufficiently motivated to do so, be able to 
discover the identity of some or all of the case study authorities. This is not an 
unusual problem for those involved in case study research (see, for example: Edwards,
1995).
PRESENTING THE RESEARCH FINDINGS
The findings of this research are presented in the following six chapters. In Chapters 7 
and 8 I summarise and discuss the data gathered via the censuses. Chapter 7 provides 
a snapshot - a full summary of results from the 1991-92 census. Chapter 8, on the 
other hand, draws on data from all three censuses to look at whether LEA versions of 
equity remain the same or change over time. Then Chapters 9 to 12 each present and 
analyse one case study. Finally, Chapter 13 offers a more general analysis and 





THE SHAPE OF EQUITY: RESULTS OF THE 1991-92 CENSUS 
INTRODUCTION
The LMS framework lays down certain general and specific rules, as well as advice 
to LEAs regarding formula construction. However, it also allows for considerable 
variations in practice between LEA. Do LEAs exploit this potential for diversity? 
Does ‘equity* look the same or different from LEA to LEA? How similar or 
different are the AEN components of LEA formulae? Data from the surveys 
conducted for this study lead to an unequivocal answer: diversity rules. Moreover, 
the dimensions of difference between LEA schemes are legion. Below, seven main 
dimensions of difference are explored: whether or not LEAs take AEN into 
account; which needs are recognised; how needs are measured; level of AEN 
funding; money allocated to schools; if LEAs operate universal or selective 
policies; and whether their schemes are targeted or not.
In this chapter, I draw on data from the second census which relates to the financial 
year 1991-92. Data from the first survey is not used since it is of a less reliable 
status: it recorded what LEAs planned in 1990-91, rather than actual LEA
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practice1. As explained in the previous chapter, although a total of 57 LEAs 
responded to the 1991-92 survey, not all responses contained all the required 
information. For this reason, in the presentation of results below there is some 
fluctuation in sample size from issue to issue.
AEN RECOGNITION
There is no law compelling LEAs to take AEN factors into account in formula 
funding. However, the 1991-2 survey found that virtually all LEA respondents (55 
out of 57) did include an AEN component in their formula. The two authorities 
which did not take AEN factors into account in funding schools - Newham and 
City of London - were, in fact, the only authorities with exactly the same approach 
to AEN and formula funding.
In the case of City of London LEA, there are special circumstances which help to 
explain its stance. Since this LEA has only one school, the precise detail of the 
formula is (in financial terms, at least) irrelevant - the school receives the total 
Aggregate Schools Budget. Having said this however, it may be that the AEN 
component in an LEA formula plays an important and quite different role - that of 
sensitising schools to childrens* needs, i.e. schools are made aware that they are 
receiving a particular amount of money precisely to take care of AEN-related 
expenditure.
Actually, 8 of the 57 respondents to the second survey were inner London LEAs stating 
plans for when they would begin LMS in April 1992.
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Newham LEA felt the need to explain the lack of an AEN component in the 
formula. The rationale offered was quite different to that of City of London LEA. 
The Newham LMS scheme announced that the LEA did not yet 'possess an 
appropriate needs assessment mechanism* and that this was why 'no separate 
provision for special needs within the formula* was made at that time.
Thus, virtually all authorities took AEN factors into account. But which factors?
WHICH NEEDS?
What did authorities say their AEN components were for? Which types of needs 
did LEAs seek to meet? Variations between LEAs in this respect formed the 
second main dimension of difference between schemes.
Judging by statements in their LMS schemes, the aspirations of LEAs varied 
considerably. For example, authorities stated that they sought to allocate AEN 
resources to:
* meet the learning difficulties of individual children with Special Educational 
Needs but without Statements of SEN (e.g. Northumberland)
* schools containing a high concentration of socially disadvantaged pupils 
(e.g. Birmingham)
* schools serving disadvantaged areas (e.g. Walsall)
* support schools in tackling the educational results of social inequality (e.g. 
Sheffield)
* compensate certain schools for the fact that poor parents are often unable 
to make ‘voluntary contributions* towards educational visits and other 
activities (e.g. Rotherham)
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With LEAs expressing such a range of different intentions, fundamentally different 
methods of measuring needs might have been expected. But all of the above 
authorities relied solely on free school meals data to measure their chosen needs. 
Despite such examples of consistency across LEAs, the third main dimension of 
difference concerns the way needs are measured.
NEED MEASUREMENT
In almost all cases, LEAs measure needs by using proxy indicators such as the 
incidence of pupils receiving free school meals {i.e. the children of families on 
Income Support), or the number of pupils scoring below a certain level on a 
reading test, say. Indeed, only one LEA respondent did not resort to the use of 
indicators at all; the authority relied solely on professional assessments of pupils’ 
special educational needs in a process known as the Special Needs Audit. This 
process is fully described and discussed in the second of the case study chapters, 
where the LEA concerned is referred to as authority B.
Authority B was not the only LEA to use professional assessments. Four others 
(8% respondents) also did so, but in their cases this was in conjunction with 
indicator measurements. For example, Berkshire schools received AEN resources 
partly on the basis of special educational needs assessments made by Head teachers 
and educational psychologists, and partly on the basis of free school meals data.
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Overall sixteen different types of proxy indicators were used by LEAs in 1991-92. 
Free school meals data proved by far the most common indicator, employed by 
85% respondents (44 out of 522). Next came educational test scores of various 
kinds (reading, maths, verbal reasoning etc.), which were used by one in four 
authorities (14 in total). Lack of fluency in English indicators were used by nine of 
the 52 LEA respondents. By contrast, measures of parental occupation were used 
by just two LEAs and the more ‘exotic’ indicator of children from families without 
a car only found favour with Gateshead3. Among the other indicators employed by 
LEAs this year were: pupil turnover; clothing or maintenance grants; large family; 
one parent family; low socio-economic group of parents; living in Council 
accommodation; and pupils from homeless families / overcrowded homes / BandB 
accommodation.
Nearly half of authorities (23 out of 52) relied on just one indicator to measure 
additional needs; 19 out of these 23 LEAs relied solely on free meals data. For 
example, the AEN components of the Cleveland, Devon and Durham formulae all 
relied solely on free meals data to measure needs (as did Northumberland, 
Birmingham, Walsall, Sheffield and Rotherham as mentioned previously).
Overall, nearly 80% LEAs used either one or two indicators to measure AEN. 
However, at the other end of the spectrum LEAs used as many as eight. In
2 57 LEAs responded to the 1991-92 survey. Two respondents did not provide details of 
the methods used to measure AEN; two more did not have an AEN component in their 
formula; and one LEA relied solely on professional assessments. Hence n = 52 in this 
case.
3 Further details of the Gateshead index are provided below.
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particular, the new authorities created in Inner London tended to use a higher 
number of indicators. For example, Hammersmith and Fulham LEA planned to use 
an index comprised of five indicators, and Greenwich six indicators. Southwark 
planned to employ the largest index, comprised of the following factors: 
professional assessments of pupil behaviour, and indicator data relating to free 
school meals, large families, ethnic minorities, children in care, pupil turnover, one 
parent families and no-wage earner households.
In the case of the Southwark index, all the eight indicators / factors were given 
equal weighting. Therefore, a child receiving a free meal generated the same need 
score for its school as a child from an ethnic minority, for instance. The Gateshead 
index, by way of a contrast, employed differential weightings. Indeed, the need 
score generated by a child from an unemployed family was three times that 
generated by a child from a large family. The Gateshead indicators and weightings 
were as follows:
The Gateshead index is also of interest because it relied on data derived from 
analysing pupils’ addresses - i.e. on aggregate data derived from local censuses and 
surveys. Bradford did much the same also. However, this was not at all common 














collected directly by schools, or at least data which related directly to the school 
level, such as free meals statistics and educational test scores.
Thus far, three dimensions of difference have been identified and illustrated: AEN 
recognition; type of need; and need measurement. What of funding issues? Level 
of funding can be analysed in two ways. First, LEAs can be compared according 
to the proportion of their budget devoted to AEN factors. Second, it is possible to 
look at differences at the school level. These are the fourth and fifth main 
dimensions of difference between LEA approaches.
PROPORTION OF ASB
In 1991-92, the average percentage of Aggregate Schools Budget devoted to AEN 
was 3.3%4. However, the range was considerable. Durham allocated least of all, 
standing at 0.2% ASB. A further eight authorities also devoted 1% or less, and 
eight more LEAs stood between 1.1% and 2% ASB. However eight authorities 
devoted more than 7.1% ASB to additional needs, with North Tyneside allocating 
the most at 12.2% ASB.
How can these differences be explained? Do they reflect variations in the level of 
need from LEA to LEA? This is an interesting question worth exploring, if only to 
discover how and why it cannot be answered. Drawing on data generated by this
This is the average across the 35 LEAs operating LMS at the time which provided the 
data. If the proposals of inner London LEAs had been taken into account the average 
would have been 3.8%.
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research study, researchers have attempted to compare levels of LEA AEN funding 
to measures of LEA AEN (Hatcher, 1992). The yardstick for assessing levels of 
AEN across LEAs comes from the government’s Standard Spending Assessment 
(SSA) exercise, which includes a specific component for Additional Educational 
Needs. The SSA produces an AEN ‘score* for each LEA which goes to five 
decimal places. In practice, scores range from about 1.6 down.
However, such calculations cannot yield meaningful answers. Logic dictates that it 
is the variation in levels of need within an LEA which should shape the proportion 
of resources devoted to AEN, not the level of need in the authority as a whole. 
Clearly, if needs within the LEA with the highest aggregate need were distributed 
equally across all schools, the conditions of equity could be secured without the 
need for a particular AEN component in the resource allocation formula.
MONEY TO SCHOOLS
The fifth dimension of difference relates to the level of funding which individual 
schools in different authorities receive in respect of AEN. Comparisons are either 
very easy or impossible to conduct in this respect. They are easy where exactly the 
same, simple allocation methods are employed. For example, one method is to 
allocate schools a flat rate sum of money per case registering on an indicator, e.g. 
an amount per child receiving free school meals. In 1991-92, Durham and 
Staffordshire and one of the case study LEAs (authority A) all employed this 
method. But whereas Durham allocated £10 per free meal, and Staffordshire £176,
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each free meal generated £383 for authority A schools. These differences had huge 
implications for schools. To have generated enough to employ a teacher - say, 
£20,000 - schools in the three LEAs would have needed to have 2,000, 114 and 52 
pupils on free meals respectively. Schools, particularly secondaries, in both 
Staffordshire and authority A could quite easily have met these notional targets; it 
would have been a near impossibility for Durham schools.
The sum per free meal method has a number of variants, which allow further 
comparisons. In some cases, LEAs varied sums according to sector, e.g. Sheffield 
primaries received £71 per free meal, whereas secondaries received £149. By way 
of a contrast, Walsall employed the same technique but allocated sums roughly five 
times greater: £462 and £629 respectively.
LEA schemes which do not adopt similar, simple allocation methods cannot be 
compared given the available data. It proves impossible in most cases to 
extrapolate what a school gets per unit of measured need. However the cases cited 
above do illustrate diversity in LEA practice and the scale of funding differences 
which existed in 1991-92. They also illustrate just some of the types of differences 
in LEA allocation methods which were found to exist, e.g. flat rate allocation, flat 
rate allocation with variations by sector, etc. Before returning to comment on such 
relatively small variations in policy, further general features of, and distinctions 
between, LEA AEN components can be explored.
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UNIVERSAL OR SELECTIVE?
Do LEA methods deem all schools eligible to receive a share of AEN resources or 
do they utilise a threshold in order to prevent resources going to the ‘least needy*? 
In other words, do LEAs operate universal or selective AEN allocations? 
Differences here form the sixth dimension of variation between LEAs.
In 1991-92 universalism predominated: two thirds of the LEAs which provided 
relevant details (31 out of 47) pursued such an approach. Purely selective methods 
were used by one in five LEAs (10 authorities), however the level at which 
thresholds were set, and the method by which they were set, once again varied.
For example, another variation of the sum per free meal method is to add a 
threshold, i.e. a school must have more than a certain percentage of pupils on free 
school meals to qualify for a share of AEN resources. 1991-92 saw both 
Bedfordshire and Devon employing this method, but thresholds at 2% and 6% 
respectively. In LEAs employing different methods of measuring needs, thresholds 
were set at 10% (Lancashire), 9.9% (Birmingham), 15% (Buckinghamshire) and 
40% (Bradford).
In all, 31 universal and 10 selective approaches were identified. The remaining six 
authorities which provided details on this issue employed both universal and 
selective approaches in the different sub-elements of their AEN component5. For
Many authorities employed two or more separate ways of measuring and allocating 
resources - two or more sub-components - in the AEN component of their formula.
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example, in Hounslow all schools were entitled to a share of the 1.9% ASB 
allocated for ‘non-statemented Special Educational Needs’ as measured by reading 
and maths test scores. However, only schools with 10% or more pupils on free 
school meals were entitled to a share of the 1.1% ASB devoted to 'social 
deprivation*.
TARGETING
The seventh main dimension of difference found in LEA schemes relates to 
whether an LEA’s AEN allocation is ‘targeted’ or not. Here, targeted allocations 
are classed as those which employ specific methods in order to push most money 
towards those schools deemed the ‘most needy’. In all, a third of authorities (16 
out of 47) were found to have targeted allocation methods. The most common 
approach was a system of banding, as illustrated by the case of Devon.
In 1991-92, Devon operated a sum per free meal method, with a threshold set at 
6%. Schools with more than 6% pupils on free meals were placed in either of two 
bands. The first was for schools with between 6.1 and 18% pupils on free meals. 
Such schools received £127 per free meal. Remaining schools, with 18.1% or 
more pupils on free meals received considerably more, £382.
Of the other targeting methods, Stockport’s was particularly interesting. In 
Stockport, entitlement to free meals was the indicator of need, and the allocation 
for each school was determined via a five stage process as follows:
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[a] the average percentage (over the past three years) of pupils entitled to free 
meals was calculated;
[b] this figure was squared;
[c] the resulting number was multiplied by the number on the school roll to 
yield a school "deprivation index score';
[d] the amount of money devoted to AEN was divided by the total deprivation
scores for all schools to yield a ‘unit of resource’;
[e] schools received a sum equal to its deprivation index score multiplied by
the unit of resource.
In the same year Leeds operated a similar type of approach in its ‘social 
disadvantage’ allocation6, but added an upper threshold, i.e. the school’s 
percentage of pupils on free meals up to a maximum of 55% was squared.
Despite the approaches discussed above being labelled as ‘targeted’, it is clear that 
in certain respects some of these schemes do not ensure that greater needs always 
receive greater funds. Banding systems are particularly prone to two criticisms. 
First, schools with quite different levels of need may be treated the same {i.e. those 
at the bottom and top reaches of a band). Second, schools with very similar levels 
of need may receive very different treatment {i.e. schools located either side of a 
borderline between bands). The latter possibility is clear in the case of Devon, as 
cited above.
Leeds also operated both an ‘Ethnicity’ and a ‘non statemented Special Educational 
Needs’ allocation in the AEN component of its formula.
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CONCLUSION
In summarising the findings of the second survey of LEAs, seven main dimensions 
of difference between authorities* approaches have been identified and illustrated. 
Despite this, there are numerous further differences which could have been 
mentioned. Whereas some schemes relied on free meals take-up data, others 
claimed to use entitlement data; it was sometimes the number of pupils on free 
meals and sometimes the percentage of pupils on free meals which determined a 
school’s allocation. Educational tests took many different forms: diverse types of 
maths, reading, verbal reasoning or cognitive ability tests. The exact form of the 
data used to measure needs varied tremendously. Additionally, these different 
forms of data were combined in myriad ways to form assorted measures of need. 
And measures of need were translated in resource allocations in dozens of different 
ways. Indeed, as mentioned above, the only LEAs which were found with the 
same approach were those which had no AEN component whatsoever. All other 
schemes for measuring and funding AEN, and hence achieving equity, were unique.
Thus, a snapshot review of formula funding practice provides a complex and varied 
pattern of practice. Equity looks very different across authorities. A wide variety 
of different focal units (individuals, schools, areas), focal variables (special 
educational need, social disadvantage, ethnic disadvantage) and input-outcome 
relationships are found. But what of longitudinal data collected as part of this 
study? Do the versions of equity created by LEAs remain the same or change over 
time? This is investigated in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER 8
EQUITY: CONTINUITY OR CHANGE?
INTRODUCTION
Whereas the previous chapter provided a snapshot, in this chapter I look at policy 
over time. I am interested in whether manifestations of equity stay the same or 
change over time. Did the search for equity end in April 1990, or continue through 
the study period? Drawing on data from all three censuses of LEAs, I focus on 
four main variables: AEN recognition; the proportion of ASB devoted to AEN 
funding; indicators used to measure of AEN; and allocation mechanisms (i.e. issues 
of universality, selectivity and targeting, as defined in Chapter 7). The data 
provides considerable evidence of formula evolution over a relatively short period.
Throughout this chapter, sample size varies from section to section because the 
quality as well as the quantity of LEA responses proved erratic. Indeed, only 
fourteen authorities1 of a possible 96 authorities provided what can be classed as
The eleven non-case study LEAs were: Barnsley, Devon, Durham, Essex, Hounslow, 
Lancashire, Lincolnshire, Newham (no AEN component), Northamptonshire, 
Rotherham and Stockport. To protect their identity, the three case study LEAs are 
referred to (in this chapter and those that follow) as authority A, authority B and 
authority C.
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full data (i.e. data on all variables on each of the three occasions), three of which 
were LEAs used as case studies2. Sample size is cited in each section below.
PROPORTION OF ASB FOR AEN
The relative priority authorities gave to funding AEN factors throughout the period 
of study can be seen in Table 4 below. Thirteen LEAs provided this data on each 
of the three census occasions.
Table 4: Proportion of ASB devoted to AEN factors. 1990-93
% ASB for AEN
Authoritv 90-91 91-92 92-93
Barnsley 1.1 2.0 3.2
Devon 1.2 1.7 2.1
Durham 0.0 0.2 0.2
Essex 0.3 0.4 0.5
Hounslow 5.9 3.0 2.9
Lancashire 5.4 5.9 6.1
Lincolnshire 0.0 0.5 0.6
Northamptonshire 1.0 1.0 1.0
Rotherham 1.4 1.0 1.1
Stockport 0.7 0.7 0.8
Authority A 12.0 7.5 3.0
Authority B 3.0 3.3 3.6
Authority C 5.0 5.0 5.1
The fourth case study authority (authority D), being one of the new inner London LEAs 
created after the abolition of the ILEA, was not part of the census research until the 
second census, in 1991.
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In terms of overall change, over half of the authorities (seven) made an adjustment 
of 0.5% ASB or more to the proportion of ASB devoted to AEN between 1990 
and 1993, whilst the others made little or no adjustment over the study period. At 
the extremes, Northamptonshire made no change at all whilst authority A reduced 
its AEN spending by a factor of four, from 12% to 3% ASB. (The case of 
authority A is discussed in detail in the following chapter).
Different directions of change are evident. Whilst the relative priority given to 
AEN fell in both authority A and Hounslow, AEN funding gained greater priority 
in two out of every three authorities (nine out of thirteen). In Barnsley the AEN 
budget almost trebled over the period of study, from 1.1% to 3.2% ASB.
The data from Rotherham LEA suggests some fluctuation in the direction of 
change, with the AEN budget dropping from 1.4 to 1.0% ASB and then rising 
again to 1.1%. However, the latter change - and many of the smaller changes 
witnessed in the data on other authorities above - may be more apparent than real 
due to rounding.
INDICATORS OF AEN
A greater amount of comparative data was derived from the censuses concerning 
the methods by which LEAs measured AEN factors, particularly which indicators 
of need authorities used. The sample size here is 30 authorities.
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On the whole, authorities tended to stay with the repertory of indicators of AEN 
they had first chosen in 1989.
Nearly two thirds of LEAs3 used exactly the same indicators, and only those 
indicators, throughout the study period. However, these ‘stable* authorities had by 
no means decided on the same indicators and methods in the first place. Devon 
and Stockport both relied solely on free meals data to measure AEN, though 
employed very different approaches (see previous chapter). Essex used free meals 
data to measure need in the primary sector, but added reading test data in 
measuring need in the secondary sector. Barnsley used data on pupil entitlement to 
‘schemes of aid*, such as clothing allowances and maintenance allowances for 
pupils over compulsory school age, as its chosen way of measuring AEN. 
Gateshead, on the other hand, maintained an index comprising five indicators: no 
car, large family, one parent family, overcrowded home; unemployment (see 
previous chapter). In contrast, authority B eschewed the use of proxy indicators of 
need in favour of using only data derived from teachers’ professional assessments 
of their pupils’ needs (see Chapter 10).
Whereas two thirds of LEAs continued to employ their first choice(s) of indicators, 
one third of LEAs4 altered their repertory of AEN indicators in some way during
These 19 (out of the 30) LEAs were: Barking and Dagenham, Barnsley, Bedfordshire, 
Devon, Essex, Gateshead, Hertfordshire, Lancashire, Leeds, Newcastle, 
Northamptonshire, Northumberland, Rotherham, Shropshire, Stockport, Trafford, 
Authority A, Authority B, Authority C.
These 11 (out of the 30) LEAs were: Berkshire, Bradford, Croydon, Ealing, 
Gloucestershire, Hampshire, Haringey, Hounslow, Oldham, South Tyneside, Sutton.
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the study period. Most did so by adding to their stock of indicators as LMS 
progressed. In this way their indices of need grew in size. For example, Croydon 
began by using only free meals data but added reading test data in 1991; Berkshire 
added professional assessments to free meals data in 1991; and Sutton added free 
meals data to reading comprehension test scores in 1992.
Hounslow and Haringey were the only authorities found to reduce the number of 
indicators used to measure AEN. Hounslow abandoned its use of professional 
assessments in 1991-92, retaining free school meals data and reading and maths 
test scores as its means of measuring AEN. Interestingly, 1991-92 was the same 
year that Authority B gained DES approval to continue its use of professional 
assessments (see Chapter 10) and also the year that Berkshire introduced 
professional assessments for the first time (alongside free meals data).
In Haringey, on the other hand, three indicators were dropped and one new 
indicator added after the first year of LMS. In reply to the first census, the 
authority stated its intention to:
allocate resources based upon ... entitlement to free school meals, 
the incidence of families in temporary accommodation and the 
number of one parent families ... diversity of languages evidenced 
within the school, the number of pupils in the early stages of 
learning English and the number of children for whom English is not 
their mother tongue.
The second and third censuses, however, showed Haringey no longer using either 
the temporary accommodation, one parent family or English as a second language
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indicators, but having decided to include high turnover of pupils as a new measure 
of AEN in schools.
The censuses also revealed two authorities - Oldham and Gloucestershire - to have 
altered their choice or use of indicators in more subtle ways. Oldham did not 
increase or decrease the number of indicators used to measure AEN, but made a 
swap. It retained receipts of clothing grants as an indicator of AEN throughout the 
study period, but in 1992 swapped ‘numbers of ethnic minority pupils’ for 
‘numbers of pupils with English as a second language’. Presumably the latter was 
deemed a more direct indicator of needs.
Gloucestershire, on the other hand, went from using only free meals data to 
measure AEN in the primary sector, and only educational test data to measure 
AEN in the secondary sector to, in 1992-92, using both free meals data and 
educational test data to measure AEN in the primary sector.
It is hard to know what, if any, conclusions can be drawn from this evidence 
regarding changes in authorities’ choice and use of indicators. But it is important 
to note that in no case was an authority found to have explicitly redefined the 
purpose / intention of its AEN component as a result of, or as an explanation for, 
changing its repertory of indicators of need. The implication is that authorities 
judged their alterations to policy to be yielding better means of measuring the 
need(s) which they had been trying to measure all along. However it is relevant to 
point out that whilst the purported focal variable may have stayed the same, in
146
effect the focal variable and input-outcome relationships alter as indicators are 
added to or subtracted from existing indices. Logic dictates that different 
indicators, or different combinations of indicators, provide measurements of need 
which treat focal units in different ways to a greater or lesser extent.
ALLOCATION MECHANISMS - UNIVERSALITY, SELECTIVITY AND 
TARGETING
Over the study period, to what extent did authorities alter the mechanisms by 
which they determined eligibility to, exclusion from, and shares of, AEN resources? 
As in the previous chapter, methods which deem all schools eligible to receive a 
share of AEN resources I class as universalisf, those which utilise a threshold in 
order to prevent resources going to the ‘least needy* I call selective, and 
allocations which employ specific methods in order to push most money towards 
those schools deemed the ‘most needy* I label targeted.
Full data on resource allocation mechanisms was obtained from 24 LEAs. It was 
found that whilst nearly two-thirds did not alter the nature of their resource 
allocation mechanisms over the study period, over a third did5.
The 14 ‘no change’ authorities were: Barking and Dagenham, Barnsley, Bedfordshire, 
Berkshire, Devon, Gateshead, Gloucestershire, Leeds, Newcastle, Northamptonshire, 
Northumberland, Rotherham, Stockport, Authority B. The 10 ‘change’ authorities were: 
Bradford, Essex, Hertfordshire, Hounslow, Lancashire, Oldham, Sutton, Trafford, 
Authority A, Authority C
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Among the ‘no change* authorities, half employed a combination of universal and 
targeted allocation methods. Exemplifying this approach, Stockport LEA was 
cited in the previous chapter, and authority B will be discussed in a later chapter. 
Just under a third (4 LEAs) pursued a purely universalist approach to resource 
allocation. The final three authorities in the ‘no change* group each went their 
own way: Devon’s approach was both selective and targeted; Northamptonshire’s 
approach embodied both universal and selective aspects; and Bedfordshire stuck to 
a purely selective approach (only schools with over 2% pupils with registered 
entitlement to free school meals received a set sum per registered entitlement).
The 10 authorities (out of 24) which did modify their resource allocation 
mechanisms over the study period pursued diverse goals. Some introduced 
targeting (e.g. authority A - see later), others reduced or abandoned selectivity 
(Lancashire and Sutton LEAs respectively), one abandoned both selectivity and 
targeting (authority C - see later), and a number appeared to make contradictory 
changes to policy (Hertfordshire, Hounslow, and Trafford).
Hounslow, for example, had two elements to the AEN component of its formula. 
The first remained unchanged: a universal allocation wherein AEN was measured 
with reading, maths and verbal reasoning test data. The allocation mechanism 
employed in the second element of the AEN component - with free meals data as 
the measure of AEN - altered each year during the study period. First, there was a 
universal allocation with all schools receiving a sum per pupil on free meals (sums 
varied according to sector). In 1991-92 the method became selective when a
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threshold was introduced: schools with less than 10% pupils on free meals were 
excluded from the allocation. Then, in 1992-93, the LEA reverted back to the 
universal approach employed in 1990.
CONTINUITY OR CHANGE?
In analysing each of the above issues in isolation, it is perhaps hard to grasp to 
what extent individual LEAs* ways of operating equity and measuring need change 
over the study period. In this final section I focus upon the fourteen authorities 
(about 15% of the total of 96 possible respondents) which provided full data on 
each time of asking. It is only by analysing these authorities that I can discover 
whether, overall, LEA resource allocation was characterised by continuity or 
change.
Of the fourteen LEAs under scrutiny here, four made no changes to their approach 
and ten made some degree of alteration over the study period.
One of the ‘gang of four’ was a clear outlier: Newham LEA did not employ an 
AEN component in its formula at all. In the 1991-92 census (as mentioned in the 
previous chapter) the authority clearly implied that it did not employ an AEN 
component because it could not find ‘an appropriate needs assessment mechanism’. 
But in reply to the third census, Newham announced that ‘The authority currently 
has no proposals to allocate resources according to any special needs factor’. This
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apparent change in stance is intriguing. Perhaps the LEA has given up on ever 
finding 'an appropriate needs assessment mechanism*. Or perhaps it transpired that 
whilst the LEA continued to look for an appropriate mechanism, variations in need 
across schools fortuitously disappeared, therefore rendering it unnecessary to 
employ an AEN component. It is unknown which, if any, of these explanations 
carries any weight.
As well as Newham, there were three other authorities which did not alter their 
stance on, or methods of, AEN funding over the study period. The approaches of 
these three - Northamptonshire, Rotherham and Stockport - were in many ways 
similar. All three defined AEN in relation to social disadvantage / deprivation 
rather than special educational needs; devoted relatively little to AEN funding (less 
than half the average for 1991-92 - see previous chapter); relied solely on free 
school meals data to measure need; and adopted universalist allocation methods (to 
which Northamptonshire added selective methods, and both Rotherham and 
Stockport added targeting mechanisms).
Durham and Lincolnshire LEAs maintained stability for the latter two years of the 
study period after having introduced AEN components for the first time in 1991. 
(According to the 1989 census, neither authority intended to take AEN into 
account in formula funding schools in 1990-91). Despite in many ways 
representing a fundamental change, the recognition of AEN in these authorities 
resulted in only a small adjustment to resource allocation policy; less than 1% ASB 
was devoted to AEN in both cases.
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Thus six of the LEAs which provided full data have been accounted for. The 
remaining eight authorities - Barnsley, Devon, Essex, Hounslow, Lancashire, 
Authority A, Authority B and Authority C - showed varying amounts of change. 
Six varied the proportion devoted to AEN by over 0.5% ASB, five changed the 
mechanisms employed in resource allocation, and two changed their indicators. 
Among these eight authorities, Hounslow stands out for having changed all aspects 
of its AEN component at least once, and most aspects of its AEN component twice 
over the study period.
The degree of policy revision and adjustment which this data indicates is 
considerable, particularly when it is realised that the three censuses actually record 
the outcomes of only two opportunities for change (the introduction of new 
formulae in April 1991 and 1992).
CONCLUSION
When the detail of AEN components is analysed over time, a mixture of continuity 
and change in policy and practice is discovered. Some authorities ended the study 
period having made few if any changes to their methods of measuring and 
allocating resources for AEN. For others, it was clearly an era in which the search 
for equity continued apace, with many and varied changes evident over the study 
period. Amidst all this, however, no major trends emerge. Census evidence does
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not show that any great convergence of LEA practice occurred, or signs of an 
imminent end to policy evolution.
But what are the factors which influence or indeed determine different versions of 
equity, and also what are the factors which cause or encourage the changes that are 
made to equities over time? These issues are now explored in the remaining 
chapters, the next four of which each present one LEA case study.
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CHAPTER 9
CASE STUDY A: THE RISE AND FALL OF EQUITY AS A POLICY 
GOAL
INTRODUCTION
As shown in the previous chapter, authorities sometimes alter their resource 
allocation priorities from year to year; the percentage of ASB devoted to additional 
needs factors may rise or fall, sometimes quite considerably. How and why do 
such changes come about? This case study of a Labour controlled Metropolitan 
Borough (authority A) explores these issues and also the factors influencing the 
choice of methods of measuring needs. What emerges is a tale of how the political 
and policy aims of elected members shifted and conflicted over time, and how 
pressure from schools and practical considerations influenced decision-making.
POLICY AND PRACTICE IN AUTHORITY A 
Overview of policy. 1990-91 to 1992-93
In the financial year 1990-91, authority A allocated 12% ASB for ‘special needs, in 
particular those associated with social deprivation*. These needs were measured
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using free school meals data, and a simple method of allocating resources was 
used. The sum to be allocated, roughly £5.5 million, was divided by the total 
number of pupils in the authority with registered entitlement to free school meals. 
The result was a figure of £908.42 which schools were then notionally allocated 
per child on their roll on free meals. The sum was notional rather than actual due 
to the way the authority chose to phase the transition from historic budgets to fully 
formula-determined budgets. The transition was planned as follows:
School budgets 1990-91 = 25% determined by formula + 75% historic 
School budgets 1991-92 = 50% formula + 50% historic 
School budgets 1992-93 = 75% formula + 25% historic 
School budgets 1993-94 = 90% formula + 10% historic 
School budgets 1994-95 = 100% formula
The method of allocating a sum per free meal was retained in 1991-92, however 
the percentage ASB for special needs dropped to 7.5%. This change, equivalent to 
a cut of around £2 million in the special needs allocation, on top of an increase in 
the numbers of children on free meals, caused the notional sum allocated per free 
meal to fall from over £900 to £382.76.
For 1992-93, changes were made to both the size and the method of the special 
needs allocation. The special needs budget was cut to 3% ASB (£1.4m) and a 
‘social deprivation index* was introduced in place of the ‘amount per free meal’ 
method. The new index again relied solely on free meals data, but targeted
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resources more heavily on the schools with the highest concentrations of pupils 
entitled to free school meals. For each school, the social deprivation index score 
equalled the number of pupils on free meals multiplied by the percentage of pupils 
on free meals. In the allocation, the social deprivation index scores of all schools 
were added together, the special needs budget was divided by that total, and 
schools received their appropriate share.
The ‘rise* of special needs funding
Prior to LMS, authority A had maintained preferential staffing ratios for schools 
which had formerly been designated by the DES as serving Social Priority Areas. 
From the beginning, the intention was that under LMS these differentials should at 
least be maintained. Moreover, there was considerable support, especially from 
Labour members, for giving even greater priority to schools in the poorer parts of 
the Borough (it was argued that recent years had seen the staffing differentials 
between Priority Area and non-Priority Area schools eroded). In their first 
attempts to devise a formula, authority A did not, however, seek to radically 
redirect resource allocation policy; incrementalist tendencies prevailed.
Officers were initially given the task of finding a way of recreating historic budgets 
via a formula. This proved to be a tricky exercise since schools had not been 
treated as isolated cost centres previously. The extrapolation of financial data for 
individual institutions required a considerable degree of informed guesswork. 
Indeed, by the time the authority was ready to put together an early draft of its 
LMS scheme, the formula contained therein was the 28th version to have been
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pieced together and tested. It would have allocated 5% ASB for special needs - 
estimated to be in line with past practice.
Labour members reacted strongly to ‘formula 28’; their message was that 5% 
appeared insufficient. To them it did not signify the emphasis which they wished to 
give to issues of social deprivation. So, alternative figures were then proposed and 
evaluated according to whether they gave the appearance of giving special needs 
sufficient priority. Initially, a degree of consensus emerged that 10% ASB, or 
twice the amount estimated to have been allocated for special needs in the past, 
was an appropriate figure. Attempts were thus made to revise the formula 
accordingly. However the Chair of the Education Committee subsequently argued 
that even 10% was not enough. She successfully recommended that 12% ASB 
was the sort of figure needed to denote the authority’s avowed intent to tackle the 
impact of social deprivation on pupils’ education. The 12% ASB figure seems to 
illustrate what Cohen et. al. described as a solution looking for a problem in the 
garbage-can model of decision-making.
Efforts were then made to accommodate this decision, and finally a formula was 
agreed - the 34th version to be modelled. This was written into the LMS scheme 
submitted to the DES for Ministerial approval.
Whilst the percentage ASB for special needs was the subject of considerable debate 
and revision, a method of measuring and allocating money for special needs was 
agreed at an early stage. When the authority first began to address how it would
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implement LMS, various indicators of special needs and social deprivation, such as 
family size and unemployment, were discussed. However relatively soon after 
Circular 7/88 was issued containing the main guidelines on LMS, an official from 
the DES made what proved to be an influential visit in late 1988. This person gave 
what authority A’s officers took to be authoritative advice: that using free school 
meals data was by far the most effective way of measuring special needs. Soon, 
discussions of alternative methods lapsed and authority A decided that if Circular 
7/88’s strictures were to be observed, then the most ‘simple, clear and predictable* 
(DES, 1988, para. 104) method was to give schools a sum for every child on free 
school meals.
Authority A*s first LMS scheme, incorporating ‘formula 34’ was approved by the 
Secretary of State at the end of January 1990 and came into operation in the April 
of that year.
Pressures and proposals for reform
The full implications of adopting ‘formula 34’ appear to have been clearly 
understood by officers and, to a lesser extent, schools from an early stage. 
Members, however, seem to have taken longer to grasp the scale of the 
redistribution between schools which would result from more than doubling the 
amount traditionally allocated for special needs. However they became fully aware 
of the situation when schools, in particular those in the more affluent parts of the 
Borough, began complaining about the dramatic budget cuts they would suffer as
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formula funding was phased in. In the event, the protest was so vigorous that a 
review of the formula was announced.
That authority A responded by agreeing to re-think its formula is not in itself a 
startling finding. However two features of the review were, in many ways, 
extraordinary. First, there was its timing. The review of the formula was 
announced in mid December 1989, more than a month before the authority’s first 
LMS scheme had even been formally approved by the Secretary of State, and over 
four months before formula funding was actually set to begin. Second, it appears 
to have been pre-decided that changes were necessary. The terms of reference 
were that ‘a review of the formula be undertaken in May 1990 ... with a view to 
submitting a variation of the formula for the 1991/92 financial year*.
The review marked a turning point. In 1988 and 1989, concerns for special needs 
had taken priority in terms of shaping ‘formula 34’. From 1990 onwards, a 
different set of aims took precedence. The primary objective became that of 
devising a formula which would provide all schools with sufficient funds to achieve 
certain pupil to teacher ratios (PTRs): 1:26 in nursery classes; 1:30 in primary 
schools; 1:19 in secondaries; and 1:14 in sixth forms. Only once these targets had 
been achieved, it was decided, should ‘any additional funds’ be allocated for special 
needs and ‘concentrated as effectively as possible on schools facing high levels of 
social deprivation*. The conclusion of the review was that only 3.14% ASB would 
remain for special needs once the staffing targets were met.
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In line with the review brief, two methods of targeting the special needs allocation 
were proposed and modelled. The first placed schools in one of six categories 
according to the proportion of pupils in the school on free meals. Each category 
_  had a different weighting, and each school’s entitlement to money would have been 
calculated by multiplying the number of free meal pupils by the weighting factor. 
The review document stated that this method was ‘far more efficient in terms of 
targeting resources' than the system used in 1990-1 although problems were 
foreseen: ‘at the boundaries of each category very slight changes in pupil numbers 
result in enormous variations in budget*. The second proposal was a ‘social 
disadvantage index’ whereby the number of pupils on free meals multiplied by the 
percentage of pupils on free meals would determine each school's entitlement to 
special needs money. This method was recommended. It was thought to be 
‘highly efficient in targeting resources’ and less problematic than the other option 
since it avoided steps in the allocation (and the associated problems). An appendix 
provided a graphic illustration of how these proposed methods and the ‘formula 
34’ method compared to each other.
The 1991-92 formula
Whereas complaints from schools with few pupils on free meals had been 
instrumental in forcing the formula review, the proposals emanating from the 
formula review were opposed by a more diverse group. Schools with many pupils 
on free meals now complained that they would suffer heavy budget losses if the 
special needs allocation dropped from 12% to 3% ASB. Moreover, the
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introduction of the social deprivation index also threatened schools with a 
relatively low number and / or low concentration of pupils on free meals.
In negotiations, an immediate cut in AEN funding from 12% to 3% ASB was 
found to be politically unacceptable. However at the same time there was a desire 
among members to move at least some way towards the proposed staffing ratios 
for all schools. The short-term compromise was that 7.5% ASB be devoted to the 
special needs allocation in 1991-92 (i.e. exactly half way between 12 and 3%) and 
that the social deprivation index should not yet be introduced.
These decisions were justified to schools by explaining the long term aims relating 
to staffing ratios in all schools. Also it was pointed out that although the schools 
with highest levels of social deprivation would, in future, gain less than if ‘formula 
34’ remained in place, they would still receive more money in the long run. This 
was because of the transitional arrangements (the formula taking over from historic 
budgets) and the fact that 7.5% ASB was still equivalent to a 50% increase in 
special needs funding compared to the pre-LMS situation.
The 1992-93 formula
Many of the discussions and controversies involved in the first formula review 
were repeated in the summer of 1991, when a second review was undertaken. The 
recommendations produced were broadly the same as those reached in the previous 
year’s review: progress towards the staffing targets should was the priority; the 
budget for special needs should be reduced to 3% ASB; and hence it would be
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imperative to introduce the social deprivation index in order to concentrate the 
available AEN money on those schools which most needed it.
In attempting to create a consensus in favour of these changes, an Education 
Committee report prepared in January 1992 again emphasised that although many 
schools would receive less for special needs than they would have done if either the 
1990-91 or 1991-92 formulae had remained in place, they would still receive 
budget increases as transitional arrangements ran out and schools* budgets became 
fully determined by the formula. Budget predictions were published for as far 
ahead as the year 1997-98 to make this point. Additionally it was argued that:
although the amount of money [for special needs] is reduced 
overall, the introduction of the social deprivation index targets these 
resources more effectively to the schools most in need.
Finally, schools were persuaded to look at the overall effect of the changes in the 
formula and not to view the special needs allocation in isolation.
In the event, the 1991 review proposals concerning special needs were agreed and 
implemented in April 1992.
ANALYSIS
Events in authority A raise two particular issues worthy of further discussion - the 
characteristics of equities, and the factors shaping equities.
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Equities
Three versions of equity are evident in the case of authority A. In all three, schools 
formed the focal units. At first sight, the focal variable also appears to have been 
the same in all three, defined as 'special needs, in particular those associated with 
social deprivation*. However, it seems necessary to distinguish between the de 
jure focal variable - stated above - and de facto focal variables. Indeed, it was 
differences in de facto focal variables, and also input-outcome relationships, that 
led to the creation of different versions of equity in practice.
What can be called the de facto focal variable changed with the introduction of the 
social deprivation index. The AEN methods used in 1990-91 and 1991-92 classed 
as equals those schools with equal numbers of children with registered entitlement 
to free meals. But the 1992-93 method, in effect, defined as equals those schools 
with an equal concentration of free meals pupils. In this way, change of AEN 
method brings about a de facto change in the focal variable.
The second way in which distinct versions of equity were created relates to input- 
outcome relationships. The method of measuring need was the same in both 1990- 
91 and 1991-92, but very different amounts of money were devoted to the AEN 
allocation (£5.5 million and about £3.5 million respectively). Thus, the resource 
‘outcome* per unit of need ‘input’ dropped from over £900 to under £400.
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Equities- shaping factors
These equities were shaped by diverse factors. The 1990-91 version reflected 
historical and political influences (continuation of Borough practice in taking social 
deprivation into account in funding schools); the credence given to DES advice 
(adoption of the ‘sum per free meal* method); and the sway held by the Chair of 
the Education Committee (in gaining acceptance for the 12% ASB figure, which 
was basically plucked out of the air).
The 1991-92 version was shaped by the ascendancy of a new policy priority - that 
of securing certain PTRs for all schools - and also by adverse reactions to that new 
goal. Hence, the second version of equity reflected the effects of change, 
bargaining and compromise: a reduction of AEN money, but retention of the ‘sum 
per free meal* method.
Finally, the introduction of the social deprivation index in the 1992-93 formula was 
a direct response to cuts in the budget for AEN (as a result of further progress 
towards the PTR targets). Thus it seems that decision-makers’ perceptions of 
what does or does not constitute an equitable allocation appear to be resource- 
specific. Changing the amount of money to be distributed led policy-makers to 
seek a different input-outcome relationship.
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CONCLUSION
Case study A describes how a powerful yet vague political commitment to AEN 
funding proved unsustainable and, in the event, implicitly ephemeral. Indeed, in 
spite of its original intentions and policy decisions, by 1992-93 authority A was 
allocating far less for special needs than it had done prior to the introduction of 
LMS.
What is clear is that in the ebb and flow of policy proposals, consultation and 
feedback there emerged strict, if tacit, limits on the degree of change to the status 
quo that schools, parents and increasingly, as time wore on, also members were 
prepared to tolerate even if change was made in pursuit of equity. This being the 
case, the authority's transitional arrangements proved valuable to both to schools 
and policy-makers. By phasing the shift from historic to formula determined 




CASE STUDY B: A PROCEDURAL PATH TO EQUITY?
INTRODUCTION
It is easy to think that who gets what share of available resources in an allocation 
according to need is determined by factors such as who is in need and who is not, 
how many people in total are in need, and relative differences in the type and 
degree of need experienced by those in need. However, in effect, who gets what is 
determined by [a] the specific methods used to identify and measure needs, and [b] 
the way the resulting measures of need are translated into financial entitlements. In 
laying down the administrative framework for LMS and formula funding, the DES 
offered no advice or prescription on issue [b]. However, with regard to how to 
identify and measure needs, the DES imposed rules.
According to Circular 7/88, only methods which identify and measure differences 
in schools’ ‘objective needs’ are acceptable. Which types of methods does this 
imply? Originally, the DES advised LEAs that this meant that discretionary need 
assessments by professionals or by any methods open to manipulation at the school 




This case study looks at a Conservative controlled County (authority B) and its 
special Educational Needs Audit* - a method of identifying and measuring needs 
which relies solely on teachers’ assessments. The validity and reliability of this 
method was initially questioned by the DES. But in April 1991 the audit received 
full ministerial approval. In charting the events surrounding the creation and 
operation of the audit, what emerges is an intriguing story which contrasts starkly 
with that told in the previous chapter. The search for equity in authority B was 
dominated by concerns to develop an accurate and sensitive method of identifying 
and measuring individual pupils* needs. But the solution policy-makers came up 
with - the audit - generated its own problems, as will be seen. Not least, it 
generated outcomes which did not appear to be equitable; a system of additional 
payments had to be introduced.
POLICY AND PRACTICE IN AUTHORITY B 
Overview of policy 1990-91 to 1992-93
In the financial year 1990-91, authority B allocated over £8 million or 3% 
Aggregate Schools Budget (ASB) for ‘special educational needs’ (as defined by 
the 1981 Education Act). Primary pupils experiencing difficulty in learning were 
identified by their class teachers, and their level of need assessed. Level 1 needs 
were least severe, Level 2 needs were of intermediate severity, and Level 3 needs 
most severe. This process of identification and assessment was referred to as an
166
audit of special educational needs. Details of how the audit worked are provided 
below.
The first audit took place in late 1989, and only covered the primary sector. 
However, primary sector data was ‘rolled forward’ to provide an estimation of the 
incidence of special educational needs in the secondary sector. This ‘roll forward’ 
was limited - secondary schools only received funds based on the estimated number 
of pupils with special needs in the first three years of secondary school.
When it came to the formula allocation, primary schools received £220 per pupil 
with special educational needs regardless of their level of need. The rationale for 
this was that additional help would be provided by members of area-based support 
teams for any pupil on level two or above. Since the area support teams did not 
work in secondary schools, payments to secondary schools did vary according to 
level of need: £220 per pupil with Level 1 needs, and £600 per pupil with needs at 
either Level 2 or 31. In the complex process of translating measures of need into 
cash allocations, policy-makers utilised both computer modelling and officer 
discretion.
In this first year of LMS and formula funding, the DES refused to grant formal 
approval to authority B’s LMS scheme due to fears that teachers’ judgements 
would not provide a sufficiently objective and consistent means of measuring needs 
across classes, schools and areas, and fears that schools would be given financial
1 Grammar schools were excluded from the allocation, and middle schools were treated as 
half primary and half secondary (as was the case in both of the following years).
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incentives to identify more pupils in need, and to define pupils’ needs as more 
severe.
However, conditional approval was granted for the audit to operate for just one 
year. For 1991-92, the DES expected authority B to develop alternative methods. 
In the event, though, very few changes were made to the audit method (i.e. the 
audit form was altered a little) and yet formal DES approval was granted (a puzzle 
examined later).
In the second year of formula funding, 1991-92, authority B devoted much more 
money to special educational needs - just over £9.9 million or 3.4% ASB. This 
increase was intended to take account of inflation and the fact that more pupils 
were being identified as in need by the audit process. The amounts allocated to 
schools in 1991-92 were as follows. Primary schools received slightly more than 
the year before: £230 per pupil with special educational needs regardless of level of 
need. Secondary schools received less than previously: £120 per pupil with Level 
1 needs, and £320 per pupil with needs at either Level 2 or 3. Payments per 
secondary pupil were reduced because data from primary schools was now ‘rolled 
forward’ to cover the first five years of secondary school (rather than the first three 
years, as before).
Finally, in 1992-93, just over £11 million or 3.6% ASB was allocated in respect of 
special educational needs. Again, the special educational needs budget had been 
increased to take account of the rising numbers of pupils identified as in need.
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Primary schools received £245 per pupil with special educational needs regardless 
of level of need. Secondary schools received £140 per pupil with Level 1 needs, 
and £340 per pupil with needs at either Level 2 or 3. In a new development, 
however, an extra element was added to the special needs allocation this year. It 
was agreed that schools with high concentrations of special needs pupils required 
significantly greater resources if they were to meet the needs of their pupils. 
Schools thus received an additional supplement of £225 per pupil with special 
needs (of whatever level) if 50% or more of the school roll were classed as having 
special educational needs. Roughly £100,000 of the £11 million AEN budget was 
devoted to financing these supplementary payments.
The introduction of the supplementary payments reflected an effort by authority B 
to recreate pre-LMS patterns of resourcing. Many schools, despite recording a 
high incidence of special educational needs in the audit process, had had to cut 
back on staff because the money delivered through the audit did not match the 
value of the extra staff which they had received prior to LMS at the discretion of 
area education officers.
Genesis of the audit
Prior to LMS, authority B took account of variations in ‘social deprivation* by 
allocating extra staff to those schools most affected. Schools in need of extra 
staffing were identified partly on the basis of free school meals data and partly on 
the basis of area education officers’ discretionary judgements2.
2 For administrative purposes, authority B is divided into six geographical areas, each 
containing over 100 schools.
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After Circular 7/88 was issued, it was realised that area officers would no longer be 
allowed to make this type of discretionary decision - more ‘objective* methods 
were called for. Authority B’s original proposal was outlined in a_newsletter sent 
to schools in December 1988. It stated that schools would be given:
a cash allowance to provide additional pupil support on a sliding 
scale to a maximum of 1 post, based on free meals uptake.
At this time, the plan was to devote 1.2% ASB to financing these additional posts.
The proposal to use free meals data to measure AEN was acceptable to the DES. 
However, it met with a firm and unfavourable response within the authority. The 
LEA later reported (in a discussion paper) that it had dropped the plan because it 
was ‘overwhelmingly condemned by ... headteachers and governors all over the 
County*. Consultation revealed that schools were concerned primarily with issues 
of special educational needs rather than social deprivation, and were
... not prepared to accept that a parentally-identified indicator of 
social deprivation such as free school meals uptake was a 
statistically valid indicator of the incidence in schools of pupils with 
1981 Act Special Educational Needs.
Taking these points on board, authority B drew up new proposals, the details of 
which were sent to schools in July 1989. The plan was to allow teachers, on the 
basis of their experience and knowledge of individual children, to measure pupils’ 
needs directly - the audit approach.
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Initially, it was envisaged that the audit need only take place in primary schools - it 
was thought that data could be ‘rolled forward* to accurately predict needs among 
secondary school pupils by taking account of traditional flows between primary and 
secondary schools. That the audit results should be both valid and reliable across 
the authority was a concern given the sheer numbers of different teachers who 
would be involved in assessing needs. Hence a system of moderation was 
proposed whereby the audit results could be checked. It was envisaged that a key 
part in the moderation process would be played by the teams of special needs 
support staff assigned to each of the six areas of the authority.
These proposals were well received by schools, and in the autumn of 1989 the 
special educational needs audit was written into authority B’s draft LMS scheme. 
At roughly the same time that the draft scheme was submitted for ministerial 
approval, the first audit was conducted.
The Special Educational Needs Audit
The first audit took place in November 1989 and was designed to generate data for 
use in the 1990-91 formula allocation. The audit form which teachers had to fill in 
was rudimentary. It asked for basic details about the child - name, age, school and 
area - and then provided teachers with four headings:
[a] Identified areas of concern
[b] Curriculum response to identified need
[c] Other responses
[d] Monitoring and evaluation procedures
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Under each heading, roughly one inch of blank space was provided for the 
teacher's assessment, and these comments, supported by the views of the area 
support service staff, were used to ascertain what level of extra help the individual 
pupil required. Level one needs were defined as those which schools could meet if 
given additional resources with which to finance minor additional provision. Level 
two needs were classed as significant, meriting not only extra funds for the school 
but also additional assistance from the area support services. Level three needs 
were classed as major, requiring multi-professional assessment and the issue of a 
statement of special educational needs.
In each of the six areas of authority B, each school's batch of forms was checked 
and signed by members of the area support services before being collated by the 
Area Special Educational Needs Co-ordinator. This was the first stage of the 
moderation process. In the second stage, a sample of schools’ returns were 
checked in each area - to gain intra-area consistency. Third, the returns of a 
selection of schools from across the county were checked to gain inter-area 
consistency. If inconsistencies or anomalies were found, the area or County 
moderation panels - made up of senior staff and Head teachers - could make 
alterations. Finally, there was also an appeals stage where schools which had had 
their audit data questioned and revised could argue their case and challenge 
verdicts.
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The first audit proved to be very time-consuming business for teachers, Heads and 
particularly members of the area support teams who oversaw the whole process. 
21% of pupils in primary schools were identified as having special educational 
needs (as a result of teachers completing over 22,300 individual audit forms)3. 
This rate of special educational needs closely matched the authority’s expectation 
(20%) which was based on the findings of the 1978 Wamock Report. It also 
served to support arguments that more than 1.2% of ASB should be devoted to 
special educational needs. There seemed to be little opposition to these arguments, 
and the authority eventually decided that the audit data should be used to 
determine the allocation of 3% ASB.
Winning over the DES
In a report some time after the first audit had been conducted, Authority B 
announced that ‘the great majority of Headteachers* felt that the audit data had led 
to a distribution of resources between schools which was ‘about right*. However 
the DES still needed convincing that assessments by teachers provided a 
sufficiently valid and reliable method of identifying and measuring needs.
Despite warnings from the DES, authority B refused to countenance alternatives to 
the audit method. Rather, discussions began both within the authority and between 
the authority and the DES about how the audit could be improved. In particular, a 
specially arranged conference was organised in May 1990 for all staff connected
The results of the first audit, with those of the second and third audits are discussed in 
more detail later in the chapter.
173
with special educational needs provision and LMS. Three changes to the audit 
were agreed at this conference:
[a] that a more detailed audit form be devised to reduce the scope for 
subjectivity to creep into the process of identifying pupils’ needs;
[b] that the procedures for moderating schools’ audit returns be strengthened;
[c] that the audit be extended to secondary schools to remove the possibility of 
anomalies arising from projecting primary school data forward as an 
indicator of needs in secondary schools.
It was also realised that, regardless of any modifications made to the audit process, 
more work could be done to explain and justify the approach to the DES. In 
seeking approval from the DES, authority B therefore argued that:
It appears to be the stated intention of Circular 7/88 that no single 
model would be prescribed and that LEAs should have discretion to 
determine the extent of variations in special needs between schools 
in ways which are appropriate to local circumstances. In view of 
the consistent and sustained support for the use of the SEN Audit 
by ... headteachers and governors and their continued rejection of 
alternatives, it is very important to the LEA to continue down this 
path.
In the event, authority B’s 1991-92 LMS scheme was formally approved, the DES 
evidently believing that the audit method now complied with the requirements of 
Circular 7/88. What were the changes made to the audit which lead the DES to 
change its stance?
Evolution of the audit
The second audit took place in Autumn 1990 and was designed to generate data 
for the 1991-92 formula allocation. This time, a new and more detailed audit form 
was used which, the authority claimed, provided teachers with an ‘objective 
identification matrix of needs and provision*. The new form contained two main 
sections. The first asked teachers to circle, from a list provided, those target areas 
of the pupil’s learning or learning environment which they would be ‘working to 
improve in the next year’. The second was more closely tied to the assessment of 
the child’s level of needs. Teachers were given a range of examples of the types 
and amounts of provision which came under each level, and were asked to circle 
those applicable to the child in question.
For the second audit, the moderation process was more rigorous and complex. Six 
discrete stages were involved. First, the forms which teachers had completed were 
checked by the Head teacher of each school. Then, members of the area support 
teams scrutinised the returns of those schools for which they had designated 
responsibility. The third stage was area moderation conducted by specially 
convened panels of Head teachers and support team leaders. A 20% sample of 
schools from each of the County’s six areas were chosen and a sample of their 
audit forms examined alongside examples of the corresponding pupils* work. After 
this, the six Area Special Educational Needs Co-ordinators visited a number of 
schools selected from the 20% samples of both their own and other areas. The 
fifth stage was County moderation, conducted by a panel of the senior staff. 
Finally, there was an appeals stage as before.
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The changes referred to above - made in order to gain DES approval - did not 
mark the end of the audit’s evolution. For the third audit (which took place in 
1991 and generated data for the 1992-93 formula allocation), minor changes were 
again made to both the audit form and the moderation process. The former did not 
affect the way needs were assessed. Rather they were designed to develop the 
audit process as a tool with which special educational needs provision could be 
monitored. Teachers were now asked not only what provision pupils should 
receive due to their special educational needs, but also what provision the child 
was already receiving (to allow checks with the assessments and prescriptions 
made in the previous year’s audit exercise). The only change made to the 
moderation process resulted from the inclusion of secondary schools in the audit 
process for the first time. Instead of a 20% sample being chosen for moderation 
(as in the case of primary schools), all secondary schools were scrutinised at the 
area level.
ANALYSIS
This case study raises issues relating to equity and policy-making in particular. 
Prior to these issues being discussed, however, the audit process merits evaluation.
Assessing the audit
As has been seen, over three years Authority B monitored the operation of the 
audit and, as they would see it, honed the technique. The perceived benefits of the
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audit are many and great. Individual pupils* needs have been assessed in a 
systematic and detailed way for the first time; schools have become far more aware 
of special educational needs issues; and, using data from successive audit forms, 
the LEA is now able to monitor what is both recommended and provided for 
specific children with special educational needs. That these benefits relate 
primarily to the educational value of the audit process rather than its suitability for 
generating data on which to base resource allocation decisions is intriguing. After 
all, the audit came into being to serve the latter purpose.
As a method of deriving data to measure need for resource allocation, how does 
the audit rate? Consider data from the first three audits and the issues it raises.
First, between Autumn 1989 and Autumn 1991 far more pupils came to be 
identified as having special educational needs: 22,341 pupils in 1989, 26,476 in 
1990, rising to 29,499 in 1991. In the same period there was a substantial increase 
in the County’s total pupil population - nearly 8,000 more pupils were in authority 
B schools. However this does not explain the increase witnessed - the percentage 
of all pupils identified as having special educational needs also showed a large 
increase: 21% pupils in 1989, 24% in 1990, and finally 26% in 1991.
The second feature of the data is that between 1989 and 1991 more and more 
children were identified as having more severe needs (i.e. Level 2 or 3 needs) and 
both the number and the proportion of special needs pupils defined as having Level 
1 needs dropped dramatically. This is shown in Table 5 below.
177
TABLE 5: Numbers and percentages of pupils identified as having 
special educational needs at different levels. 1989-1991.
Pupils with special educational needs
% SEN % SEN
Lev 1 Lev.2 pupils pupils
Year number number Lev. 1 Lev. 2
1989 16441 5900 74% 26%
1990 15229 11247 57% 42%
1991 13833 15666 47% 53%
When increases in the total pupil population between 1989 and 1991 are taken into 
account, the drop in numbers of pupils deemed to have Level 1 needs becomes 
even more significant. In just two calendar years, the ratio of Level 1 needs to 
Level 2 and3 needs went from 3:1 in 1989 to 0.9:1 in 1991.
Third, there is evidence of inter-area inconsistency. Table 6 shows the percentage 
of pupils identified as having special educational needs in the six different areas of 
authority B in the years 1989, 1990 and 1991.
TABLE 6: Percentage of pupils identified as 1
educational needs bv area of authority B. 1989-1991.
Area 1989 1990 1991
Yellow 19 24 27
Pink 23 24 27
Green 21 24 27
Red 22 24 25
Blue 22 23 25
Brown 21 21 22
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In general there appears to have been some stabilisation in the pattern of inter-area 
differences since 1990 when the moderation process was made more rigorous. 
However the record of the area I have called ‘Yellow ’ is particularly notable; it 
went from identifying the lowest proportion of pupils in 1989 to identifying the 
highest proportion in 1991. This suggests either a sharp and substantial increase in 
the incidence of special educational needs, or a (legitimate or incentives-led) higher 
rate of reporting needs.
At this point, it pays to reiterate the reservations the DES originally had regarding 
the audit: that teachers’ judgements would not be sufficiently objective and 
consistent, and that schools would have financial incentives to identify more pupils 
in need, and to define pupils* needs as more severe. It could be argued that the 
above evidence suggests that most if not all of the Department’s fears were borne 
out.
In the first three audits at least, complex moderation procedures did not seem to 
prevent either a remarkable growth in the numbers of pupils being identified as in 
need, nor an extraordinary shift from Level 1 needs being the most commonly 
identified to Level 2 and 3 needs becoming the most common. These trends are 
hard to explain without casting doubt on both the validity and the reliability of the 
audit method. However, no firm conclusion can be reached regarding whether 
changes in the audit data accurately reflect changes in pupils* needs or merely chart 
changes in teachers’ behaviour as a result of financial incentives.
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Equity
In authority B, each year saw in effect a new manifestation of equity in evidence. 
As the volume of finances devoted to special educational needs and numbers in 
need altered, so too did the input-outcome relationship achieved by the AEN 
component of the formula. Also, the introduction of the extra supplements for 
schools with a majority of pupils with special needs redefined which schools were 
classed as equals and which unequals. In effect, this brought school size and 
composition into the equation used to calculate equitable resource allocations.
The case of authority B is primarily of interest in relation to procedural equity, 
which demands that equals be treated equally and unequals unequally. There 
appear to be two ways in which authority B’s methods may have generated 
procedural inequities. First, reliance on teacher discretion may have led to 
inconsistencies in the process of need measurement and hence inconsistencies in 
distinguishing equals and unequals in terms of needs. Second, there was a 
mismatch between the audit process (which generated individualised assessments 
and assumed there to be a continuum of need) and the resource allocation process, 
in which needs were divided into only three categories, each category generating a 
particular lump sum payment. Grouping needs / payments in this way may have 
ensured that all equals were treated equally, but, inherently, it also meant that 
pupils with unequal needs were treated equally in financial terms.
From the above, it appears that it does not pay to be too causal with the concept of 
procedural equity. The case of authority B highlights the possibility of procedural
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equity and procedural inequity co-existing, i.e. that certain aspects of a procedure 
{e.g. method of measuring need) may conform to the dictates of equity whilst other 
aspects do not {e.g. method of allocating resources). Moreover, it has shown that 
procedures deemed equitable do not inherently produce financial outcomes which 
are deemed equitable. In the case of authority B, the audit method did not secure 
sufficient funds for the most needy schools and a system of extra supplements had 
to be introduced.
Policy-making
Events in authority B seems to illustrate the phenomenon of bottom-up policy­
making, in two clear ways
First, the LEA overtly challenged the DES over methods of assessing need, and 
this challenge and the subsequent discussions between the authority and the 
department were instrumental in changing DES policy. By the end of the study 
period, many LEAs were beginning to view audit-type methods as a credible 
alternative to using free meals data to measure AEN factors.
Second, events within the LEA also illustrate bottom-up policy-making in action. 
As more needs became identified via the audit, and more of those needs were 
judged to be severe rather than minor, the authority diverted more resources to the 
AEN component of the formula. In this way, the actions of teachers and schools - 
whether in good faith or as a result of financial incentives - shaped LEA resource
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allocation policy. And in this way, teachers and schools helped to shape the 
versions of equity employed in resource allocation.
CONCLUSION
This case study has focused on the development, operation and implications of an 
innovative method of need assessment - the Special Educational Needs Audit in 
authority B. This was seen, by the LEA, as a procedural route to equity. But as 
was shown, there were some real and potential problems with this assumption, not 
least because there did not seem to be a direct link between procedures deemed 




CASE STUDY C: UNCLEAR QUESTIONS AND UNAVAILABLE DATA 
INTRODUCTION
As the censuses of LEAs show, free school meals data is by far the most commonly 
used indicator of additional needs under formula funding. But ubiquity does not 
necessarily denote popularity. Indeed, in their first LMS schemes, many LEAs 
stated that they were only relying on free meals data until more appropriate 
methods of measuring needs could be developed. By implication, this meant that 
many authorities were using methods of measuring needs which, they believed, 
gave rise to a less equitable allocation of resources than was possible if alternative 
methods of measuring needs had been used.
This case study focuses on a Conservative controlled County (authority C) which: 
relied on free meals data as a measure of needs; consistently admitted a lack of 
faith in the use of free meals data for this purpose; continually promised that 
alternative methods of measuring needs would soon be developed; and actually 
made only one minor policy change during the period of study. The original aim of 
this case study was to chart and analyse the way new methods were researched and 
adopted, looking in particular at the criteria used to decide between options. In the
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event, however, authority C never reached that stage. In fact, this case study sheds 
light more on the factors which held back the development of more sophisticated 
methods of measuring needs and prevented the achievement of a more equitable 
distribution of money to schools. -
POLICY AND PRACTICE IN AUTHORITY C 
Overview of policy, 1990-91 to 1992-3
Prior to LMS, authority C took account of the incidence of ‘social deprivation* by 
allocating additional staff to those schools with the highest incidence of free meals 
entitlement. Resources totalling £220,000 - 0.025% of the total allocated to 
schools - were allocated in this way. Early discussions about formula funding 
prompted talk of great change; initially, it was anticipated that 9% Aggregate 
Schools Budget (ASB) would be devoted to additional needs /  social deprivation. 
However, this level of spending was soon deemed inappropriate since it would 
have led to a massive redistribution of resources between schools. In the event, in 
each of the first three years of LMS (1990-91, 1991-92, and 1992-93), authority C 
devoted around £4 million or 5% ASB to what it labelled ‘special educational 
needs and socio-economic needs’.
Throughout the period of study, authority C relied solely on free meals data to 
provide measures of need across schools. Two factors influenced this. First, the 
authority had previously relied on free meals data (along with discretionary
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decisions by officers) to identify those schools in need of additional resources. 
Second, in the run-up to LMS implementation, when a multitude of difficult 
decisions had to be taken, and the authority remained undecided about the best 
way of measuring AEN in the long run, free meals data seemed to offer authority C 
a cheap and easy interim measure. It was deemed particularly valuable in the 
circumstances since it was cheap and easy to collect, regularly updated, and was 
acceptable to the DES.
When it comes to the detail of the methods used to measure needs and allocate the 
£4 million devoted to special educational needs and socio-economic needs, the 
approach adopted in 1990-91 differed from that of the two following years.
In 1990-91, thresholds were employed to avoid the least needy schools receiving 
resources. Primary schools with 4% or less of pupils taking free meals and 
secondary schools with 2% or less of pupils on free meals received nothing. Then, 
a system of bands and weightings was used to calculate budget shares for all 
eligible schools. First, for each school the percentage of pupils taking free meals 
was calculated. Based on these percentages, schools were then placed in one of 
four bands. Each band had a different weighting factor associated with it. 
Different bands and weightings were used for the primary and secondary sectors 
(this was intended to reflect the fact that up-take of free meals was lower in the 
secondary sector). The bands and weightings authority C used were:
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PRIMARY
% pupils on FSM Band Weighting
Above 4% 1 0.5
Above 8.5% 2 1.0
Above 13% 3 1.5
Above 20% 4 2.0
SECONDARY
% pupils on FSM Band Weiehtine
Above 2% 1 0.75
Above 5.5% 2 1.0
Above 9% 3 2.0
Above 12% 4 2.5
For each eligible school, the total number of pupils on the roll was multiplied by 
the relevant weighting factor to yield a weighted pupil number. Then, the money 
available for AEN factors was divided by the total number of weighted pupil 
numbers in the whole authority. This calculation yielded a resource unit of £88. 
Finally, each school received the amount equal to its weighted pupil number 
multiplied by the resource unit.
After the first year of formula funding, however, the bands and weightings method 
was abolished. Partly this was because, as the officer responsible for special needs 
at the time commented, the method was ‘untidy and a bit too complicated’. Such 
disadvantages might have been tolerated if it were not for the fact that the authority 
could offer no research evidence to justify either the bands it had created or the 
relative differences in the weightings it had used. Moreover, a working paper in 
June 1990 had shown how large changes in schools’ budgets could be caused by 
small changes in the numbers of pupils on free meals (which caused schools to 
move between bands). Indeed, though the paper did not highlight the fact, a
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difference of just one pupil on free meals could have produced a 100% change in 
the money received for special needs1.
The working paper concluded that:
While it can be argued that resources should follow need ... there is 
little reason to believe that a school's needs will oscillate so 
violently from year to year because of the loss or gain of a small 
number of pupils with free school meals.
To replace the system of bands and weightings, a far simpler method was 
introduced in 1991-92. The budget for special educational and socio-economic 
needs was divided in proportion to the total numbers of pupils in the primary as 
opposed to the secondary sector. Then the budget available for the primary sector 
was divided by the total number of pupils taking free meals in primary schools, and 
a corresponding calculation was made for the secondary sector. These calculations 
yielded two resource units of £750 for the primary sector and £1,500 for the 
secondary sector. Finally, each school received an amount equal to the resource 
unit (for that sector) multiplied by the number of pupils in the school taking free 
meals.
This method was retained, unchanged, for the financial year 1992-93 . On this 
occasion, the amounts allocated per free meal pupil were £629 in the primary 
sector and £1,187 in the secondary sector.
1 E.g. a 500 pupil secondary school with 45 (9%) of pupils on free meals would be placed 
in band 4; have a weighted pupil number of 1000 (500 multiplied by a weighting of 2); 
and receive 1000 times the resource unit. If one child on free meals left, the same school 
(now with 8.8% pupils on free meals) would be placed in band 3; have a weighted pupil 
number of 500 (weighting factor of 1); and receive only 500 times the resource unit
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Desire for change
When an organisation makes only marginal changes to its policy over time, there is 
a tendency to presume that policy-makers are satisfied with their actions. The case 
of authority C, however, serves to illustrate that this is not always so. Indeed, 
from the earliest discussions of the additional needs component of the formula, 
dissatisfaction was expressed with free meals data as an indicator of needs. There 
were three root causes of this dissatisfaction.
First, free meals data was understood to offer a proxy indication of needs, rather 
than a direct measure. This was problematic because policy-makers did not know 
how strong the association was between the distribution of free meals and the 
distribution of needs. This lack of information generated a degree of general 
apprehension about the free meals data, but did not lead to research designed to 
test the relationship of the two variables. And despite the absence of research 
evidence to substantiate its claim, both of the authority’s first two LMS schemes 
asserted that free meals data offered a way of measuring needs which was ‘too 
crude*.
Second, free meals data was viewed as essentially data on the incidence of social 
disadvantage among pupils. But there were many involved in policy-making 
discussions who argued that special educational needs / learning difficulties should 
be the concern. This led them to argue either that the wrong thing was being 
measured, or that the right thing was being measured but in a very roundabout
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way. Advocates of the latter argument tended to believe that social disadvantage 
was, in a general way, a causal factor in terms of learning difficulties among pupils. 
However they saw no reason to rely on proxy data on the incidence of potentially 
contributory factors, rather than developing ways in which the incidence of 
learning difficulties could be measured directly.
The third reason for dissatisfaction was that policy-makers felt that there was 
something not quite right about the distribution of resources resulting from the use 
of free meals data to measure needs. For example, after the system of bands and 
weightings had been abolished in 1991, the authority still judged that their new 
approach did ‘not necessarily allocate resources to the schools and the individuals 
who need support* (stated in 1991-92 LMS scheme). However, such views were 
not supported by clear statements of what an equitable allocation of resources 
should look like, and policy-makers could not explain what informed their views 
about what was equitable.
Given authority C*s dissatisfaction with its approach to measuring and funding 
AEN, it is unsurprising that from the very start of LMS and formula funding the 
LEA promised schools that an alternative approach would soon be developed. 
Indeed, the first proposals for change were written into the 1990-91 LMS scheme 
at a time before formula funding had even begun to operate. The scheme stated:
Shortly a data series will be available ... which uses Census material 
... to measure the relative differences among schools and their 
consequent requirement for resources.
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It is intended that this series will be enhanced by data measuring the 
relative needs among schools arising from the special educational 
needs of pupils.
In the longer term pupil related Census data will be generated by 
collecting the pupil’s postal code and applying a resource weight to 
this postal code and hence the pupil.
These statements implied that some fundamental changes would soon be 
introduced, perhaps as soon as April 1991. However the statements were short on 
specific detail. This was mainly because they expressed little more than the ideas 
of the day - policy-makers were not, at that time, actively researching new 
approaches to measuring additional needs factors.
But the lack of detail in the above proposals might also be explained by the fact 
that the authority had other plans, as stated in a different part of its LMS scheme. 
Contrary to the earlier proposals, schools were told that data from the SATs tests 
might be used:
In the future the LEA will consider full use the programmes of 
national assessment which will ensure a consistency of approach in 
the identification of all aspects of special needs.
One year later, change had occurred - the system of bands and weightings method 
had simply been replaced by a less complex free meals method - but none of the 
proposals mentioned above had been introduced. However the earlier proposals 
had been combined and efforts had been made to see how they could be put into 
practice. In the 1991-92 LMS scheme, schools were told that:
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Research is continuing into the use of two other sets of data to 
establish a more satisfactory method of allocation of ... resources 
based upon:
(a) Census data for socio-economic needs
(b) National Curriculum assessment data for special educational 
needs.
Before explaining these proposals in more detail, the Research' mentioned above 
merits brief consideration. As the LMS scheme states, investigations were being 
made into how the authority could use certain types of data; solutions - both those 
proposed by authority C staff and those adopted by other LEAs - were being 
explored. What the scheme does not state, however, is that there was not, at any 
stage, a detailed discussion of what was meant by ‘ socio-economic needs* and how 
it differed from special educational needs.
The plans laid in the 1991-92 LMS scheme - to use Census data to measure socio­
economic needs and National Curriculum data to measure special educational 
needs - first emerged in a working paper issued in June 1990. This paper, written 
by a senior officer in charge of LMS implementation, had recommended that the 
budget for additional needs remain at 5% ASB and be sub-divided to create, in 
effect, two distinct allocations.
3% ASB would be devoted to special educational needs. These needs would be 
measured using results from National Curriculum testing, primarily at age seven2. 
Exactly how such data would be used to determine financial requirements was left
2 In the case of primaiy schools, needs would be assessed using data from the tests of 
seven year old pupils in the schools. For middle schools, data from the tests at seven 
years would be ‘rolled forward’ in order to assess needs. For secondary schools, data 
from tests of eleven year olds would be used.
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unstated. However the working paper did state that all schools would be treated as 
eligible to receive funds allocated in respect of special educational needs.
According to the working paper, the remaining 2% ASB of the additional needs 
allocation would be devoted to socio-economic needs. No definition of socio­
economic needs was offered, however a method of assessing these needs across 
schools was proposed. This method - which relied on decennial Census data and 
social survey data generated by the County’s Planning and Transport department - 
was not spelt out in any great detail. However, the working paper did list ten 
factors that might be taken into account - things such as the percentage of the 
population in social classes IV and V, the percentage of households with no bath or 
inside W.C. - and did specify that the aim would be to:
link individual pupils anonymously to this data by their post codes 
to produce for each school an index of socio-economic need ...
As has been seen above, the proposals issued in the June 1990 working paper were 
accepted and, to a certain extent, work began on the business of finding ways of 
implementing them. However, this work did not progress far, and by the end of 
the period of study, none of the plans had been translated into policy. How can 
this be explained?
Factors inhibiting change
Having decided as early as June 1990 what it wanted to do, what prevented 
authority C from bringing its plans to fruition? In offering answers to this question,
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a distinction must be drawn between inhibiting factors which were endogenous to 
the proposals outlined above, and exogenous factors which compounded them.
The proposals authority C made in 1990 proved to be flawed in one major respect, 
and this was the main reason why radical policy changes did not come about. 
Quick change was required - the authority did not wish to continue relying on free 
meals data to measure additional needs because it believed that inequitable financial 
outcomes for schools resulted. However, two types of data required for the 
alternative methods which had been proposed - decennial Census data and National 
Curriculum test results - were, at that time, unavailable. Indeed, having decided 
what it wanted to do, authority C found that it would have to wait until 1993 for 
the relevant data to become available, and then wait until April 1994 to introduce 
changes to the additional needs component of the formula.
Given authority C’s view that measuring needs using free meals data was 
inappropriate and led to an inequitable allocation of funds to schools, it might be 
thought that delay in introducing new policy would have caused the LEA some 
frustration. However, conflicting objectives were in operation and, in two ways at 
least, lack of change actually suited the authority.
First, there was a genuine desire to secure stable and secure financial conditions for 
its schools in a turbulent period which included, in 1991, central government 
capping authority C’s spending plans. Despite the fact that education fared better 
than most other services when cuts had to be made, over 250 teaching posts were
lost across the authority as a direct result of capping. This, in turn, acted to limit 
the LEA’s scope, as policy-makers saw it, to make changes to the detail and hence 
the impact of the AEN component of the formula. On the one hand, the authority 
did- not wish to see the unstable conditions caused by external pressures being 
compounded by self-imposed changes which would inherently effect a 
redistribution of resources between schools. On the other hand, the LEA also 
wished to secure financial stability because it feared schools might otherwise opt 
out of local authority control and become Grant Maintained. Schools were known 
to be aware of the financial benefits to be gained from going Grant Maintained, and 
there were concerns that budget fluctuations caused by the introduction of the 
Census and SATs approach might prove to be the last straw for some schools, 
triggering off a wave of opting out. As one officer concluded:
You’ve got to get where you want to get to without doing untold 
damage to schools and the LEA along the way. It’s alright talking 
about principles but ultimately everything we do or want to do has 
to be tempered by some sort of realism.
The second main reason why lack of progress did not unduly concern authority C 
was that it had plans to conduct a wholesale review of its funding formula in 1993. 
At the end of the period of study, the authority argued that it had always held a 
holistic view of the formula, and that piecemeal changes to different components of 
the formula had thus been resisted prior to the 1993 review. This may be the case. 
However, given factors mentioned at the start of this section, it is debatable 
whether the promise to review the formula as a whole in 1993 did not become one 
of the ways in which authority C came to rationalise the lack of progress it made.
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Indeed, there is reason to be cynical, not least because - as has been shown - the 
authority did not leave its formula totally unchanged prior to 19933.
ANALYSIS
This case study portrays policy-making as primarily the business of finding 
solutions even when the questions are unclear, reacting to problems, and finding 
some sort of a balance between conflicting objectives. It also illustrates the 
phenomenon of solutions waiting for a chance to come into being, as described in 
the garbage can model of decision-making - having decided what to do, authority 
C had to wait for the relevant data to become available.
Equity
This case study raises a range of issues relating to equity and equities.
First, two equities were evident, with the distinction between them arising from 
differences in the methods used to measure need. The bands and weightings 
method treated school size as a determinant of need and hence a determining factor 
in deciding which schools were equals and which unequals. This contrasted greatly 
with the ‘sum per free meal* method used from 1991 onwards. The latter method 
delivered the same amount of additional resources to schools (in the same sector) 
with the same number of pupils on free meals, regardless of whether that number
3 As explained above, it abolished the bands and weightings system in 1991.
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of pupils on free meals represented five or fifty percent of pupils on the roll. The 
former method delivered very different amounts to schools of different sizes, even 
if the same number of pupils in those schools took free meals, because it was the 
proportion of pupils on free meals which determined the allocation4.
Second, there is an intriguing situation to take note of. Policy-makers seemed to 
know inequity when they saw it; they felt that the AEN component of the formula 
did not fully fulfil its task of relating resources to need. However, at the same time 
they did not seem to have a clear idea of what equity would look like if it were 
achieved.
Quite conceivably, the proposed Census / SATs method of measuring AEN might 
generate a distribution of resources which also seems inequitable; it was certainly 
being developed without reference to any specific distribution of financial 
outcomes which it was expected to yield.
Leading on from the above, it was concerns about methods of measuring needs 
which dominated the search for equity in authority C (as in authority B). Two 
presumptions seemed to be in force: that once suitable methods were found, 
equitable outcomes would prevail; and that equitable methods could be developed 
in the absence of a clear idea about what equity in outcomes should look like. Yet,
Take two hypothetical secondary schools. School X has 300 pupils, 25 (8%) of whom 
take free meals. Placed in band 2, this school generates 300 weighted pupil units (300 
on roll multiplied by weighting of 1). School Y has 1,000 pupils, 25 (2.5%) of whom 
take free meals. Placed in band 1, this school generates 750 weighted pupil units (1,000 
on roll multiplied by weighting of 0.75). School Y therefore receives 2.5 the allocation 
received by school X.
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the authority did not undertake to test the suitability of a range of different 
methods of measuring needs. This would have been the logical approach given 
their presumptions and the fact that policy-makers felt able to tell inequity of 
outcomes when they saw it.
Third, this case study shows the co-existence of equity with other, conflicting 
policy goals. The search for greater equity in resource allocation, via the creation 
and implementation of a more adept method of measuring need, was seen as 
necessary and important, but so too was the desire to provide schools with 
financial stability and prevent them from opting out. These goals were (to at least 
some extent) inherently contradictory; clearly, there would have been no point in 
the authority adopting a new and more complex method of measuring AEN factors 
unless it led to a redistribution of resources between schools compared with pre­
existing methods.
The final issue relating specifically to equity is particularly intriguing. In Circular 
7/88, the achievement of equity in resource allocation is stated as an objective 
which all authorities must secure, a legal requirement. But the evidence presented 
above suggests that this LEA did not abide by this rule, nor did central government 
enforce it. Over the period of study, authority C openly admitted in its LMS 
schemes and other public documents that it did not think it was using equitable 
procedures or achieving equitable outcomes. Despite this, the DES formally 
approved authority C’s LMS scheme. Whether it actually makes sense to impose
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the achievement of equity as a policy goal, without specifying the concept further, 
is questioned later in Chapter 13.
Need
This case study also suggests that it is possible for policy-makers to be involved in 
developing and operating policies for allocating resources according to needs 
without having a particularly clear idea about what they mean by ‘needs*. Precise 
definitions and goals do not seem to have played much part in policy-making in 
authority C.
Second, the implicit underlying assumptions of the methods of measuring needs 
employed by authority C merit consideration. The bands and weightings approach 
seems based on the assumption that need does not increase in a linear way, but 
rather increases by a series of discrete amounts. This assumption was illustrated 
most clearly in the adoption of a threshold, i.e. a primary school with 4% pupils on 
free meals was not judged to require any additional resources to meet needs 
whereas a school with 4.1% pupils on free meals was. Authority C’s second 
approach - where schools received an amount per pupil on free meals - cancelled 
out this assumption, and replaced it with one to the effect that needs do increase in 
a linear way.
There is one thing more to say about the bands and weightings method which 
authority C used in the first year of formula funding. As noted above, the implicit 
logic of the bands and weightings procedure is that at certain points along the
continuum of increasing incidence of need the amounts of money which schools 
require in order to meet needs grow dramatically. But when this logic was put to 
the test, it was found to be unacceptable. The case study highlights how minute 
changes in the data used to measure additional re^ds - changes which policy­
makers could not accept denoted any discernible difference in pupils' needs or a 
school's need for resources - can have a significant impact on the amounts schools 
receive from one year to the next.
CONCLUSION
The self-made dilemma for authority C was that it committed itself to change, but 
developed alternative policies which could not be brought in for a number of years. 
April 1994 was the earliest that any significant shift in policy towards measuring 
special needs could have occurred. Meanwhile, authority C was burdened with 
what it deemed to be a most unsatisfactory method of allocating nearly £4 million 
per annum. Moreover, the LEA were left with no guarantee that the new 
approach, if or when implemented, would yield a distribution of resources which 
policy-makers would recognise as equitable.
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CHAPTER 12
CASE STUDY D: GREAT EXPECTATIONS AND SMALL 
ACHIEVEMENTS
INTRODUCTION
The same Act of Parliament which introduced LMS and formula funding also 
announced the abolition of the Inner London Education Authority. Thirteen new 
LEAs were to take ILEA’s place, and were commanded to begin operating LMS in 
April 1992, two years after all other LEAs. This case study follows events in one 
of the new inner London LEAs, a Labour controlled Borough, during the two-year 
run-up to LMS implementation. It focuses on the deliberations out of which, it 
was intended, the detail of the AEN component of the authority’s formula would 
emerge. In particular, the study explores how authority D attempted to construct 
and justify an index of need similar to the ILEA Educational Priority Index.
POLICY AND PRACTICE IN AUTHORITY D
Overview of policy development
In the summer of 1990, an overall framework was imposed on policy-making 
discussions which was to remain until the submission of the draft LMS scheme in
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Autumn 1991. The need to build an AEN component into authority D’s formula 
funding plans was not questioned by members or officers. Nor was the need to 
develop an index of need such as ILEA had done with its Educational Priority 
Index (EPI). Simple and single measures of need were, it was decided, 
inappropriate given the legacy of the EPI and the scale and diversity of need within 
the Borough (as uncovered by ILEA’s EPI surveys). It was also decided that due 
to the high levels of social disadvantage in the Borough, and consistent with ILEA 
past practice, a considerable proportion of available funds should be devoted to 
AEN factors.
Despite the desire to keep faith with ILEA practice, a carbon-copy of the ILEA 
EPI was not proposed. It was judged that Circular 7/88 prohibited certain features 
of the ILEA EPI methodology, for example, the use of data derived from 
professional, discretionary assessments. Moreover, it was also felt that certain 
types of need arose within authority D which the ILEA EPI had not taken into 
account.
These decisions and rationales for action were first made explicit in a draft paper 
produced in October 1990 entitled Educational Priority Indices and School 
Resourcing. This paper - which ran to fifty pages - was written by officers from 
the authority’s Research and Statistics Unit and Policy Unit. Seventeen different 
indicators were evaluated, namely the nine which the ILEA had employed in its 
Educational Priority Index and a further eight indicators which had ‘been cited by 
headteachers as being of particular relevance’. The purpose of the evaluation
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exercise was to decide whether each was ‘relevant* for use in authority D, would 
prove acceptable to the DES, and would not cause undue problems of data 
collection. In this process, data from the penultimate ELEA EPI survey1, 
conducted in 1988, was used to inform decision-making. Also, the experiences of 
other LEAs which had already been through the process of gaining DES approval 
for their LMS schemes was drawn upon. As a result, provisional recommendations 
for a new, authority D-specific, Educational Priority Index emerged. Version A2 of 
the index included seven indicators o f ‘poor educational achievement*:
[a] eligibility for free meals
[b] membership of a large family (four or more children under 16)
[c] English as a second language / lack of fluency in English
[d] pupil mobility (movement between schools within the school year)
[e] the London Reading test (below a certain score; secondary pupils only)
[f] children in ‘special circumstances’ (either: Travellers, refugees, living in
temporary accommodation, or on the Child Protection Register)
[g] cumulative disadvantage (primary school pupils scoring on 3 or more, and
secondary school pupils scoring on 4 or more of the above indicators).
It was recommended that data for the index should be collected by surveying 
schools; much of the data could not be derived in any other way. These surveys 
would need to take place annually, it was argued, because ‘large and unforeseen 
changes’ could occur from year to year.
The ILEA undertook biannual surveys to generate data for the Educational Priority 
Index. In early 1990 the most up to date data came from the 1988 survey. The 1990 
survey - the final ILEA EPI survey - had already taken place when Educational Priority 
Indices and School Resourcing was published, but the data did not become available 
until December 1990.
Authority D did not refer to its proposals as Versions A, B, C, etc. of the index. I have 
chosen to do so in the hope that it will make it easier to understand the evolution of 
policy.
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These recommendations were provisional in more than one sense. No data had 
been available with which to assess the Special circumstances' indicator; a small 
scale study was therefore requested to gather information. And in the case of the 
other six indicators, the working paper made clear that their inclusion in the plans 
was conditional on the 1990 ILEA EPI data supporting their choice. When that 
data became available in December 1990 a meeting was held in which Educational 
Priority Indices and School Resourcing was discussed with an eye to confirming, 
modifying or rejecting the paper's proposals.
At this meeting, which involved the authority’s senior staff responsible for LMS 
implementation as well as the working paper's co-authors, most but not all of the 
paper’s recommendations were supported. The result was Version B of the index, 
slimmed down from seven to five indicators: membership of a large family was no 
longer deemed relevant, and it was thought that if pupils in ‘special circumstances' 
did not register on any of the other indicators then they were unlikely to be 
educationally disadvantaged. This left:
[a] free school meals
[b] English as a second language / lack of fluency in English
[c] the London Reading test - below a certain score (secondary pupils only)
[d] cumulative disadvantage (not specifically defined)
[e] pupil mobility - movement between schools within the school year.
Having agreed on the indicators to be used, discussion turned for the first time to 
issues of how the indicators / data would be combined, whether differential 
weightings would be used, and how the index would be employed in resource 
allocation. The weighting method which ILEA had used was dismissed for being
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too complex (and hence guaranteed to meet with DES disapproval) and too costly 
in terms of time and resources. But since no other system of differential 
weightings could be agreed it was decided to give all indicators an equal weighting.
Members of the meeting also considered the use of bands or thresholds - 
mechanisms by which to make resource allocation more selective. Such 
mechanisms were, however, dismissed as inherently problematic because small 
changes in need readings could greatly affect the amount of resources received by 
schools.
February 1991 saw the publication of authority D’s draft scheme which contained 
numerous intriguing features. The first firm indication of the percentage of ASB to 
be devoted to AEN in the formula was given: 7.9% or £3.1 million. This figure 
was very much provisional; it primarily reflected an estimate of the amount ILEA 
had allocated to authority D schools for AEN factors.
These budgetary details had not been known at the December meeting, and matters 
agreed at that meeting do not seem to have informed the draft scheme. The 
development of the formula and the presentation of the formula seem to have been 
two different exercises. For example, the draft LMS scheme offered two different 
indices for measuring AEN factors for ‘exemplification* purposes. Neither 
contained the number of indicators previously agreed; differential weightings had 
been concocted (when the December meeting had agreed to weight all equally); 
and the indicator of ‘parental occupation*, which had been previously rejected, was
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Schools were told that firm details of the indices to be employed would have to 
await the release of new ILEA data, but they were assured that the ‘final EPI will 
have more factors’.
Two months later, in April 1991, there were two important developments. Within 
the authority, a revised version of Educational Priority Indices and School 
Resourcing was published. This contained the long-awaited data from the final 
(1990) ILEA EPI survey of schools. Although much of the text remained the same 
as before, the revised version reflected the decisions reached by senior officers in 
December 1990, and the outcome of discussions held with the LMS Steering 
Group, a body that included representation from headteachers. As a result, the 
paper proposed that the ‘special circumstances’ indicator be re-introduced and the
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‘parental occupation* indicator be resurrected. Thus, what can be called Version C 
of the index consisted of seven factors:
[a] free school meals -
[b] parental occupation
[c] English as a second language / lack of fluency in English
[d] Special circumstances - either: Travellers, refugees, living in temporary
accommodation, or on the Child Protection Register)
[e] the London Reading test (below a certain score) (secondary pupils only)
[f] cumulative disadvantage - primary school pupils scoring on 3 or more, and
secondary school pupils scoring on 4 or more of the above indicators (i.e. 
not including pupil mobility)
[g] pupil mobility - movement between schools within the school year).
Version C appeared to mark the culmination of the index’s evolution, and to end 
the speculation generated by the draft LMS scheme. Therefore, to collect the data 
needed to feed this index, a survey of all schools in authority D was conducted at 
the end of May 1991. The sample consisted o f ‘all pupils in the intake year, plus all 
pupils new-on-roll since the previous September in other years*. Few problems 
were encountered in conducting the survey, although there were some 
discrepancies in the way schools had interpreted questions and in terms of the data 
schools had to hand. However, the biggest problem proved to be that the data 
derived from the 1991 survey was not available to policy makers for a considerable 
period. Indeed, when authority D prepared its LMS scheme for submission to the 
DES in December 1991, the data was still unavailable.
The second important occurrence in April 1991 was the publication by the DES of 
Circular 7/91, which altered some of the rules governing formula funding. In 
particular 7/91 now required LEAs to devote at least 80% ASB to ‘pupil-led*
\
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funding, of which 5% ASB could be devoted to pupil-led special educational needs 
funding. Authority D, having had the ground rules changed at the mid-point of 
their two-year run-up to LMS implementation, spent the Summer of 1991 seeking 
to establish whether, or to what extent, their plans should alter in the light of the 
new regulations. In the event, the authority’s LMS scheme formally submitted to 
the DES for Ministerial approval in December 1991 reflected both change and 
continuity.
There were three new features to the final LMS scheme. First, an increased 
amount, 9.06% ASB or nearly £3.7 million, was now devoted to AEN factors in 
the formula. Despite being £0.5 million higher than the previously quoted AEN 
budget, this figure was again said to reflect past practice under ILEA.
Second, AEN funding was now split into two almost equal portions: one portion 
(4.17% ASB) falling within the pupil-led element of the formula, whilst the other 
(4.89% ASB) remained in the non-AWPU part of the formula. No changes were 
made to the indicators making up Version C of the authority’s Educational Priority 
Index, which would be used to decide both parts of the AEN allocation3.
The third new feature was that the LMS scheme was once again proposing that 
differential weightings would be employed when the authority’s need index came 
into use. The scheme stated that there had not been ‘time to analyse and verify’
3 There was one minor exception to this: the LMS scheme stated that ‘Because [pupil] 
mobility is not pupil specific it is not used in allocating through the weighted pupil 
units’, i.e. not used in allocating the 4.17% ASB falling within the pupil-led element of 
the formula.
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the data gathered in the May 1991 survey of schools, and that ‘Therefore 
weightings have not yet been allocated* to the different indicators employed. In the 
absence of these weightings, Model Index 2 from the draft LMS scheme was again 
used for ‘the purpose of exemplification’ in school by school tables to demonstrate 
the outcomes of formula generated budgets compared to historical budgets.
Despite lacking full details of how the EPI would operate, authority D’s LMS 
scheme, as submitted to the DES, was formally approved to begin in April 1992. 
But this did not mean that formula funding began at that date. The LMS scheme 
had laid plans for a four-year phasing-in period from historical budgets to formula 
determined budgets and had, moreover, stated that this period would not begin 
until April 1993 when school budgets would be 25% determined by the formula 
and 75% based on historic budgets. Thus, in the financial year 1992-93, schools 
received 100% historic budgets, and authority D therefore gained a further year to 
finalise its Educational Priority Index.
Finally, in June 1992 the results of the previous year’s survey of schools were 
written up in a confidential paper. This cross-tabulated indicator data for 
secondary pupils with those pupils’ scores on the London Reading test4. The paper 
did not make any new policy recommendations, at least not in an explicit fashion. 
However, it was written on the clear assumption that the system of weightings to 
be used in authority D’s index would follow the same approach as that which ILEA 
had used prior to its demise.
This test on transfer from primaiy to secondary sector places pupils in one of three 
Bands, Band three denoting those of lowest performance.
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ANALYSIS
In the context of this study, authority D’s deliberations over the construction of a 
needs index are intriguing in three main respects, each of which is now considered 
in more detail: the issue of deciding which indicators to use in the index; the role of 
information in decision-making; and the influence of the legacy of the ILEA on 
decision-making.
Evaluating indicators
Authority D invested considerable time, resources and expertise in the process of 
choosing indicators for its needs index. Rather than describing the fate of 
individual indicators here, the focus is on the processes by which they were said to 
have been evaluated. Three criteria were explicated in the Educational Priority 
Indices and School Resourcing papers. First, would the DES approve the use of 
the indicators? Second, what were the data collection implications? Third, was the 
indicator ‘relevant’ to authority D?
Whether or not indicators would prove acceptable to the DES was obviously an 
important consideration. Acceptability was assessed partly in the light of Circular 
7/88’s prescriptions, partly on the basis of information gained from LEAs which 
had already been through the process of gaining DES approval for their LMS 
schemes, and also by means of informed guesswork and discussion with DES 
officials. For example, it was known that the DES would not allow children’s level
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of fluency in English to be measured by teachers’ judgements because the DES saw 
this method as too subjective. However the experience of Haringey LEA had 
shown that the DES would allow lack of fluency in English to be taken into 
account, albeit in crude terms, if data was collected in schools which simply 
recorded an answer ‘yes’ or ‘no* to the question ‘Is the pupil a beginner in 
English?’. Hence it was recognised that DES acceptance hinged not on the nature 
of the characteristic concerned, but on the means of its measurement.
Data collection issues formed the second issue of concern in evaluating indicators. 
Here, decision-makers relied primarily on their own and colleagues* previous 
experiences to inform their discussion; most were former ILEA employees and had 
been involved in operating the EPI and the associated surveys of schools. For 
example, ILEA had used the indicators, ‘one parent family’ and ‘parental 
occupation’, but problems were foreseen if such factors were to be retained: some 
teachers were unwilling to ask parents for personal details; and the data soon 
became inaccurate due to frequent changes in family or employment circumstances. 
On the other hand, the ILEA EPI indicator of ‘pupil behaviour’, which relied on 
assessing pupils with behavioural problems, was thought to involve too much 
teacher time in its collection.
Foresight of data collection problems did not, however, seem to play a great part in 
determining whether in practice indicators were chosen or rejected. For example, 
although the collection of ‘parental occupation’ data was deemed problematic, the 
index in the final LMS scheme included this indicator.
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The third concern in evaluating indicators was expressed in terms of whether or not 
each indicator was ‘relevant* for use in authority D. The Educational Priority 
Indices and School Resourcing working papers argued that there was no single 
way of determining relevance. Rather, they presented a range of different types of 
data - where such data was available5 - which showed:
[a] the correlation between a child registering on an indicator and that child’s
risk of being in the lowest Verbal Reasoning band at age 116;
[b] the extent to which the overall average incidence of pupils registering on a
particular indicator in authority D was higher than the equivalent average 
figure for ILEA as a whole;
[c] the extent to which the incidence of pupils registering on a particular
indicator differed between authority D schools;
[d] the proportion of authority D schools where 30% or more children
registered on a particular indicator and the proportion of schools where 
over 50% pupils registered on the indicator.
The thinking underlying these ‘tests’ of relevance was nowhere explained, nor was 
their relative importance specified. Indeed, the point and role of the tests is 
questionable in many cases.
Data relating to test [d] seems to have been presented for pure information rather 
than decision-making purposes; in no case did it play a part in determining the 
relevance of an indicator, and no rationale was offered to explain why it should.
The working paper authors relied on data gathered for the 1988 EPI exercise by the 
ELEA for their 1990 version of Educational Priority Indices and School Researching, 
and on 1990 ILEA data for the final version of the paper, published in April 1991. In 
neither case had the ILEA collected data on the indicators which authority D had chosen 
to add to the list of ILEA indicators for consideration.
These correlations were produced by the ILEA in the course of operating the EPI.
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Overall, factor [a] did not appear to have much influence either. For example, 
‘disturbed pupil behaviour* was identified as a ‘more powerful indicator of poor 
educational achievement than any of the other indicators taken in isolation*. Yet it 
was ultimately classed as not particularly relevant to authority D7. This was 
apparently because test [b] showed there to be relatively little difference between 
the incidence of pupils with disturbed behaviour in authority D as compared to 
ILEA as a whole. But why the behaviour of pupils in areas outside authority D 
should in any way affect the assessment of needs or the allocation of resources 
within the authority is extremely hard to understand.
However, the role of test [b] is debatable since in the case of all of the indicators 
previously used by the ILEA (and hence where data was available) authority D 
scored higher incidence than ILEA as a whole. This is shown in Table 7, which 
draws upon data from the 1991 version of Educational Priority Indices and 
School Resourcing.
It was known that this indicator would be difficult to get past DES approval since it 
relied on teachers’ subjective assessments of pupil behaviour. However, the point is that 
regardless of this, the indicator which provided the strongest link to educational 
underachievement was viewed as somehow lacking ‘relevance’.
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Table 7: EPI factors in authority D primary schools (January 1990 
data)
ILEA Auth. D Authority D range
Indicator c* v cr. % aver. % min % max %
Free meals 42 52 17 79
Large families 24 25 7 55
One parent fam. 29 32 0 55
Parents unempl. 29 35 0 58
English as 2nd language 27 37 13 65
Fluency in English 18 24 2 59
Ethnicity 49 68 40 100
Disturbed behaviour 22 22 0 42
Pupil mobility 9 10 1 21
Ultimately, the authors of Educational Priority Indices and School Resourcing 
argued that the extent of variation in incidence between authority D schools was 
the most important factor in assessing relevance, i.e. test [c]. If need were 
distributed evenly across all schools, whether the level of need be high or low, 
there would be no need for a special AEN component in the formula.
However, there were considerable differences between schools on all indicators 
where data was available. The Table above shows this for Primary schools, and the 
same was true for the Secondary sector. By implication then, if test [c] had been 
the main one used to assess ‘relevance’, all of the ILEA EPI indicators would have 
been deemed applicable to authority D. This would have meant that choice or 
rejection of the ILEA indicators rested on issues of data collection or DES 
acceptance. However, in the event, the ‘large families* indicator, for example, was 
deemed not relevant despite the range of incidence being 7% to 55% in the Primary 
sector and 22% to 40% in the Secondary sector.
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Added to all these anomalies, it should be noted that the ‘special circumstances’ 
and ‘cumulative disadvantage' indicators were chosen for inclusion in authority D’s 
index without any supporting data of any kind being available.
Overall, therefore, it remains hard to tell on what basis choice of indicators rested, 
other than the idiosyncratic choices of policy-makers and their advisers. Although 
significant amounts of data were presented, supposedly to aid the evaluation 
process, and despite various choice criteria having being identified, no overall 
pattern or practice can be discerned in the selection of indicators. Indeed, as the 
examples cited above clearly show, it was possible for indicators to fail the tests set 
them, or remain ‘unknown quantities', and yet remain part of the proposed 
Educational Priority Index.
Information
Throughout the period of study, authority D actively engaged in consultation and 
dissemination of information. Officers operated from the viewpoint that the more 
they shared information and sought opinion, the better the quality and the less 
controversial their final decisions would prove.
However, there were times when this belief came to grief; where sharing of 
information and dispersal of information did not prove inherently ‘good things’. 
One example relates to the use of two different model indices in the draft LMS 
scheme. Each index had a particular distributive impact, as displayed in full, school
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by school tables. Indeed, one secondary school stood to gain £14,500 more if 
Model Index 1 rather than 2 was employed. Another secondary stood to gain 
£12,000 more if model Index 2 were used. These differences caused great concern 
to the schools concerned, and since the final index would not correspond to either 
model, it is extremely difficult to understand how the exercise offered schools or 
members anything in the way of "exemplification*.
This naive attitude towards information was also evident in relation to the 
evolution of plans for the needs index. It was clearly believed that the authority 
simply could not have too much data to aid its deliberations, and that fresh data 
would aid decision-making to a far greater extent than pre-existing data. Hence, 
substantial data collection exercises and statistical analyses were undertaken, and 
decisions were frequently delayed until new data was gathered. This appears 
rational, the desire being to compose the needs index of indicators most closely 
related to needs. However, actual decision-making did not appear to be 
substantially aided. Policy-makers seemed to display a hope or assumption that 
answers would somehow automatically emerge from data, if a sufficient amount 
was generated, i.e. that survey data would clarify the detail of the needs index. 
The implication is that authority D did not have a clear idea of what equity between 
schools would look. Rather, equity would be what the needs index delivered, and 
the detail of the need index would be somehow decided by the data.
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The influence of the ILEA
The legacy of the ILEA is a factor that does seem to have played a significant part 
in shaping the whole policy-making process in authority D. ILEA’s practice in 
relation to funding for additional educational needs shaped not only the policy­
making agenda and process, but also the outcomes of policy-making. Undoubtedly 
part of the explanation for this is that many of the officers responsible for 
implementing LMS in the authority had previously been ILEA employees. Indeed 
some had had posts directly concerned with the surveys or analysis of data 
conducted for ILEA’s EPI. Also, it is true that due to its size and deployment of 
resources, ILEA had been able to conduct research and policy analysis on a scale 
and to standard otherwise unheard of in English LEAs.
However, the suitability of a method requiring mass annual surveys and complex 
statistical analyses to a relatively small LEA is questionable. Indeed, by the very 
end of the study period, the team which was still trying to finalise the EPI was also 
already stating that there was a definite need to reduce the scale of the EPI 
operation. Considerable staff time had been taken up with entering data from the 
survey of schools and this was particularly problematic since the authority knew it 
would soon have to cut back on the costs of central staff. It was also being 
admitted that too many indicators were being used in the EPI. Not only was the 
EPI unwieldy, and its eventual impact hard to assess, but there was also a 




This case study is somewhat different to its three predecessors in that none of 
authority D’s plans regarding AEN came into effect within the study period. 
However, events were revealing, not least in showing how chaotic policy-making 
may be even when there is a strong bias towards incrementalism. As this and the 
other case studies show, equities are very susceptible to the vaguaries of policy­
making. These and other issues resulting from my census and case study research, 






THE SEARCH FOR EQUITY - ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
INTRODUCTION
The empirical element of this research aimed to discover whether equity looks the 
same or different from place to place, whether the shape of equity changes or 
remains the same over time, what factors shape the search for equity, and the 
solutions policy-makers arrive at in measuring need.
The previous six chapters presented the key empirical findings of this research. 
Two main themes emerge from this data. First, the censuses show great diversity 
in the design of the AEN components of LEA formulae, and also little in the way 
of convergence of practice between LEAs over the period of study. Second, the 
census data and case study material indicate that there was relatively little policy 
stability within individual LEAs over the same period; many aspects of formulae 
were changed or revised from year to year.
These findings may be surprising. Over time, a meeting of minds over policy and 
increasing stability might have been expected after an initial period of policy­
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making scramble and experimentation, particularly since all authorities were 
working to and within the same national guidelines. But nothing like a national 
model emerged, and no general trajectory or trend in formula evolution became 
evident: whilst some-authorities simplified, others developed methods more 
complex; and LEAs reducing their AEN allocation were found alongside 
authorities increasing theirs.
Overall, it is Cohen et. a V s (1972) garbage-can model of decision-making and the 
incrementalist model which appear best as aids to understanding this study’s 
findings. As illustrated by the case studies, policy-making typically took the form 
of finding solutions in the absence of stated goals or clarified problems. The search 
for equity was characterised by improvisation and experimentation with the 
information and tools which policy-makers had to hand. However, along with 
improvisation, inertia was also an important factor; strong incrementalist 
tendencies were also witnessed. The case study and census evidence tells the story 
of many authorities juggling with the AEN components of their formulae from year 
to year in order to cope with new demands and perennial difficulties.
The explanation for this, I argue, can be found in the nature of the policy problem 
being faced by LEAs - the policy problem that is the search for equity in financial 
resource allocation. In particular, three main sets of issues /  factors emerged as 
crucial in shaping the search. First, equity has to jockey for position with other 
goals; I found evidence of multiple objectives. Second, in order to secure equity 
according to need policy-makers need to be able to identify and measure needs and
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work out the cost of satisfying them; these prove to be extremely tricky tasks. 
Third, and most crucially, the search for equity is shaped by the concept of equity 
itself its uncompromising complexity and the myriad confusions it generates.
Thus, explanations for the general pattern of policy diversity and policy volatility 
are found in the nature of the task at hand for policy-makers - the search for equity. 
In analysing and discussing these factors, the theoretical and empirical strands of 
this thesis are drawn together and become interwoven. That completes my 
research into the search for equity.
However, there has been another major part to this thesis which stems from the 
theoretical element of the research project. I claim that we need to adopt a new 
approach to the concept of equity. The crux of this claim is that we need to think 
in terms of equities, i.e. that multiple versions of the concept of equity are not only 
possible but can be and are used in research and policy-making. These theoretical 
issues and claims are reiterated in the final section of this chapter. That section 
also considers possible criticisms of my approach.
MULTIPLE OBJECTIVES
The achievement of equity is often treated - by analysts and policy-makers - as self- 
evidently the primary goal of many policies. One of the aims of this research was 
to study this ‘on the ground*. I sought to analyse whether equity peacefully co­
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exists or conflicts with other goals, i.e. whether manifestations of equity in practice 
are shaped by concerns other than those relating to equity. The amount of 
evidence which I can bring to bear on this issue is not large, however the news is 
not good for equity.
This research provides evidence that the achievement of equity is only one among 
many policy objectives for LEAs and may be overridden by rival goals. Indeed, the 
case study material identified a general and major adversary to equity: the goal of 
financial stability. It appears that LEAs were sensitive to the difficulties schools 
would face if their budgets fluctuated too greatly from year to year.
Events in case study authorities A and C illustrate this well. Authority A, for 
example, abandoned plans to allocate schools over £900 per child on free school 
meals (representing, in total, 12% of the ASB) when it became evident just how 
radical a redistribution of resources this would effect. The desire to achieve equity 
in resource allocation was overruled by an objective relating to minimum 
standards in school management. In this case, the minimum standard was defined 
in terms of the basic degree of financial and organisational stability required by 
schools to be able to operate and plan effectively. However, it is important to 
realise that stability concerns did not completely override those relating to equity; a 
balance between these rival objectives was sought. The balance meant that the 
LEA avoided the potentially extreme results that blind pursuit of either objective 
may have created. However, it also meant that a tension was built into policy 
which encouraged year-on-year, piecemeal change.
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This incremental change may have favoured equity in the long-run; the LEA would 
slowly be able to make progress in redistribution without causing too much 
instability in any one year. However, a further factor compounded equity’s fall 
from pre-eminence as a policy objective in authority A. The authority decided to 
prioritise the pursuit of specific pupil teacher ratios and resolved that the budget 
devoted to AEN factors would consist of whatever was left after enough funds had 
been devoted to the funding of the PTRs. The desire to achieve equity in resource 
allocation was thus overruled by an objective relating to minimum standards in 
service provision.
Another illustration of the multiple objectives point relates to the possible trade­
offs between complexity and transparency, and between simplicity and equity in 
procedures. Simple methods have the advantage of comprehensibility: councillors, 
teachers and parents can see why each school receives the funds it does. More 
complex methods, involving multiple indicators, thresholds, bands and weighting 
systems, may be seen as more equitable in the sense of being able to take more 
factors into account or being able to manipulate data more adeptly. However, 
more complex formulae may prove mysterious and confusing to interested parties, 
and even to those designing and operating them.
All this is not to deny that equity is an important goal to policy-makers. Indeed, 
some of the case study data shows just how great an effort some authorities put 
into pursuit of this goal. But these findings do reveal that equity has to take its
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chances with other goals in the cut and thrust of the policy process; equity is not 
always the omnipotent policy objective it is often taken to be. And this, in turn, 
begins a list of factors which help to us to interpret and understand this study’s 
empirical findings.
GETTING TO GRIPS WITH NEED
The second main set of issues / factors which defined and influenced the search for 
equity relate to the concept of need. To be able to find equity according to need 
policy-makers must be able to decide which needs should be taken into account, 
work out how to measure them, and decide what cash value to apply to need 
readings. But need proves to be a tricky concept to get hold of and work with, and 
the solutions policy-makers come up with are shaped by this.
Spot the need
First off, policy-makers were uncertain about what should count as needs. In many 
cases, the precise nature of need was left unclarified. But those that did confront 
the problem found it extremely hard to distinguish between different types of 
needs, in particular between special educational needs and needs arising due to 
social disadvantage. Were these the same, similar, or different needs? The answer 
varied from place to place; some LEAs only recognised special educational needs 
(for example, authority B), others only social disadvantage (for example, authority
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A), and many recognised both (either in one or two elements of their AEN 
allocation) (for example, authorities C and D).
It was also unclear whether the needs of ethnic minority children arose because of 
social disadvantage or were in some way separate, perhaps due to language 
difficulties. Again, LEA decisions varied and hence whilst some authorities took 
the former approach, others took the latter, and yet others did neither. In these 
and other similar ways, LEA practice diverged and the impressive variety of 
approaches found under LMS was spawned.
Measurement
Deciding which needs should be taken into account is one thing, but knowing how 
to measure them is quite another. Both the censuses and the case studies showed 
that virtually all LEAs relied on proxy indicators (notably free school meals data) 
to measure needs. But the relationship between these indicators and needs was 
rarely clear. Rather, in most cases indicators seem to have been chosen because of 
their easy availability and ubiquity, rather than because their efficacy as measures of 
need had been in any way proved.
Constraints of time, resources and expertise go a long way to explaining why 
policy-makers should find availability such a beguiling facet of certain data. The 
popularity of free meals data as an indicator of AEN provides the most obvious 
example of this. Free meals data is not only readily available to policy-makers, but 
is regularly updated, collected at the school level, notionally measures the same
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thing across schools (although there are take-up issues to consider), and incurs no 
extra costs of collection (since the LEA must collect it anyway). It is also an 
indicator of need which - although being by no means a self-evident measure of 
need - has a history of use as a measure of social disadvantage. Not only does the 
government employ free meals data as an indicator of AEN in the Standard 
Spending Assessment exercise, but some LEAs also used the data as a criterion in 
resource allocation prior to the introduction of LMS (e.g. the ILEA, authority B, 
authority C; see also Lee, 1989). Familiarity obviously breeds trust in the case of 
indicators of need.
In some LEAs, the repertory of available and familiar indicators extended beyond 
free meals data to all kinds of educational test scores, data from local authority 
planning department surveys, and census data. Authority D was particularly well 
provided for, since the ILEA had undertaken large surveys every two years to 
collect data for its Educational Priority Index. And as the study period progressed, 
results from the SATs were becoming available as a result of the implementation of 
National Curriculum testing arrangements. LEA allocation schemes thus came to 
reflect - in part - the size of the repertory of available data in different locales.
The cost of meeting need
Proxy indicators may be able to offer policy-makers a rough idea - quite literally, 
an indication - of where needs arise. They may even be able to inform policy­
makers about likely variations in the relative amount or degree of need from place 
to place. But proxy measures tell policy-makers nothing about what is needed to
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satisfy needs. This would seem to pose a problem for policy-makers who have to 
apply cash values to need indicator readings. However, in a sense the problem 
does not materialise. The evidence is that policy-makers can and do decide cash 
values for need readings without necessarily having any idea about Jthe nature and 
cost of need satisfiers. Hence authority A was able to alter the sum paid per 
measure of need (i.e. per free school meal) from over £900 in 1990-91 to under 
£400 in 1991-92. In some ways this is not surprising though. The processes by 
which inputs (extra funds to schools) are transformed into outputs (goods or 
services which form need satisfiers) and then final outcomes (improved educational 
performance by the intended beneficiaries) are still very poorly understood. This 
lack of understanding, of course, helps to explain the extraordinary disparity in the 
amounts of money allocated by LEAs to meet needs: for example, as noted in 
Chapter 7, the sum allocated varied from £10 to £383 in the case of those LEAs 
whose criterion of need was the number of children receiving free school meals. 
Given the lack of evidence about what payment is required to satisfy any given 
need, it is not surprising that LEA decisions vary so considerably and sometimes 
appear so arbitrary.
Need: a mixed blessing
Overall then, policy-makers face many problems and uncertainties in the business 
of identifying and measuring needs, and allocating resources to meet them. 
However, as will also be seen in relation to equity, the concept of need offers 
policy-makers a mixed blessing: opportunity rides pillion to uncertainty.
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In effect, policy-makers are issued with an invitation to experiment. They can 
attempt to address all kinds of different need factors in resource allocation. In 
assessing these needs, there is an impressive repertory of possible indicators to 
draw upon, and myriad methods of combining and manipulating data can be used. 
Not only that, but wildly varying cash values can be attached to need indicator or 
need index readings. Governing these choices there are apparently relatively few 
hard and fast rules; the rules which were supposed to apply to formula 
construction1 were on the whole not enforced or proved unenforceable. There is 
thus colossal scope for policy diversity.
In this way, policy-making and policy solutions are shaped by the uncertainties and 
problems associated with the concept of need on the one hand, and the lee-way 
granted by the concept on the other. As stated above, the concept of need offers 
policy-makers nothing if not a mixed blessing.
EQUITY: COMPLEX, CONFUSING, YET ACCOMMODATING
Even if equity were the sole or the ultimate policy goal, and even if need were a 
transparent and unchallenging concept, it is clear that policy-makers’ lives would 
be far from easy. Equity offers such a heady mix of complexities, confusions and 
possibilities.
These rules were that Special Educational Needs should be taken into account, that 
simple methods be used to measure needs, and that objective methods be used to measure 
needs (i.e. no professional discretion).
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In the search for equity in resource allocation, clarity over the meaning of the 
concept would be an indispensable aid. Policy-makers need to know what they 
want and how to get it, i.e. what sort of distribution of funds needs to be achieved, 
and how that distribution can be secured. How do they find these things out? 
From the literature policy-makers could obtain a degree of guidance: the core 
demands of equity are ‘treat equals equally and unequals unequally*, and ‘to each X  
according to its T . This offers them some very general advice about both 
outcomes and procedures. But in the translation of these vague prescriptions into 
the detail of policy, policy-makers are pretty much left to their own devices. And 
in that process, they confront the full complexity of the concept of equity, and 
experience both the chronic uncertainties and the broad possibilities associated with 
it.
This research identifies four key issues about equity which impact upon policy­
making and shape policy-outcomes: specification; outcomes; links between means 
and ends; and scope for variety.
Specification
To operationalise equity, there are three essential ingredients; a focal unit, a focal 
variable and an input-outcome relationship are required. But which should be 
chosen? When picking a focal unit, should the aim be equity between individual 
pupils, schools or geographical areas? Each is a viable choice, and there is no rule 
to follow. However, each approach is likely to result in a different distribution of
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resources. In relation to the focal variable, which type(s) of need should be taken 
into account? Again, there are choices. Earlier chapters illustrated the many 
different options available under the blanket heading ‘additional educational needs*. 
Lastly, an input-outcome relationship must be selected. Just how differently should 
unequals be treated? Is it only a linear relationship between rising need and rising 
resources which denotes equity, or should some other form of input-outcome 
relationship be used (e.g. a series of steps)? There is no general rule to follow here 
either.
Policy-makers are very much left to their own devices in the process of 
specification; it is up to them to decide how to add detail to the vague prescriptions 
which equity provides. Presumably this is not such a dire predicament though. 
Presumably, their choice of unit, variable and input-outcome relationship is 
informed by an image of what it is they wish to achieve. But do policy-makers 
always know what it is that they are trying to achieve? This leads us to the second 
issue - outcomes.
Outcomes, equity and inequity
A clear and detailed picture of the pattern of desired outcomes (in terms of cash 
amounts to schools) would presumably be extremely useful to policy-makers. It 
would provide a crucial reference point in the process of deciding need 
measurement and allocation methods. It would enable policy-makers to judge how 
closely the allocations they are able to achieve in practice match the ideal they are 
aiming for.
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But how can a detailed picture of desired outcomes be derived? The concept of 
equity itself does not deliver such a vision, ready-made. Furthermore, and 
interestingly, the case studies reveal a dearth among practitioners. It appeared that 
the search for equity went on with, at best, a fairly blurred picture to go by and, 
more often than not, no picture at all.
At the outset, it seems more than a little odd to hope to achieve something without 
knowing what is that you hope to achieve. It is as if policy-makers hope to 
stumble across equity, or expect it to somehow reveal itself to them. The latter 
was certainly the case in authority D where there was an assumption that survey 
data, if collected in sufficient quantity, would somehow decide the detail of a need 
index, and the need index would in turn deliver equitable outcomes.
But the situation is perhaps not as ludicrous as it may appear. First, in many ways 
it is not so surprising that authorities were unclear about what pattern of financial 
outcomes would denote equity. It is a very complex policy-problem that they face, 
with hundreds of schools and thousands of pupils to consider, and a set sum to 
ration out between them.
Moreover, second, it appears that policy-makers can make progress towards equity 
without knowing exactly what it will finally look like. This is possible because 
although they have trouble envisaging the outcomes they want to achieve, policy­
makers are fairly confident in their ability to spot cases of inequity when they see
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them. This seems to be due to differences in the amount of information needed in 
each case. To be able to make a claim of equity, policy-makers need to know full 
details about all eligible units, both in terms of their needs and the amounts 
allocated to them. A case of inequity, on the other hand, can be spotted after 
considering only two cases. All that is required is evidence of two units which 
either [a] have equal need but receive unequal resource shares, or [b] have unequal 
needs but receive equal resource shares.
The relative transparency of inequity and the relative obscurity of equity are factors 
which may encourage a reactive mode of policy-making characterised by 
experimentation and marginal adjustment. The visibility of inequities highlights the 
inadequacies of policy and leaves it prone to criticism, and the obscurity of equity 
means that it is hard for policy-makers to know how else to act but to try and 
eliminate inequities as and when they come to light.
Ends and means
It may be that policy-makers adopt a reactive mode because the nature of outcome 
equity (in terms of cash budgets) remains obscure; hence what they do is strive to 
eradicate inequities. But could they not secure outcome equity by means of 
establishing equitable procedures? Common sense seems to dictate that procedural 
equity and outcome equity are inherently linked: that equitable procedures 
inherently yield equitable outcomes, and that equitable outcomes are only delivered 
by equitable procedures. But how do procedures and outcomes interrelate, and is 
common sense vindicated by real events?
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Case study evidence shows that procedures deemed equitable can produce 
outcomes which are not deemed equitable. For example, in authority B (see 
Chapter 10) great care and effort went into the development of the Special 
Educational Needs Audit process and the organisation of a stringent, multi-stage 
moderation process to ensure equity. Policy-makers strove to ensure the process 
was equitable, i.e. that it ensured consistency in the assessment of pupils with 
similar needs across schools, and took full account of differences in pupils' needs. 
But it transpired that the audit was not perceived to treat the most needy schools 
fairly. The cumulative needs of schools with high concentrations of pupils with 
special needs did not seem to be taken into account by the individualistic 
procedures of the audit, and hence a system of extra supplements were introduced 
to compensate the most needy.
The potential for disjunction between chosen procedures and desired outcomes 
seems far greater in the case of authorities relying on proxy indicator data. LEAs 
such as the case study authorities C and D - which believed they could develop 
suitable composite indices of need without having a clear vision of desired 
outcomes as a reference point - are really engaged in an act of faith. They appear 
to know little about what it is that indicator data does and does not indicate, at any 
one time, or over time. Thus when indicator readings fluctuate over time, they are 
left uncertain whether or not this reflects genuine changes in underlying needs.
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Not surprisingly, policy-makers appear to find it hard to establish equitable 
procedures in the abstract without regard to outcomes. And given that they have 
trouble clarifying the outcomes they seek (as noted above), this is perhaps why so 
many changes are evident in the census data. Policy-makers appear to rather 
routinely tinker with their procedures, or suddenly adopt radically different 
procedures; it is often a process which is solutions-led.
These problems relating to specification, outcomes, and means and ends, are thus 
potentially great problems for policy-makers. They alone go a long way towards 
explaining the LEA behaviour discovered by the censuses and case studies. 
However, it is also important to see the opportunities generated by equity’s 
imprecision, i.e. that great scope for policy variety is an inherent feature of the 
search for equity.
Equity: another mixed blessing
Many problems and anxieties faced by policy-makers in operationalising equity 
have been discussed above. However, the order to achieve equity is nothing if not 
a mixed blessing.
The down side is represented by the myriad confusions and uncertainties generated 
by the concept, the general difficulty policy-makers encounter in knowing what 
equity looks like, and the practical problems they experience in trying to bring 
equity to life.
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The up side is that the imprecision of the core demands of equity enables policy­
makers to pursue all sorts of diverse approaches (within limits) and still legitimately 
claim them as equitable. Within the broad parameters that equity imposes, it really 
is a case o f ‘anything goes’- Policy-makers may be wracked by uncertainty, but at 
the end of the day all sorts of permutations of focal units, focal variables and input- 
outcome relationships can count as legitimate versions of equity. These versions 
may embody very different intentions. They may well yield very different 
distributions of resources. To their creators they may be a source of pride and joy 
or, conversely, embarrassment and regret. And recipients may judge them fair or 
foul. But they still conform to the basic demands of equity; they stand as fully- 
fledged equities.
THE SEARCH FOR EQUITY
Thus I have argued that to be able to make sense of the findings of the censuses 
and the case studies, it is necessary to understand the policy problem faced by 
LEAs. In particular, I have highlighted three main sets of issues. The existence of 
multiple objectives is a factor shaping versions of equity, and which also seems to 
encourage continual, gradual evolution of policy. Then there are issues relating to 
the multiple uncertainties and opportunities generated by equity itself, but also its 
conceptual sidekick, need. Both concepts have schizophrenic qualities, posing 
serious challenges to the abilities of policy-makers and yet offering great scope in 
their interpretation. Overall, in the search for equity policy-making seems to be
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solutions-led, much shaped by practical constraints of time, resources, knowledge 
and, in particular, availability of data. These issues and factors help to explain the 
main features of my empirical data: policy diversity and policy-churning.
EQUITY REVISITED
Thus we have glimpsed something of the enormity, complexity and difficulty of a 
task routinely set for policy-makers: to search for equity in resource allocation. I 
now return to the very concept of equity to hammer home my main theoretical 
assertions and critically examine the concept in the light of this study's findings.
The starting point
My starting position is that if one seeks understanding about equity it is 
extraordinarily unhelpful to study the term’s colloquial usage in the literature {i.e. 
how it is used and referred to by academics and policy-makers). Two problems are 
encountered. First, the precise meaning of equity is only very rarely stated in 
explicit terms. This would not be such a problem if equity could only mean one 
thing. However, second, a multitude of diverse meanings of ‘equity' can be 
witnessed or inferred.
Given these problems with the literature, I felt it necessary to go back to and then 
work out from first principles: ‘treat equals equally, and unequals unequally’, and 
‘to each X  according to its Y . After analysing these core demands and examining
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what they do and do not specify, I argued that equity means very little indeed until 
detail is added to these propositions. A focal unit, a focal variable and input- 
outcome relationship must be specified. These are the three essential ingredients 
required to give equity meaning. Moreover, I argue that it is the interplay between 
these ingredients that determines what equity means, in practice, in any particular 
case.
Equities
In identifying these essential ingredients, I have provided a conceptual framework 
by which to make sense of the multifarious forms which equity seems to take in 
research and practice, i.e. a method of mapping different versions of equity - 
equities - according to their key features.
I feel there are three main factors in favour of my approach which explicitly takes 
account of differences between equities.
The first reason is straightforward - it is necessary to acknowledge differences 
between equities because they exist. Others have, of course, noticed this also. 
However, previous attempts to distinguish between forms of equity (for example 
the work of Mooney, cited in chapter 4) are inadequate. Such typologies simply 
cannot cope with the diversity of versions of equity which are possible in research 
and practice. This is because they are not derived from an analysis of the concept, 
but rather result from a partial review of its colloquial usage or, more simply, the 
preferences and idiosyncrasies of the researcher. Rae (1981) makes a similar point
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about attempts to classify forms of equality. He also points out that his aim is not 
to single out any particular author for criticism, but to ‘point out the necessary 
futility of the genre1 (ibid, p. 144). The same is true here.
The second reason is that differences between equities do not arise by magic. They 
result from policy-makers or researchers making different choices (about units, 
variables and input-outcome relationships) in the operationalisation of equity.
Third, there is the distributional reason for highlighting differences between 
equities. Although they derive their form from a common root, and may be 
superficially labelled or thought of in similar terms, different versions of equity will 
tend to vary (to a greater or lesser extent) in their distributional impact. It is 
widely accepted that equity according to desert and equity according to need will 
tend to reward the same individuals in very different ways. However it is also 
important to acknowledge that so may equity according to need Y and equity 
according to need Z. Moreover, even if the focal variable is held constant, 
differences in focal units or input-outcome relationships may also affect the 
distributional impact of different equities.
Given that different equities exist, may reflect varied intentions, and may produce 
dissimilar distributions of resources, in what way is it helpful to fail to distinguish 
between them?
The notion of equities - help or hindrance?
Of course, some will argue that ‘equities ’ is an unhelpful term. It will be said that 
what I call equities are not different versions of equity, but rather different ways of 
achieving the very same thing, namely equity, but in different contexts.
Presumably then, the argument is that to secure equity it is necessary to measure 
needs using free school meals numbers in one locality, whilst in another area it is 
only by using educational test scores or a multiple factor need index that equity will 
result. Presumably the argument is that whilst £10 is enough to satisfy one unit of 
need in some places, in others nearly £400 is required to satisfy that same unit of 
need. This line of argument, I feel, has little to commend it. Indeed, it contains 
what I see as two important flaws.
First, it implies that there is one thing called ‘equity* which exists in a single, 
ultimate, objective form. Many researchers write as true believers in this, but I 
remain devoutly agnostic on this issue. The demands of equity are imprecise, and 
real resource allocation typically takes place in extremely complex contexts. With 
hundreds of schools (of all types, sizes, pupil catchments, facilities, staff) and 
thousands of pupils (of all types of abilities, needs, demands) to consider and a set 
sum to allocate between them, who is to say exactly what amount per school or 
pupil constitutes absolute equity? Only a fool would argue that the distribution of 
resources they advocate is utterly perfect; that they have found the Holy Grail of 
social policy.
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Second, the ‘anti-equities’ argument is not supported by my empirical evidence. In 
fact, my research undermines it in two main ways. Evidence presented in Chapter 
72 shows up distinctions in the intentions of authorities. Clearly they were not 
taking alternative routes to the same ultimate objective, but heading off in different 
directions in search of diverse destinations. Also, the ‘anti-equities* argument 
seems to presuppose rationalism in policy-making: that the detail of LEA formulae 
reflects a full and informed analysis of goals, context and methods. As discussed 
earlier in this chapter, my research serves to confound rather than confirm that 
view.
In these ways, I defend my approach against one type of possible criticism. I 
maintain that we fail to recognise and acknowledge distinctions between equities at 
our peril: different equities provide us with radically different tools for research, or 
goals for policy-making.
The mystery of the missing moral dimension
All this is well and good, but there is another feature of my approach that may raise 
the hackles of others. I have not taken equity to be an intrinsically moral concept 
(other than in terms of it demanding consistency, which is to some extent a moral 
demand). Hence, in offering a method of mapping equities I have made no attempt 
to devise some sort of a ‘moral filter’ to decide which types of variables, units or 
input-outcome relationships can and cannot be incorporated into versions of 
equity.
2 See the sub-section entitled ‘Which needs?’.
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This of course leads to interesting and controversial possibilities. For example, 
skin colour, gender, sexual orientation, intelligence, social status, etc. all remain as 
viable focal variables for versions of equity. Oven this, it becomes possible for an 
anathema such as apartheid to be classed as equitable3, a prospect that for many 
will appear as ridiculous as it is distasteful. Surely then, I have created a 
framework which is fundamentally flawed? I do not think so, and have three 
reactions to the charge.
First, I can opt for something of a cop-out. All the equities studied in the 
fieldwork element of this research project have been versions of equity according 
to need. I would not think there is likely to be much dispute over the moral 
dimension of these equities, and therefore it was not strictly necessary to confront 
wider issues of morality. My method of mapping different equities thus served the 
purposes of this specific piece of research.
Second, I could say that whilst I do think my approach has much to commend it, I 
do not see it as providing a flawless tool. Perhaps the work I have begun could be 
continued and built upon, so as to incorporate a moral filter to distinguish between 
what can and cannot count as a version of equity. The gulf between my way of 
viewing equity and that of equity traditionalists could thus be bridged.
i.e. the focal variable is racial background, and the input-outcome relationship is such 
that whites receive most, blacks least, with ‘coloureds’ and Asians in the middle.
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Third, however, I can reply with my own question: Is the missing moral dimension 
really a problem of my approach or a problem of the concept of equity itself? I opt 
for the latter - if the gulf between my work and that of traditionalists is to be 
bridged, it will have to be bridged by others. My contention is that the morality of 
certain equities depends solely on the specific units, variables and input-outcome 
relationships which are employed, not from the root of the concept of equity. The 
meeting of need, the enhancement of well-being, or other such admirable demands 
are only found in certain versions of equity - certain equities. At the root, from 
which our understanding of the concept must grow if we are to make sense of the 
bewildering diversity of manifestations of equity in research and practice, we find 
only demands for consistency and proportionality in treatment, nothing more 
specific. Indeed, the root of the concept does not even specify the form that 
proportionality of treatment should take. Strictly speaking, an inverse relationship 
between need and resources fits the demands too.
Therefore the ‘morality problem* lies not so much in the way I have approached 
the study of equity, but in the disjunction between popular assumption and the 
findings of academic inquiry.
Equity - a ‘full* or ‘empty* concent?
Where does all this leave the concept of equity? It certainly seems that once we 
depart from the core of the concept equity can mean many different things. 
Bearing this in mind, two contrasting types of conclusion seem possible: the ‘full’ 
and the ‘empty’ options. The former concludes that equity is a concept bursting
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with meaning because equities can take so many different forms; equity is therefore 
‘full’ because it can mean so many different things. The latter concludes that 
equity is virtually devoid of meaning precisely because it proves such a malleable 
concept; equity is ‘empty* because it can mean so many different things.
Interestingly, both Rae (1981) and Sen (1992) came to the same fork in the road in 
their studies of the concept of equality. Both opted for the ‘full* thesis on equality, 
arguing that just because the concept can exist in numerous different versions does 
not mean that it is meaningless. However my judgement on equity is less 
straightforward.
What neither Sen nor Rae do is to distinguish between root and branch - in their 
case, between equality and equalities. Their argument that equality is deeply 
meaningful seems to rest on the fact that certain equalities can carry substantial 
and substantive meaning (to borrow Sen’s phrase). But the problem with this line 
of argument is shown up extremely well by equity. Yes, specific equities can 
clearly carry substantial and substantive meaning. But that does not mean that 
equity is itself a deeply meaningful concept. Indeed, the meaning of equity - with 
no further detail added - whilst not insignificant, is minimal: it demands no more 
than consistency and proportionality of treatment. Crucially, the raw concept of 
equity does not specify between whom or what consistency should be sought, 
according to which criteria or characteristics consistency should be judged, or how 
resources should be linked to differences in those characteristics.
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Given this and the sheer number of different equities which are possible, and taking 
into account the ability of equities to oppose each other in terms of intent and 
distributional impact, I think the value of imposing ‘equity’, or even ‘equity 
according to need’ as a goal of allocation is severely limited.
Demanding ‘equity’ is a bit like asking for ‘an animal'. If your demand for an 
animal is met, you will know that what you get will have certain characteristics, 
namely [a] it will be a living organism and [b] it will not be a plant. But who 
knows what the animal will look like and how it will behave - you might get 
anything from an amoeba to a blue whale, a trout or a toucan, a gecko or a gorilla.
Setting a goal of equity according to need obviously reduces the pool of 
possibilities, but it still leaves a tremendous number and variety of possibilities. To 
continue my metaphor, ‘equity according to need’ is to ‘equity’, as ‘mammal’ is to 
‘animal’. The range of possibilities remains impressive; included among mammals 
are dogs and dolphins, horses and humans.
Thus I would argue that if government and others who set policy goals are serious 
in their intent to direct policy in a certain way, they really need to be far more 
precise in their demands. Moreover, they and many others need to question 
whether equity really is such a worthy social goal, given that it can take so many 
different forms. There are many equities under whose banner I would refuse to 
march; people need to be far more specific and discerning in their faith in equity.
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If equity is to survive as a meaningful concept in the social policy pantheon, it 
needs to be far better understood.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has clarified and discussed the empirical and theoretical findings of 
this research. Three main issues / factors crucial in shaping the search for equity 
were discussed: problems of balancing equity with other policy goals; uncertainties 
and opportunities associated with need, its identification, measurement and 
satisfaction; and the complexities and confusions generated by the concept of 
equity itself. Then, the approach I have taken in this study of equity - which hinges 
on the notion of equities - was summarised, defended and its implications analysed.




CONCLUSIONS AND AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
INTRODUCTION
This final chapter is divided into three main sections. The first provides a brief final 
summary of my thesis which has analysed the search for, and the nature of, equity. 
The second section offers my overall conclusions on the thesis, its contribution to 
knowledge and also its limitations. Finally, I offer suggestions for future research.
SUMMARY
This study has analysed local education authorities and their search for equity in 
resource allocation. Equity is not a notion that translates directly into policy; it 
requires interpretation and operationalisation. Therefore, my empirical research 
was governed by aims to discover what equity looks like when made manifest in 
policy; whether it takes one or a variety of different forms in practice; and the 
nature of the factors that play a part in shaping manifestations of equity.
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In search of answers to these questions, I undertook three national censuses of 
LEAs in England, achieving good response rates on each occasion. These showed 
up great variety in LEA formulae, and also a high degree of flux over the study 
period. The factors influential in shaping LEA policy were meanwhile examined 
via four case studies of individual authorities. Overall, I argued that there were 
three main features of the policy problem faced by LEAs which help to explain why 
diversity and change were the key features of my census data. These three main 
features were: the existence of multiple and often competing policy objectives; the 
uncertainties and opportunities associated with the concept of need; and also 
problems and opportunities associated with the concept of equity itself.
This thesis provided both an empirical and a theoretical study of equity. On the 
theoretical side, I wanted to develop the notion of equities - different versions of 
the concept - following the lead of Rae in his seminal study of equality / equalities. 
In explaining how equities are created, I highlighted the three ingredients which are 
essential in operationalising equity in the context of resource allocation - I called 
them the focal unit, focal variable, and input-outcome relationship. This unit / 
variable / relationship approach provides, I argue, a means of mapping different 
versions of equity which is rooted in conceptual analysis rather than equity’s 
colloquial usage.
Indeed, I argued that colloquial usage of equity provides little if any help to those 
wishing to, or needing to, understand the concept. I have asserted that goals of 
‘equity* or ‘equity according to need’ are less meaningful than many seem to
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assume; such goals would seem to direct policy in a way which is more symbolic 
than real. I urge that advocates of equity pay greater attention to what it is that 
they are really advocating.
CONCLUSIONS
In offering conclusions to my thesis, I have two main tasks. The first is to 
acknowledge and discuss the limitations of my work. The second task is to 
consider the contribution to academic knowledge which I have made.
Limitations
Above and below, I make claims as to the merits of my thesis. This is not to say 
that my work is not without its limitations. However, in some cases I do find it 
hard to distinguish between the limitations of this current work and my suggestions 
for future research, for the two seem closely linked.
In the empirical element of my thesis, I have studied equity as it relates to financial 
allocation in education. That was the purpose. But it is not at all clear whether my 
work has any broader relevance. I feel that it does - there seems little to suggest 
that the factors I have identified as those impinging on the search for equity are not 
fairly generally experienced by policy-makers in other similar financial rationing 
contexts. However, my research does nothing to vindicate that assumption.
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Strictly speaking, my findings concerning the search for equity do not hold 
currency outside of the arena of LMS and formula funding.
Indeed, it could be argued that my findings are of even more limited value, due to 
my reliance on the explanatory power of case study research. The authorities were 
not chosen with the intention of establishing a representative sample of authorities 
to study. Therefore, strictly speaking my case studies provide, at best, a valuable 
insight into what went on in the individual authorities concerned, but reveal 
nothing about the search for equity in other LEAs across the country. They also 
cannot explain exactly why particular authorities (other than the case studies 
themselves) acted in the way that they did. I acknowledge this line of argument, 
though think it yields an unduly harsh judgement. My aim was to understand the 
policy problem facing authorities and the main factors influencing the search for 
equity, not provide explanations of every decision made across England.
The census research must also be mentioned. It has already been noted - in 
Chapters 6 and 7 - that the data derived from the first census is of more dubious 
validity than that derived from the two later censuses. I have treated the findings 
of the first census - which took place in late 1989 - as worthy of analysis since they 
represent what authorities publicly stated they were planning to do. However it 
may well be that authorities subsequently changed their plans prior to the initial 
implementation of LMS in April 1990. Therefore, it may be that my data shows up 
a higher degree of change than actually occurred.
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In terms of the theoretical / conceptual element of my thesis, I must also note 
limitations. The way I analyse and understand the concept of equity is very much 
dictated by and linked to my interest in resource allocation. But equity is a concept 
with wider applications. Therefore, although I have made some rather broad 
claims as to the merits of my way of understanding and working with the concept 
and its offshoot versions (the unit / variable / relationship approach), it is not at all 
clear to me - at this stage of my examination of equity - whether my approach and 
work has much to offer those analysing issues other than financial rationing 
processes. I return to this issue below.
Moreover, many will find my work severely limited - if not totally unacceptable to 
them - because I have dared to strip the root concept of equity of a moral 
dimension. As noted in the previous chapter however, I do not see this as a 
problem of my work, more a problem of equity’s own making and a confusion 
arising from a mismatch between common assumption about equity and what is 
revealed by academic analysis of the concept.
Contribution
Now this thesis is completed, it is time to make claims as to its contribution to 
social policy analysis. There are three main ways in which I believe my thesis has 
added to, or called for changes to, the existing body of knowledge.
First, I have studied equity in a fresh way by means of analysing how equity is 
interpreted in practice by policy-makers and identifying the factors - problems and
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possibilities - that influence this process and its results. This has a number of 
advantages. Usually, the researcher imposes his / her own interpretation of equity 
as an ideal against which practice and outcomes are compared. Such traditional 
analysis reveals remarkably little; not least, it ignores the fact that many different 
interpretations and operationalisations of equity are possible - researchers may be 
comparing chalk and cheese. Moreover, the traditional approach shows an 
unwelcome degree of arrogance: it announces that academics can decide the 
‘ought* (what policy-makers should do) without bothering to understand the ‘is* 
(why it is that policy-makers do what they do).
Second, I have coined and justified the use of the term equities. I have shown how 
important and useful it is to adopt an approach which acknowledges the existence 
of different versions of equity. Moreover, I have provided a means of 
understanding how equities differ. This method hinges upon the identification of 
three components, which I have called the focal unit, the focal variable (this term 
coined by Sen), and the input-outcome relationship.
Finally, I have renovated the concept of equity. ‘Equity* stands for no more than 
consistency and proportionality of treatment. It is only versions of equity - equities 
- that contain deeper meaning and more substantive demands. Moreover, I have 
exposed the range of different meanings that equities can take. In so doing I have 
undermined the popular assumption that equity is inherently associated with 
welfare; in showing how an apartheid regime could in theory count as an 
expression of equity, I showed a possible association between equities and
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diswelfare. This will do nothing if not sting others to react, and in so doing they 
will provide further evidence of my work’s contribution to knowledge and debate.
FUTURE RESEARCH
In all research, a degree of selectivity and prioritising is called for. Thus, in the 
preceding pages of this thesis I have sometimes asked questions and pointed to 
gaps in the literature, without necessarily offering answers or plugs. Moreover, 
sometimes the process of finding out more reveals how little we as yet know. In 
this final section, I offer a range of suggestions for possible future research and flag 
the main issues which, I feel, crave the attentions of social policy analysts.
First, there are many other contexts in which it would be worth exploring the 
search for equity, following the kind of approach I adopted in this thesis. My own 
work would be complemented by similar studies in other service areas where 
financial rationing by formula occurs, and also by comparing the allocation policy 
process at different levels in the administrative hierarchy. For example, central 
government allocates resources to local authorities in the Standard Spending 
Assessment / Revenue Support Grant process; local authorities allocate budgets to 
schools via formula funding; and schools allocate these resources to provide an 
educational service. What are the versions of equity in operation at each stage, and 
are the factors influencing procedures and outcomes similar or different?
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Second, there is much relevant work to be done in analysing key concepts and their 
translation into policy. Still retaining the type of approach I have pursued in my 
thesis, we could change the concept and the laboratory, with potentially very 
fruitful results. Do other concepts take numerous forms in policy and practice, as 
equity does? For example, until it was abolished, the Unit Fines policy in the 
Magistrates Courts offered a laboratory in which to examine how ‘justice’ was 
interpreted and translated in practice by different groups of policy-makers 
(different Benches) across the country. It is fascinating to ask: Do concepts mean 
the same, and translate into policy in similar ways, across service or even national 
boundaries?
The most important and stimulating topics for future research relate to the concept 
of need. In particular, there is much work to be done analysing issues of need 
satisfaction, need aggregation, and the interplay between the two. We clearly need 
to know much more about how to satisfy needs - it does seem quite bizarre that 
millions of pounds of public money can be allocated without allocators holding 
much of an idea what that money should be or could be used for. Research might 
also be directed to the further study of indicators and their use in resource 
distribution. Moreover, it seems worth exploring whether need could be better 
measured in terms of indicators of the amount of need satisfier that is needed, 
rather than indicators of underlying conditions (which do not necessarily tell us 
anything about need satisfiers). Finally, in Chapter 3 I asked *... are all needs 
reducible to individual requirements? Can a unit of need satisfaction only satisfy 
one person’s need at once? Is the need of a group of individuals the same as the
sum of those individuals* individual needs?’. Without answers to these questions, 
resource allocation according to need will remain, at best, a process characterised 
by acts of faith. At worst, it will remain characterised by the kind of shenanigans 
which Blalock (see Chapter 5) warned us of, whereby ‘need’ serves as a 
legitimating front behind which policy-makers can pursue virtually whatever type 
of allocation they wish. Given the sums of public money involved and the scarcity 
of those resources compared to the limitless legitimate demands which exist, there 
is an urgent need to direct research towards these issues.
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